Understanding the nuclear energy debate in Turkey : internal and external contexts by Udum, Şebnem
 
 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE IN TURKEY:  
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Ph.D. Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
by 
ŞEBNEM UDUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of  
International Relations 
Bilkent University 
Ankara 
June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To My Sister 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE IN TURKEY:  
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXTS 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
ŞEBNEM UDUM 
 
 
In Partial Fulfilment of  the Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
               Supervisor 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         Prof. Dr. Haluk Utku 
         Examining Committee Member 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
          Examining Committee Member 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
          Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Nedim Karakayalı 
          Examining Committee Member 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel 
              Director 
 
  
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE IN TURKEY:  
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXTS 
 
Udum, Şebnem 
Ph. D., Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
June 2010 
 
 
Nuclear energy generation in Turkey has sparked debates on its relevance and 
necessity for energy security policy. As a developing country, Turkey chose nuclear 
energy to address both to sustainability and development needs. The decision is 
challenged on the basis of “threats” to life, environment and security. The arguments 
and prescriptions of the contending sides render two meanings for nuclear energy: 
“asset” and “threat.” This dissertation looks into the construction of these two 
meanings that prescribe nuclear energy either as the appropriate policy choice or an 
imminent threat to human life and environment. The respective arguments are shaped 
by the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation, environmentalism and anti-
nuclearism. This study analyzes the contending discourses in order to find how the 
opposing meanings of nuclear energy are produced and sustained. It finds that the 
former meaning and policy prescription is formed with reference to the Realist 
conception of state power and security. It is Critical Theory, Marxism and Green 
Political Theory which account for the second meaning of nuclear energy. The 
“conflict” is not only at the practical but also at the theoretical level. The dissertation 
argues that this conflict can be addressed through a critical engagement of the parties 
concerned. It seeks to find common grounds on which the parties can talk. The 
analysis of the discourses reveals these common grounds where the two sides can 
find points of reconciliation and formulate a sound energy security policy. 
 
Key words: Turkey, nuclear energy, energy security, environmentalism 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ NÜKLEER ENERJİ TARTIŞMASINI ANLAMAK:  
İÇ VE DIŞ KOŞULLAR 
 
Udum, Şebnem 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
Haziran 2010 
 
Türkiye’de nükleer enerji üretme projeleri enerji güvenliği politikası için gerekliliği 
ve uygunluğu açısından tartışma yaratmıştır. Gelişmekte olan bir ülke olarak, 
Türkiye nükleer enerjiyi hem sürdürülebilirlik hem de kalkınma hedefleri için 
seçmiştir. Bu karara yaşam, çevre ve güvenliğe “tehdit” oluşturduğu gerekçeleriyle 
karşı çıkılmıştır. İki tarafın argümanları ve önerileri nükleer enerjiye iki farklı anlam 
yüklemektedir: “Değer” ve “tehdit.” Bu tez nükleer enerjiyi ya uygun bir siyaset 
seçimi ya da insan hayatına ve çevreye ciddi bir tehdit olarak sunan bu iki anlamın 
inşa edilmesine bakmaktadır. Tarafların tezleri uluslararası nükleer silahların 
yayılmasının önlenmesi, çevrecilik ve nükleer karşıtlığı normlarıyla şekillenmiştir. 
Bu çalışma nükleer enerjinin zıt anlamlarının nasıl üretildiğini ve sürdürüldüğünü 
bulmak için karşıt söylemleri analiz etmektedir. Birinci anlam ve siyaset önerisi 
Realizmin öngördüğü devlet gücü ve güvenliği çerçevesinde oluşturulmuştur. 
Eleştirel Teori, Marksizm ve Yeşil Siyaset Teorileri de ikinci anlamın nasıl 
oluşturulduğunu açıklamaktadır. Bu “çatışma” sadece pratikte değil aynı zamanda 
teorik düzlemde de bulunmaktadır. Bu tez, tarafların bir araya gelerek tezlerini 
tartışmalarıyla çatışmanın çözülebileceğini savunmaktadır. Bu anlamda çatışan 
tarafların konuşabileceği ortak düzlemlerin bulunmasını önermektedir. Söylemlerin 
analizi iki tarafın uzlaşma noktaları bulabileceği ve sağlam bir enerji güvenliği 
siyaseti oluşturabileceği ortak düzlemleri açığa çıkarmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, nükleer enerji, enerji güvenliği, çevrecilik.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Nuclear power1 projects, unlike other energy projects, involve an 
international security dimension and are related to a country’s international relations. 
Nuclear technology has critical components which can be used for civilian and 
military purposes. Peaceful nuclear power is inextricably linked to the norms of 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime: States party to the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states have the right 
to pursue peaceful nuclear power and they commit not to divert this technology to 
military use.  
Turkey sought to generate nuclear energy since the 1960s, but it could not 
materialize its plans for four decades. The energy estimates and increasing 
dependency on natural gas in 1990s and particularly in the 2000s brought nuclear 
energy back on the agenda as part of energy security policy. The first steps to 
generate nuclear energy were taken in the 1950s, and Ankara re-tabled the plans after 
                                               
1 “Nuclear power” is used interchangeably with “nuclear energy” where it is appropriate. Throughout 
this study, “nuclear power” or “peaceful nuclear power” refers to “nuclear energy.” When it concerns 
nuclear weapons, the  Term, itself, “nuclear capability” or “nuclear option” could be used. Only in the 
usage “country X is a nuclear power,” would refer to “weapons capability.” 
2 
 
successive failures in 1970s, 1980s and 2000. They were halted mainly due to 
financial problems, unfavorable political developments or insufficient legislation. 
There were proliferation concerns during the 1980s and 2000s, and public dissent 
was not negligible in the 1990s. Since 1992, when Greenpeace visited Turkey for the 
first time, Ankara’s decisions to pursue nuclear energy stimulated public debates on 
its relevance for Turkey’s energy needs.  
Nuclear power generation is not just a technical or economic issue, but has 
become a political issue as a result of international environmentalist and anti-nuclear 
movements which protest nuclear weapons and nuclear industry, because of the fear 
from radiation and proliferation risk. International and domestic groups also 
protested Turkey’s decisions to utilize nuclear energy on the grounds that it was 
dangerous for the environment and human life. 
The opponents argue that nuclear power plants are dangerous for humans and 
the environment, and disadvantageous for the economy. Environmentalist and anti-
nuclear groups could muster support from not only local peoples, chambers, unions 
and political parties, but also regional countries. They formed public opinion through 
protest campaigns, and platforms where they shared and disseminated information 
against nuclear energy. They also tried to dissuade providing companies, their 
governments and publics against nuclear energy projects.  
The Turkish government is determined to carry on with the project which 
intensifies the conflict between the two positions. The arguments of the government 
and the supporters of nuclear energy are based on the necessity for a type of energy 
that would ensure diversification, produce sufficient amounts of energy for the 
country’s needs and observe environmental sustainability. Considering the 
“pressing” energy needs of the country and to reduce dependency on other resources, 
3 
 
the government singled out nuclear energy as the best choice, and put forward that it 
is a necessity for economic growth, development and scientific progress. 
The competing arguments of each side assign nuclear energy two meanings in 
opposition that challenges policymaking. Each side is resourceful to convince the 
uninformed audience that nuclear energy is an “asset” or a “threat,” because they tell 
a narrative that construct the “reality” of nuclear power. The dissertation aims at 
answering the following questions: 
 How is it possible that nuclear energy could have two meanings in conflict?   
The accompanying research questions are:  
How were subjects, objects and meanings constructed to make possible for 
Ankara to take the decision? 
How does the opposition construct subjects, objects and meaning to make it 
possible that nuclear power is not the rational policy choice? 
The competing discourses reflect the conflict between two groups, and the 
dissertation also seeks to answer:  
What are the common grounds to mitigate the conflict and produce a 
sustainable decision for energy security? 
The positivist methodology does not provide the relevant tools to understand 
how the process of the construction of reality takes place. Instead of “why,” the 
research question is a “how-possible.” “Why” questions analyze the link between 
variables and neglect the processes and socio-historical contexts shaping the 
behavior of policymaker(s). They take subjects as given, and do not allow analysis of 
how subjects (and objects) are constituted by power. How-questions expose how 
“power” works to constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive 
outlooks. It is the kind of power that produces meanings, subject identities and their 
4 
 
relationships.2 Looking at how policy decisions are made broadens the understanding 
of what policy makers are doing-rather than assuming that they are choosing among 
various policy options. This type of research allows the researcher to see how they 
construct “realities,” meanings and concepts, constitute subjects and objects and their 
identities, and thereby arrive at the definition of “the issue,” “policy options” and 
“the rational choice.”  
The positivist tradition takes a case and tests it against a theory without 
looking at the inner meaning of statements or behavior. The subjectivity involved in 
a course of action is ignored, or are taken as intervening variables. In the interpretive 
tradition,3 the researcher tries to understand how meaning is created, and sustained 
by subjects. Belief systems/ideologies or fear affect the rationality of actors and their 
decisions. Put differently, the subject chooses the best one from among the options, 
and his rationality is not defined by a neutral “national interest,” but ideology/belief 
systems, fear or interest.4 Therefore, the epistemological position of the former is 
explaining, and that of the latter is understanding. 5 
Interpretive social science is related to hermeneutics, which emphasizes a 
detailed reading of a text to discover the meaning embedded in the text. In this sense, 
the statements of the contenders in the debate will be analyzed by using the 
methodology of discursive practices approach. Through the textual mechanisms of 
presupposition, predication and subject positioning, this method would help derive 
the concepts, categories and meanings that actors create. The definition of the 
                                               
2 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of US 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1993, 
p. 299. 
3 Max Weber, Economy and Society, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. 
4 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 71-77. 
5 Ibid; Keith Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Program of ‘Critical 
Security Studies,’” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1998, p. 317; Jeffrey T. Checkel, 
“Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics: a Review Essay,” Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004, pp. 229-244. 
5 
 
concepts, positioning of self and “the other,” and granting meanings to these 
concepts produce the “reality.”6 
The discourse of the first group stands on the theoretical basis of Realism 
with respect to its “reality” of nuclear energy that refers to state power, security and 
survival. Its conceptualization of international trade and environmental protection are 
within the framework of Realism. The second group is influenced by Marxism, neo-
Marxism and “Green” political theories. Not only at the practical level, but also at 
the theoretical level, they are not reconcilable.  
Mitigation of this conflict is necessary. For constructivists, conflict is not a 
clash between forces or entities (such as between states in Realism), but is formed 
due to a disagreement, dispute, misunderstanding or lack of communication between 
conscious agents. The conflict in the minds and wills of the parties bear the conflict. 
An inquiry of the discourses is required to correctly understand conflicts. Discourse 
analysis would reveal the sources and depth of the dispute, its intellectual obstacles, 
as well as the possibilities for resolution. It would disclose the sentiments, beliefs and 
ideas by which the conflict is organized and expressed.7 The dissertation 
hypothesizes that the two positions on nuclear power can be reconciled on the basis 
of common grounds and with talks that can advance on common points. The 
discursive practices approach will also clarify these commonalities for the two sides 
to “critically engage” and contain the “conflict.” 
The dissertation will make textual analysis of the data from primary sources, 
such as official statements by government agencies, state officials, political parties, 
unions, chambers, environmental organizations… etcetera. It will make extensive use 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly General Board minutes. Second, it relies on 
                                               
6 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction…,” 1993, pp. 297-320. 
7 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 256-257. 
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interviews in the debate, such as academics, retired military officers and energy 
experts. The data is also gathered from secondary sources like newspaper reports, but 
if it quotes statements, they are confirmed with the bearers. Books and articles are 
also used particularly on the history of nuclear energy, anti-nuclearism and 
environmentalism. The dissertation will not focus particularly on the military use of 
nuclear technology, that is to say, the diversion of the technology to manufacture 
nuclear weapons. The debate in Turkey on nuclear energy includes arguments that 
either supports or despises the possibility of a latent nuclear weapons capability. The 
dissertation, however, will not directly examine that issue. Nor will it discuss or 
make predictions about Turkey’s security policy in relation to the transfer of nuclear 
technology. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: The Chapter II will provide the 
analytical framework, and introduce the theories and tools for analysis. Chapter III 
will review the literature on the topic. Chapter IV will tackle power relations on the 
development of nuclear power and will examine the international belief systems and 
norms that influence the arguments in the domestic debate. To that end, the chapter 
will first look at the power relations at the international and national level regarding 
nuclear power. It will make use of international documents to display the hierarchy 
in the pursuit of peaceful nuclear power. Second, it will focus on the norms of 
nuclear nonproliferation, peaceful nuclear power, and energy security. Turkey’s 
official documents will reveal the existence (or non-existence) of these norms. 
Similarly, it will look at the belief systems of anti-nuclearism and environmentalism. 
Chapter V will provide the history of Turkey’s attempts to generate nuclear energy in 
parallel with the history of anti-nuclear protests. Chapter VI will give a sketch of the 
arguments by introducing the parties who put them forward. Chapter VII will analyze 
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the arguments by de-constructing them to reveal the meaning, concepts, categories 
and power relations regarding pursuit of nuclear energy. This chapter is pivotal to 
find out whether the contenders can critically engage and find some common ground 
for reconciliation. Actors construct meanings through constitutive stories where they 
pick some data and ignore others. Discursive practices may also distort or 
misrepresent scientific and technical details. Thus, Chapter VIII aims at filling in 
such gaps in the arguments, and revealing technical distortions or misrepresentations 
that render a certain meaning for nuclear energy. Chapters VII and VIII will provide 
the bullet points of the talks between the two sides and the course of the process for a 
possible reconciliation and the making of a sound energy policy.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
The question “how is it possible that nuclear energy could have two meanings 
in conflict?” requires the analysis of the competing discourses on nuclear energy in 
Turkey. How-questions expose how meanings, subject identities and their 
relationships are produced.8 This type of research allows seeing how policymakers 
construct “realities,” meanings and concepts, constitute subjects and objects and their 
identities, and thereby arrive at the definition of “the issue,” “policy options” and 
“the rational choice.” 
The accompanying research questions are “how were subjects, objects and 
meanings constructed to make possible Ankara to take the decision?”, and “how does 
the opposition construct subjects, objects and meaning to make it possible that 
nuclear power is not the rational policy choice?” The competing discourses are 
indicative of conflict, and the dissertation also seeks to answer “what are the 
common grounds to mitigate power relations/conflict and help reconciliation 
                                               
8 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction…,” 1993, p. 299. 
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between the government and the civil society?” The dissertation will use discourse 
analysis as methodology.  
 
 
2.1.Theoretical Background  
 
The dissertation will not test a case against a theory, but make use of the 
theoretical insights of Realism, Liberalism, Critical Theory and Constructivism in 
analyzing the public debate on nuclear power and in making projections for its 
possible solution. Pursuit of peaceful nuclear power and energy security are 
concerned with the maintenance of state power, hence belong to the Realist domain. 
On the other hand, the opposition is concerned with the protection of environment, 
health and human rights. Political Ecology/Green Politics and particularly anti-
nuclearism are considered as social movements that are in a struggle against the 
prevailing political and economic systems. They are critical of materialism, hierarchy 
and impoverishment of life under capitalism.9 Anti-nuclearism is one of the means of 
such movements that aim at a fundamental re-structuring of power relations in 
society.10 The insights of Liberalism, Marxism and Critical Theory will provide the 
background in the analysis of the environmentalist and anti-nuclear arguments. At its 
face-value, the rivalry of power between the parties on the establishment of nuclear 
power plants seems not to yield reconciliation neither at theoretical nor practical 
                                               
9 Claus Offe, “New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” Social 
Research No. 52, Winter 1985, pp. 817-868; Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, London: 
Hutchinson, 1984; Klaus Eder, “The ‘New Social Movements:’ Moral Crusades, Political Pressure 
Groups, or Social Movements?” Social Research, No. 52, Winter 1985, pp. 869-890; Jean Cohen, 
“Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements,” Social 
Research, No. 52, Winter 1985, pp. 663-716; Jürgen Habermas, “New Social Movements,” Telos, No. 
49, Fall 1981, pp. 33-37. 
10 Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer eds., Coalitions and Political Movements, The Lessons of 
the Nuclear Freeze, London: Boulder, 1997, p.15. 
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level. The dissertation will make use of the insights of Constructivism which has 
more to say to mitigate power relations, and inquire the common grounds of the two 
sides for a possible reconciliation. 
According to Realism, international system is anarchic, that is, there is no 
central government; but government exists within the units of the system, which are 
states claiming sovereignty.  A system of sovereign states would, by definition, be 
politically structured as anarchy, because the claim of sovereignty would inevitably 
deny the recognition of any higher political authority. In case of a conflict, the 
absence of higher authority to resolve conflicts among sovereign states renders the 
international system as one of self-help. Therefore, the defining characteristic of 
international politics is insecurity, and it determines state behavior. Security 
underlies everything that states or societies might wish to practice.11   
The key variable in political behavior is power. Realists conceive power as 
the capacity to do physical harm to others, while they define insecurity as being 
vulnerable to being seriously harmed by others’ deliberate use of force. They begin 
assessing power by looking at military capabilities. Therefore, the most powerful 
actors are those with the greatest military strength. States are the key actors in the 
realist world, because they embody concentrations of power, especially by having the 
greatest capacity to use military force to do harm. This breeds insecurity, because 
states often come into conflict and they could inflict severe damage on each other. As 
a result, they become constantly preoccupied by security concerns.  
T. Hobbes talks about a pre-civil condition as the “state of nature” where 
there is a constant risk to life. To escape from it, humans created a sovereign state, 
which would protect them from both internal and external threats. However, that 
                                               
11 See Classical Realist scholars: Thucydides, Thucydides: History of the Peleponnesian War, Rex 
Warner tr., Baltimore, MD: Penguin Classics, 1972; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Peter 
Bondanella and Mark Musa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
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created another state of nature between states, that is, the security dilemma, where an 
increase in the power of one would create insecurity for the other.12 International 
affairs is a zero-sum game. Under these conditions, cooperation is unlikely, and if it 
takes place, it is based on interest, and short-lived. It may put the state at a 
disadvantage, that is, result in a loss of power vis-à-vis its rival. The characteristics 
of international relations are the same for all times, and would not change. Similarly, 
economic relations between states are perceived as a zero-sum game: The realist 
conception of international trade is based on absolute gains and upholds economic 
independence in order to sustain state power.13 Industrial Revolution made the 
pursuit of energy and securing its supply an inalienable part of maintaining state 
power. In addition to military and economic security, the state seeks to have energy 
security: Accordingly, the energy resource should be cheap, reliable, ample and 
continuous. More importantly, it should not render the state dependent on one type or 
a single supplier.  
While Realists are convinced that the features of international system are 
valid for all times, Liberalism is more optimistic about human nature and change: 
Liberal theorists believe that modern civil society and capitalist economy can bring 
progress if the state guarantees individual freedoms. It has a conviction in human 
rationality and is hopeful for a better life. The state is also central to Liberalism, but 
in the sense of preserving the liberty of the individual from harm by other individuals 
or states. The state should serve collective will under the guarantee of democratic 
                                               
12 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985. 
13 This view of international trade has its roots in mercantilism, which focuses on increasing state 
power and a positive balance of trade (that is to say exports exceeding imports). See Victor di Riqueti 
Marquis de Mirabeau and François Quesnay, Philosophie Rurale ou Économie Générale et Politique 
de l’agriculture, The Haige: Libraire Associés,1763. The philosophy was then advanced by Adam 
Smith. See Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, London: Penguin, 1979 (originally published in 1776). 
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institutions.14 Liberalism was developed by political philosophers and political 
economists, and flourished in the 17th century, after the scientific revolution and the 
establishment of the sovereign state in Europe. The Enlightenment period affected 
the liberal thought in terms of its optimism in human reason, and their capacity to 
improve their life. According to the liberal thought, the individual can attain a better 
life through reason and in many cases by technology. Democratization and market 
capitalism can expand individual freedoms.15  
Liberalism influenced environmentalism in its belief that environmental 
problems can be addressed by technical solutions, and with more protective 
legislation as a result of a change in state policies.16 The dominant view of 
environmentalism, particularly in Western societies, is the acceptance of the system 
and the role of the state as the regulator and as the agent to pass legislation to protect 
the environment, which is understood in “service of humans.” Also, they understand 
that the process of modernization is effected by the scientific revolution and the 
liberal intellectual revolution,17 which are on the same platform with liberal thought: 
human progress for a better life.  
The dissertation hypothesizes that the debate is marked by arguments in favor 
of development (in the Turkish context it means power, economic growth, 
modernization, westernization) and environmental protection in terms of energy 
                                               
14 John Baylis and Steve Smith eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 165. 
15 The first variant of Liberalism is laissez-faire, which argued that the state should be constrained for 
the proper functioning of the market. See John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1980. According to this idea, liberal regimes would allow the improvement of the material 
and moral conditions of people, principally because of the free economic and other activities of the 
private sector. Jeremy Bentham’s famous phrase, “the greatest happiness for the greatest number,” 
refers to the benefit that the political and economic system of the modern liberal state will bring. See 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1907 (first published in 1789). 
16 Dimitrios I. Roussopoulos, Political Ecology, Montreal, New York: Black Rose Books, 1993, p. 73. 
17 David Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, London and New York: Routledge, 1990, 
pp. 37-54. 
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security, that is, what type of resource to choose: the proponents’ arguments fall into 
to the Realist domain, and those of the contenders are in the critical domain, but that 
there are common points at the theoretical and practical level, that is, the gray areas. 
These gray areas contain the liberal conviction in modernization and the relevance of 
the state for better environmental regulations. It promises to be the ground for 
reconciliation, which can begin with the “critical engagement” of the decisionmakers 
and the civil society. 
Political Ecology/Green political theory is critical of Environmentalism’s 
preference for “sustainable development” over the argument of “limits to growth:”18 
Environmentalism accepts and operates within the framework of the existing 
political, social, economic and normative structures of world politics, and seeks to 
address environmental problems within those structures. Greens believe that the 
environmental crisis originate because of those structures, therefore contend that they 
need to be challenged and transcended. The environmentalist position is closer to the 
liberal institutionalist position,19 while Green political thought has overlapping 
arguments with Marxism and Critical Theory. For scholars of the Green Political 
thought, the states system, and other structures of world politics are unable to provide 
an effective response to environmental problems. Ecocentrism, decentralization and 
“limits to growth” are the main themes that define the characteristics of Green 
Politics. Robyn Eckersley argues that moral value should not be placed only on 
human beings, but on ecosystems and all living things.20 Green Politics view that 
global problems can best be addressed at the local level. So, instead of global power 
                                               
18 Matthew Paterson, “Green Politics,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater eds., Theories of 
International Relations, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, p. 264. 
19 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations 
Theory, Boulder: Westview, 1989, cited in Paterson, “Green Politics,” 1995, p. 253. 
20 See Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach, 
London: UCL Press, 1992. 
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structures, it is local action by small-scale political communities and self-reliant 
economies that should respond to environmental problems.21  
T. O’Riordian finds that environmentalism represents a search for mediation 
between individual freedoms versus common good, minority versus majority rights, 
protection of the rights of the present generation versus those of future generations.22 
He differentiates between ecological environmentalism and technological 
environmentalism, which he refers to as “ecocentrism” and “technocentrism” 
respectively. Ecocentrism upholds equality among humans and nature in the sense 
that nature deserves respect for its own sake, and not because it is useful to humans.23 
Limits, self-reliance, self-sufficiency, zero population and economic growth are the 
key words of ecocentrism.24 David Pepper finds that the roots of this view go back to 
19th century romanticism and to the views of Thomas Malthus and Charles Darwin. 
Romanticism was a reaction to the material changes in the society as a result of 
industrialization. Mass production changed social relations and degraded the 
environment. Romanticism was critical of science, logic, order and authority. For 
romantics, nature had integrity of its own, and it could survive without humans-but 
not vice versa.25 Therefore, humans need to have responsibility towards the nature. 
Ecological environmentalism was also influenced by the views of Malthus, 
particularly with respect to the “limits to growth” debate which represents the 
concern about a conflict between population growth and subsistence. In the Essay on 
the Principle of Population, Malthus argued that unless population growth rate is 
checked, it will surpass the increase in the level of food supply, hence end in a 
                                               
21 John S. Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987. 
22 Timothy O’Riordian, Environmentalism, London: Pion, 1981, cited in Pepper, The Roots of Modern 
Environmentalism, 1990, p. 14. 
23 O’Riordian, Environmentalism, 1981. 
24 Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 1990, p. 28. 
25 Ibid, pp. 76-79. 
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crisis.26 Darwin endorses a systems view of nature in The Origin of Species, and 
influenced the ecosystems idea that everything is interconnected and interdependent. 
These systems are weather/climate, water, landforms, soils and biota.27  
Technocentrism, on the other hand, differs in its approach to environmental 
problems: It has a rational, scientific approach to manage the environment.28 
According to it, the nature can be utilized for human needs. Through appropriation of 
nature, humans achieve high technology and material consumption, which are 
regarded as the indicators of progress. In addition, when it comes to decision-making 
about the environment, the authorities are the objective scientific experts, because the 
public is relatively ignorant. The roots of this view lie in scientific revolution of the 
16th and 18th centuries in parallel with the growth of capitalism.29 Technocentricism 
upholds human progress and accepts the prevailing economic system, and in this 
sense is close to the liberal view of environmentalism. 
Political ecology/Green Politics diverges from environmentalism in its belief 
that science is not apolitical, and that action should come from local and regional 
levels instead of the state.30 Robyn Eckersley detects three major themes of political 
ecology: participation, survival and emancipation. In the 1960s, environmental 
problems were perceived as a “crisis of participation” in which the environmental 
impacts of urbanization and industrialization were not considered equally with their 
causes. Environmental concerns were seen within the context of participatory and 
distributional issues.31 In the 1960s and 1970s, the New Left movement revealed the 
                                               
26 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 7th ed., London: Dent, 1872, cited in 
Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 1990, p. 93. 
27 Lorne H. Russwurm, “A Systems Approach to the Natural Environment,” in Lorne H. Russwurm 
and Edward Sommerville, Man’s Natural Environment: A Systems Approach, Massachusetts: 
Duxbury Press, 1974.  
28 Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 1990, p. 29. 
29 Ibid., p. 37. 
30 Roussopoulos, Political Ecology, 1993, pp. 86,87. 
31 Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach, 1992, p. 9. 
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problems of industrial society, and aimed at decentralization and self-management of 
power and resources.32  
In the early 1970s, the Limits to Growth and the Blueprint for Survival 
brought forward the theme of the crisis of survival.33 They found out that the 
environmental crisis was threatening the survival of humanity. Therefore population 
growth rate should be checked, and there should be a minimally acceptable lifestyle 
rather than the pursuit of “good life.”34 Donella Meadows et al. in the Limits to 
Growth, argued that exponential economic and population growth produced series of 
crises because resources were depleted rapidly as demand rose for food and raw 
material for continued industrial growth. At the same time, the environment fell short 
of assimilating waste products because its absorptive capacity was exceeded.35 
Greens conclude that exponential growth is impossible in a finite system, and diverge 
from environmentalists regarding “sustainable development,”36 which assumes that 
economic growth is compatible with responding to environmental problems. On the 
other hand, for Greens, sustainability requires decrease in production and the use of 
energy.37 E. F. Schumacher, in Small is Beautiful, stressed that values shaped 
economics: There is the possibility of an alternative economic system which would 
improve the quality of life, instead of just focusing on improving the quality of 
                                               
32 George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968, Boston, Mass: 
South End, 1987. 
33 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III., The 
Limits to Growth: A Report fort he Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, New 
York: Universe, 1972; Edward Goldsmith, Edward Goldsmith, Robert Allen, Michael Allaby, John 
Davoll, Same Lawrence eds., Blueprint for Survival, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 
34 See Garrett Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, December 13, 1968, 
pp. 1243-1248. 
35 Meadows et al., Limits to Growth, 1972. 
36 It was originally used in the World Conservation Strategy by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (World Conservation Strategy, Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable 
Development, Switzerland: IUCN, 1980) and then by the Brundtland Commission, (Our Common 
Future, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, annexed to UN 
Document A/RES/42/187, December 11, 1987.) 
37 Keekok Lee, “To De-Industrialize-Is it so Irrational?” in Alan Dobson and Paul Lucardie eds., The 
Politics of Nature: Explorations in Green Political Theory, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 105-117. 
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work.38 He foresaw global networks of small-scale, self-reliant communities, which 
are libertarian, egalitarian and participatory. In this sense, for the Greens, the state is 
both unnecessary and undesirable.39  
Others argued that the environmental crisis was beyond a crisis of 
participation or survival, and questioned the notion of material progress, which they 
believed had social and psychological costs. They saw that ecological critique of 
industrialism had the potential to emancipate the human from the industrial type of 
society.40 This emancipatory ecopolitical theory sought to find to overcome the 
“logic of destruction” inherent in capital accumulation and consumer society, and in 
general, all systems of domination.41 With their criticisms of the systems of 
domination, Marxism and Critical Theory deserve attention.  
The Marxist perspective on the environment underlines the importance of 
conflict between vested class interests. According to this view, environmental 
concerns represent the clash of interests between the owners of resources and those 
who demand access to them. They represent the capital-owning classes and the 
proletariat respectively. These conflicts are borne out of the inherent contradictions 
within the capitalist economic system, and they can only be resolved by its total 
overthrow. They also argue that the ruling classes hold the power and the means to 
distort the arguments of the minority, constrain their influence, and hide information 
from majority about the alternative options available. Therefore, Marxists argue that 
it does not make sense to have faith in the power of the argument or the availability 
of “the facts” on the abuse of nature in order to stop this abuse. People would be 
                                               
38 Ernst F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered, London: Harper and 
Row, 1973 cited in Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 1990, pp. 25-6 
39 Paterson, “Green Politics,” 1995, 258. 
40 See William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction: On Needs and Commodities, London: Marion Boyar, 
1978; John Rodman, “Paradigm Change in Political Science: An Ecological Perspective,” American 
Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 49-78, cited in Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political 
Theory…, 1992, p. 18. 
41 Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p. 21. 
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selective to the arguments they favor such as in the nuclear debate: Both sides would 
claim objectivity and assert that their arguments are superior to those of the other 
side. To the Marxist interpretation, this situation represents the defense of each side’s 
own vested economic interests.42  
Marxists argue that man-nature relationship depends on the stages of 
development:  Through interaction with nature, humans produce objects not merely 
to satisfy basic human needs, but for esthetic purposes. Therefore, new needs are 
created. Burgess argues that this constant interaction makes them more human over 
time.43 In this context, the definition of “need” and “natural resource” is dependent 
on time and on historical stages of development.44 Marxists argue that 
environmentalists fail to recognize the social and historical nature of resources and 
ecological problems, and ignore the importance of the mode of production in 
conditioning the perception of nature and society.45  
Eckersley divides the Marxist solution to the environmental crisis into 
humanist and orthodox. According to the Orthodox eco-Marxist perspective, 
environmental problems are caused by the exploitative dynamics of capitalism, 
therefore relations of production should change, and the nature can benefit all, not 
just the capitalist class.46 What does not change is the “mastery of nature” however. 
Green political theorists were inspired by Orthodox eco-Marxism as a starting point, 
but it is not an example of Green political theory.47 The other strand is humanist eco-
                                               
42 Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 1990, pp. 32, 34. 
43 Rod Burgess, “The Concept of Nature in Geography and Marxism,” Antipode, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1978, 
pp.1-11. 
44 Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 1990, p. 163. 
45 Ibid., p. 173. 
46 Charles Tolman, “Karl Marx, Alienation and the Mastery of Nature,” Environmental Ethics, Vol 3. 
Spring 1981, pp. 63-74; Howard Parsons, Marx and Engels on Ecology, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 
1978 cited in Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p. 82. 
47 Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p. 77. 
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Marxism which demands a reassessment of the belief in material progress.48 
Humanist eco-Marxists argue that even if the possessors of capital change, the 
technology would still be of domination and will not end the ecological crisis. They 
sought to resolve the ecological contradictions of capitalism and to find the type of 
human being in a society not characterized by domination.49  
Critical Theory/Frankfurt School is a subset of humanist Marxist thought, but 
it revised the humanist Marxist thought to address the emancipatory concerns of 
ecocentrics. They showed the other dimensions and levels of domination and 
exploitation beyond the economic sphere.50 Frankfurt School criticized the Orthodox 
Marxist view about the progressive march of history, which emphasized “mastery 
over nature” for more freedom. Instead, they sought a reconciliation with nature. 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse provided theoretical insights for ecocentrism with 
their critique of technological civilization. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the 
Age of Enlightenment brought forward reason, but it inflated the importance of 
human over nature. Marcuse argued that social relations should be reordered in order 
to free nature from mastery. 51 Jürgen Habermas tried to show that political decision-
making served to capitalist and bureaucratic system, while colonizing daily social 
activity.52 The overriding concern of Marcuse and Habermas is to open up improved 
channels of political communication to reach democratic consensus that would 
facilitate the development and use of technology toward the liberation of human. 
                                               
48 Andre Gorz, Ecology as Politics, tr. Patsy Vigderman and Jonathan Cloud, London: Pluto, 1980; 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “A Change of Political Ecology,” New Left Review, Vol. 84, 1974, pp. 3-
31, cited in Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p.87. 
49 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, cited in 
Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p. 87. 
50 Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p. 97. 
51 Ibid., pp. 101-105. 
52 Anthony Giddens, “Reason Without Revolution? Habermas’ Theories des kommunikativen 
Handelns,” in Habermas and Modernity, Richard J. Bernstein ed., Cambridge: Polity, 1985. 
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Critical Theory takes human as the referent, and its opposition to the domination of 
nature is because it leads to the domination of people.53  
Ulrich Beck, a critical sociologist, analyzed the contemporary stages of 
development, and introduced the concepts of ecological enlightenment54 and 
reflexive modernity.55 Beck sees that the industrial and capitalist society emerged in 
the phase of simple modernity, where classes emerged, along with the accumulation 
of wealth and rapid scientific progress. However, the industrial society has arrived at 
the phase of “reflexive modernity” where its main concern is no longer harnessing or 
controlling the nature for the benefit of humankind, but the suffering from the 
problems as a result of techno-economic development. Therefore, Beck calls this 
“reflexive modernity” which refers to modernity as a problem in itself.56 Beck is 
concerned about uncontrolled risks produced by capitalism. The risks of advanced 
technologies may escape from bureaucratic and political control and threaten the 
existence of human beings.57  
The concept of “risk society” emerged as a result of developments in the 
Western European societies, which started feeling insecure and uncertain because of 
the heightened awareness of risks. They attributed different meanings to work, 
family life and identity with this transition from industrial to risk society. As a result, 
they started questioning scientific and technological institutions and their 
                                               
53 Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, p.11; Eckersley acknowledges that 
these themes had a significant impact in shaping “…the Green critique of industrialism, modern 
technology, and bureaucracy, and the Green commitment to grassroots democracy,” but adds that 
Critical Theory didn’t have a major direct impact on the theory and practice of the Green movement. 
Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory…, 1992, pp. 98,101-105. 
54 Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Joness, “Marxist Theories of International Relations” in Baylis 
and Smith eds., Globalization of World Politics, 2001, pp.214-215; See Ulrich Beck, Ecological 
Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society, Armherst, New York: Prometheus, 1991. 
55 See Ulrich Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization,” in 
Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash eds., Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, pp. 1-55. 
56 Beck et al., Reflexive Modernization …, 1994, p. 8. 
57 Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. 
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regulators.58 Beck’s concept of “risk society” is based on the concern that dangers 
and hazards may become predictable but unpreventable, especially within the 
ecological context. This is perfectly applicable to nuclear technologies when Beck 
argues that “the injured of Chernobyl… are not born yet.”59 The difference of 
industrial society from risk society is that social conflict does not arise from the 
distribution of goods. To the contrary, increased production worsens the distribution 
problem, because due to the risks involved in the production process, the goods 
become “bads.”60 Issues like investment decisions and plant management, which 
were not discussed previously, provide room for social movements. As a result, the 
operation of parliamentary democracy and official bureaucracies are challenged, 
because they are not capable of controlling ecological risks.61  
 Environmentalists agreed to “ecological modernization” and “sustainable 
development” as compromise solutions. Ecological modernization argues that 
economic growth and the resolution of ecological problems can be reconciled, in 
principle.62 To “modernize modernity,”63 Mol explains that the harnessing of nature 
by capitalism can be corrected to the benefit of nature by two processes: the 
ecologization of economy and the economization of ecology.64 The first refers to the 
de-linking of economic growth from negative environment impact as much as 
possible by recent technological innovations. The second aims to increase the “cost” 
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of environmental impact in economic accounts, because the nature has been counted 
as “free” and “abundant” by modern theories of economics.65 Both risk society and 
ecological modernization agree that there is an ecological crisis emanating from the 
structural problems of modern capitalism. They have hope for the positive 
contribution of new technologies for the ecology to be less affected by economic 
processes,66 that is, sustainable development.  
The dissertation hypothesizes not only about the nature of the conflict, but 
also argues that it can be addressed. The debate on nuclear energy in Turkey is a 
theme in the conflict between goals of development and environmental protection in 
terms of what type of resource to choose for energy security. The dissertation will 
make use of Constructivism which offers insights to manage differences and to 
mitigate the conflict. Constructivism is accepted not as theory of International 
Relations, but an approach which considers international relations as a social 
construction, thus it challenges rationalist assumptions.67 N. Onuf introduced the 
term Constructivism to the study of international relations,68 but it is A. Wendt who 
particularly advanced the approach.69 Other Constructivists differentiate between 
“systemic” and “holistic” Constructivisms,70 where the former is represented by 
Wendt and the latter is endorsed by M. Finnemore, who integrates domestic and 
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international structures.71 The effects of culture, norms and identity on national 
security were also studied.72 
There are ongoing debates in Constructivism,73 but the main Constructivist 
assumptions are that there is no external or objective social reality; instead social and 
political world is a creation of human consciousness and institutions, such as 
anarchy. They are created through interaction between states, and are subject to 
change. Therefore, “international relations” does not exist as a physical entity, but as 
a set of ideas, thoughts and norms which were arranged by people. Accordingly, if 
these thoughts, ideas and norms change, then will the system.74 In this sense, 
Constructivism is a potential challenge to the status quo, because it is capable of 
understanding the relationship between power and knowledge,75 that is, what people 
count as “common sense.” 
For constructivists, conflict is not a clash between forces or entities (such as 
between states in Realism), but is formed due to a disagreement, dispute, 
misunderstanding or lack of communication between conscious agents. The conflict 
in the minds and wills of the parties bear this conflict. Constructivism prescribes an 
inquiry of discourses to correctly understand such conflict, because discourse is a 
critical mechanism that creates, shapes, alters and replaces structures of collective 
meaning.76 Discourse analysis would reveal the sources and depth of the dispute, its 
intellectual obstacles, as well as the possibilities for resolution. It would disclose the 
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sentiments, beliefs and ideas by which the conflict is organized and expressed.77 The 
focus of constructivists is not only on the differences and the regulation of these 
differences by people, but also on the ways of creating and sustaining social, 
economic and political relations despite their differences. Joint arrangements like 
sovereignty and international organizations are expressions or applications of 
common ideas or beliefs of different peoples, and show that they could relate to and 
deal with each other.78  
The dissertation argues that mitigation of this conflict is necessary so as not 
to end up with “absolute war-” in Clausewitz’s terms. In absolute war, the scope of 
the conflict is unlimited, which includes all available resources at hand. For each side 
in the war, there is the tendency toward the extreme until when the enemy is 
rendered powerless. According to Clausewitz, this is a condition of contradiction, 
and compels the parties to move away from the extreme. At this point, he defines war 
as “commerce” because the parties to the conflict enter into a process of barter: They 
reduce the tendency toward the extreme by engaging into interaction in order to 
reach the political object of war.79  
M. Foucault refers to this Clausewitzian logic of war in trying to explain 
modern sovereignty and the formation of social relations under the power of the 
modern state. For him, this logic of war is a feature of the power relations between 
                                               
77 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations…, 2003, pp. 256-257. Also See: 
Emmanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, pp. 319-363. To see a discussion of how an agreement 
can be reached that meets the basic concerns of the conflicting parties, see Herbert C. Kelman, “The 
Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a 
Negotiated Solution?” Political Psychology, Vol. 8, No.2, pp. 162-186. For an analysis of the 
competing validity claims and the relevance of discourse, see Friedrich Kratochwil, “Politics, Norms 
and Peaceful Change,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 192-218.  
78 The productive power of discourse and how it shifts preference from conflict to common norms is 
studied by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power and International Politics,” International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 39-75. 
79 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976, p. 149. 
25 
 
and/or within states. When two forces collide, the tendency toward the extreme is 
replaced by the experience of fear. For Foucault, the mitigation of war relations as a 
result of fear is crucial: It indicates the preference for the preservation of life. 
Accordingly, he argues that the modern state prefers to use its power for the 
production rather than the disabling of life.  
According to Foucault, power relations are extensive within the society. 
Power is not necessarily peculiar to the government or the state; it is exerted in a web 
that covers all the strata of the society.80 He understands that the power relations in 
the society could be in the form of either war or politics.81 Power relations need 
resistance; it is indeed part of power relations:82 When power is exerted, it faces 
resistance, hence power relations begin. The state does not unilaterally exert power. 
To the contrary, it will consistently face resistance, and therefore will need to renew 
or revise power relations.83  
For Foucault, the Clausewitzian war, that is power relations, explains the 
strategy of the modern sovereign state. This strategy refers to the use of state power 
and of power relations in the society to produce new political orders. Hence, the 
modern state acquires new forms of governance. It finds the opportunity to 
accommodate itself to new circumstances. It uses its power to facilitate the 
management of differences within the society. Put differently, state sovereignty 
prevails in a renewed manner.84 In this context, conflicts within societies are also 
mitigated by the experience of fear. The sovereign reinforces its power with the 
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governance of difference, that is, it aims at reducing differences.85 Fear from the 
escalation of conflict will lead the sovereign to bring the parties in conflict together 
and interact. The dissertation refers to “critical engagement,” in which the 
contending parties come to understand that the qualities of each party are necessary 
to address social problems. For negotiation, common grounds are necessary, and they 
will be derived by discourse analysis. 
 
 
2.2. Methodology 
 
The dissertation will make use of discourse analysis to see how actors 
attribute meanings to nuclear energy, which suits to their belief systems, ideologies 
or interests. Discursive Practices Approach-through presupposition, predication and 
subject positioning-, would help derive the concepts, categories and meanings that 
actors create. The definition of the concepts, positioning of self and “the other”, and 
granting meanings to these concepts arrive in a certain “truth.” 
In the analysis of each argument, one government and two non-governmental 
texts will be presented and analyzed. The findings out of discourse analysis will 
reveal common concepts, categories and meanings which will provide ground for 
parties to mitigate power relations between them. The nuclear energy debate is not 
independent from the international belief system and norms. That is to say, the 
national discourses are in interaction with international norms. This interaction will 
be presented by looking at international and national texts on three main areas: 
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nuclear nonproliferation and the pursuit of nuclear energy, energy security and anti-
nuclearism/environmentalism.   
 
 
2.2.1. Discourse Analysis 
 
Although discourse analysis has increasingly been used in analyzing 
international relations,86 there is no consensus on how to study discourse in. J. 
Milliken points to three theoretical commitments as tools to study the discourses: 
Discourse constructs social realities through systems of signification, produce and 
reproduce things within the discourse by creating a “regime of truth”, and maintain 
the discourse through play of practice. In the first one, she refers to Saussure’s model 
of signification (or representation), which includes a signifier (word), signified 
(concept) and significatum (referent). The emphasis in this model is given to the 
relationships where things are placed in a sign system.87 There are also binary 
relationships88 which are not neutral, that is, one element in the binary is privileged 
with the establishment of a relation of power. Thus, using sign systems (languages), 
people construct the meaning of things. This strand is influenced by the constructivist 
understanding of meaning. Second, discourses may create a “regime of truth,” by 
defining subjects authorized to speak and act (experts, officials), practices to 
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logically or properly intervene on people or objects, and produce publics and their 
common sense, to determine how officials should act for them and in their name. 
Thereby, discourses define and enable authorities and experts, silence and exclude 
“others,” accept a certain “common sense,” and render other modes of thinking 
meaningless, inadequate, immoral, etcetera…89 
Milliken suggests that the analysis should be based on a set of texts by 
different people who are the authorized speakers or writers of a dominant discourse, 
or who think and act within alternative discourses: 
 
An analysis can be said to be complete (validated) when upon adding new texts and 
comparing their object spaces, the researcher finds consistently that the theoretical 
categories s/he generated work for those texts…90 [It should be explained] …how a 
discourse produces this world-how it selectively constitutes some and not others as 
“privileged storytellers… to whom narrative authority… is granted.”91  
 
Considering that policymaking involves a continuous struggle over the 
definition of an “issue” or a “threat” and their interpretation, that is, “politics of 
representation,”92 one can see that regarding policymaking, politics of representation 
is related with how policymakers make sense of crises/issues, “how they construct 
stories to explain [them] and how they develop strategies for handling these crises as 
political challenges, and how they conceptualize ‘solutions’ to these crises.”93  
Actors define and constitute “issues,” objects, subjects and “dangers” through 
discursive practices.94 Weldes and Saco show that state officials engage in 
interpretive practices to constitute particular objects as “threats” and formulate 
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policies to deal with them. The actors engaging in discursive practices are mainly 
state officials who define threats, adopt policies and implement them. They produce 
“realities” that help the practice of statecraft and enhance state power. They privilege 
the state over domestic actors, including the public, in the making of (for instance, 
energy) policy. Arguments of the state can construct a “single identity” for itself (and 
its supporters) and exclude the “other.” This identity provides guarantees for action.95 
Discourse can construct the other as a threat to the identity of the self. It can decrease 
the legitimacy of the “other:” The discursive construction of antagonism between the 
state and the people who appeal to them provides guarantees for action to the 
opponent.  
An approach that focuses on discursive practices as a unit of analysis can get 
at how “reality” is produced and maintained and how it makes various practices 
possible. The analytic question addressed is not why particular decisions are made; 
the policy decision itself becomes a secondary concern. What is central is the 
discourse(s) which construct a particular “reality.”96 A discourse provides discursive 
spaces, that is, concepts, categories, metaphors, and analogies by which meanings are 
created.97 Discourses create various kinds of subjects and simultaneously position 
these subjects vis-à-vis another.98 
R. L. Doty uses the textual mechanisms of presupposition, predication and 
subject positioning that provide analytic categories to find “…how discursive 
practices constitute subjects and objects and organize them into a “grid of 
intelligibility.”99 Presupposition creates background knowledge and constructs a 
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particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true. Predication is 
another way to see how texts construct the world by attaching various labels to 
subjects. Predication reveals how texts link certain qualities to particular subjects 
through predicates, adverbs and adjectives. They attach attributes to subjects, 
construct their identities, and express what subjects can do. They also create “reality” 
by linking particular subjects and objects, and they produce subjects and objects vis-
à-vis others (such as Great powers as the legitimate possessors of nuclear weapons, 
and North Korea as a ‘rogue state’ due to its aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons.). 
Presupposition and predication establish various kinds of relationships between 
subjects and between subjects and objects, which Doty calls subject positioning. 
These relationships that position subjects could be in the form of opposition, identity, 
similarity and complementarity. These relationships can be located by deconstructing 
the texts.100 Deconstruction can be done by identifying the oppositional structuring in 
a text which results in the hierarchization of one term in relation to another.101 In this 
sense there is a dominant term and a subordinate term which underlines the former. 
The subordinate term is deemed the “other”, the deviant, or the inferior to the first 
term. These three tools of discursive practices show how a “world” is produced by 
exposing the positions of various kinds of subjects and their endowments with 
particular attributes. They work together and simultaneously.102 The dissertation will 
use these tools of discursive practices approach to see how discourses in the nuclear 
energy debate create different meanings. 
The second theoretical commitment of discourse is discourse productivity. 
Discourse produces truths, common sense and authorities/experts. States take 
decisions for particular issues, and these are legitimized to elites and the broader 
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public by being presented as “scientific truth”, and these “truths” help reproduce a 
“common sense.” Latham contests the realist assumption that state action is driven 
by objective interests or by a unitary and rational actor, and argues that it is actually a 
form of social practice: According to mainstream theories, self-interested states 
pursue policies to maximize interests and minimize risks to these interests, where 
“national interest” is taken as “objective” and “self-evident.” Constructivists argue 
that it is the product of interpretive processes. As Jutta Weldes puts it: 
 
In contrast to the realist conception of “national interests” as objects that have 
merely to be observed or discovered, then, my argument is that national interests are 
social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and 
culturally established meanings with which the world, particularly the international 
system and the place of the state in it, is understood.103 
 
She argues that interests are not obvious correlates or derivatives of the 
concrete “realities” of the international system, but are products of the “ubiquitous 
and unavoidable process of representation through which meaning is created.”104 
Departing from this point, Latham contends that understanding state action requires 
an understanding of the processes of representation and interpretation through which 
national interest is produced. He argues that people, in order to know the world and 
their position in it, construct “ontological narratives,” which then produce the 
meanings that structure social action: 
 
…such an understanding requires a recognition that the representational process is 
inherently storied and that the constitutive representations that govern social life are 
profoundly narrative in form…the meanings that structure social action are 
produced through the pervasive and inescapable practice of knowing the world and 
one’s place in it through the construction of ontological narratives. These narratives 
are the stories that actors construct out of available cultural and linguistic resources 
to create meaning out of the disorder of lived experience…ontological narratives are 
constitutive stories – that is, they actually produce (rather than simply attempt to 
reflect) social facts. They do this by generating the specific forms of knowledge, 
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consciousness, “common sense,” practice and identity that allow people to 
understand – and thus act in – the world.105 
 
Ontological narratives assume that there are multiple actors in the world with 
different identities, and are assigned a specific role to perform through these 
narratives. They also constitute interests following from specific identities of the 
objects. More broadly, as constructivists have argued, interests are social 
constructions out of identities and cultural material that social actors have at hand. 
Ontological narratives necessarily involve a selective appropriation of “relevant” 
facts from a “potentially limitless array of social experiences deriving from social 
contact with events, institutions and people.”106 A story line organizes actions or 
events with varying degrees of significance, and then arranges “significant” events 
into meaningful chains of causality and relationality, thereby “creates” the world 
within which social actors exist and act.107  
As the stories of the debating actors select “facts,” they ignore or miss others. 
Thus, in addition to studying the debate, it is also important to display what is 
excluded from it. Ronald Bleiker, in his assessment of the United States’ 
construction of North Korea as a rogue state,108 points at the language of defense 
analysts which became the most accepted, the most credible and rational way of 
assessing issues of security. Experts on military technologies were instrumental in 
constructing North Korea as a threat, and the political debate was articulated in 
highly technical terms. Non-experts were without technical expertise to verify their 
claims, which were used to legitimize important political decisions. “As a result, the 
techno-strategic language of defense analysis has managed to place many important 
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security issues beyond the reach of political and moral discussions.”109 Similarly, 
technical language may obscure facts or misrepresent them, thereby affecting policy 
or public opinion. In both discourses, the dissertation will explore the distorted or 
misrepresented technical facts which helped sustain the discourse. It will be done in 
the last chapter. 
Chapter VII will play a pivotal role for the dissertation. It will make a textual 
analysis of the statements of the proponents and dissenters to reveal the meanings 
ascribed to concepts, the links established between the concepts and the construction 
of identities.  The texts will be selected from the statements of the authorized 
representatives in the two groups, such as the governmental institutions, bureaucrats, 
heads of associations, unions, energy firms, energy professionals, civil society 
organizations, journalists and academics. The diversity of the choices will also 
address the problem of selection bias, since the views of the groups or individuals are 
not uniform. The below example demonstrates how the analysis will be done: 
 
If Turkey aspires to develop viable solutions for the future in its national energy 
policy, it should place its energy basket over five pillars, that is, renewables, coal, 
hydro, nuclear and natural gas. 110…[N]uclear energy is not a choice but a necessity 
in order to meet the country’s energy shortage…the resources at disposal will fall 
short for a continuous flow of electricity for basic loads and peak hours, thus, 
nuclear energy is a must and the only way out.111 …We are determined [to establish 
nuclear power plants which will] decrease the dependency [and] to pay less for the 
energy bill compared to oil and gas whose prices are on rise, and to inflict less 
pollution to the environment…112 …If you [the opposition] want us to be 
environment-friendly, to produce cheap, sustainable and continuous electricity 
without polluting the environment, we should do it… 113 
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Presupposition: Turkey will have an energy shortage in the future. Nuclear 
energy and nuclear power plants are cheap, environment-friendly, and will decrease 
dependency on foreign sources. 
Predication: Nuclear energy is predicated as “a necessity to meet the 
country’s energy shortage”, “must” and “the only way out.” These predicates 
constitute nuclear energy as the “life buoy” from “a situation that needs urgent 
response.”  
Subject Positioning: Local resources, particularly water, oil and gas are put in 
an inferior position vis-à-vis nuclear energy: There are not enough domestic and 
renewable resources, the resources at disposal will pollute the environment, and oil 
and gas will be costly. “We” is the identity of policymakers, the government, Energy 
Ministry, energy bureaucracy, etcetera… “We” constitutes them as subjects, and 
grants the identity of the “powerful, mighty.” Since “We” are working for the best 
interests of the country, “We” are entitled to determine the best resource.  
The following chapter will review the literature on the contending views on 
nuclear power. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 The literature on the contending views on nuclear energy is quite limited. 
Since the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is part of the nuclear 
proliferation puzzle, initially the literature on the civilian use of nuclear technology 
was formed in relation with nuclear proliferation. In Nuclear Power and 
Nonproliferation, William C. Potter presents an interdisciplinary analysis of 
relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation, and describes the 
historical, technical, economic and political components of the nuclear power-
nuclear proliferation dilemma.114 Stephen M. Meyer, in The Dynamics of Nuclear 
Proliferation, focuses on the factors for nuclear proliferation, which he analyzes in 
two main categories, namely technological determinism and political-military 
factors. The subscribers of the first view argue that the acquisition of nuclear 
technology will inevitably compel the country to take the proliferation decision.115  
Richard Kokoski sees that the spread of nuclear technology is a challenge to 
the nonproliferation regime, particularly after the end of the Cold War. In 
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Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he explains the technologies 
crucial for developing nuclear weapons, looks at the impacts of their existence, 
spread and further development on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.116 In The 
Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation, Robert F. Mozley focuses on the 
technology used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. He also looks at the efforts to 
prevent the spread of the technology and the degree of success and possible 
consequences of failure.117 
At the international level, there are several studies that put forward 
contending views on nuclear power, but they did not go beyond presenting the 
arguments and making projections for the future of nuclear energy. Neal Bernards 
and Joanne Buggey, In Nuclear Power: Examining Cause and Effect Relationship,118 
provide the opposing views on nuclear power, and focus particularly on public 
concerns regarding safety. It assesses whether nuclear energy is desired or seen as a 
“necessity.” Nuclear Power,119 edited by Tom and Gena Metcalf looks at the history 
of the use of nuclear technology, and explores the advantages and disadvantages of 
nuclear power. Ewan McLeish, in The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Power,120 discusses 
the supporting and opposing views on nuclear energy. He also provides basic 
information on the technology, costs, history and environmental impacts. Gwyneth 
Cravens, a former nuclear skeptic, studies American nuclear facilities and fuel cycle, 
and compares them with those of the rest of the world. In Power to Save the World: 
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The Truth About Nuclear Energy,121 she looks at safety issues, proliferation and 
economics. She convinces the reader that nuclear energy should play a larger role in 
power generation, and should replace coal to avoid pressure on the climate.  
In the edited volume of Harald Müller, How Western European Nuclear 
Policy is Made, country cases were studied, including Belgium, Germany, France, 
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.122 The 
domestic debate in France centered on technical issues and safety, but the public 
opinion was ineffective in affecting policy on nuclear issues.123 British citizens had a 
greater range of possibilities where they could make their voices heard, such as the 
requirement to hold public inquiries into the nuclear planning proposals. Therefore, 
public opinion was more effective on policy compared to the French case.124 Nuclear 
opposition in West Germany began in the 1970s and spread to the rest of the country. 
Nuclear power plant projects were accompanied by street-fighting and law suits. The 
opposition was not equally interested in proliferation issues, however.125 The 
Swedish voted against the further use of nuclear energy in a 1980 referendum. 
However, the energy demand and lack of supply keeps the advocates of nuclear 
energy in the industrial sector.126 
As far as the developing countries are concerned, development and the 
accompanying energy demand elevated nuclear power as a suitable option. However, 
safety -particularly with respect to accident risk and waste disposal- was the primary 
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concern for their publics: In Ghana, the perception of risk was that nuclear power 
plants could explode like atomic bombs.127 The language of the media was quite 
effective in creating or reinforcing public fear. The Lithuanian public was affected by 
local and international news on the lack of nuclear safety in Lithuanian power 
plants.128 Having experienced Chernobyl, the Ukrainian public grew strongly against 
nuclear energy projects. Therefore, it also becomes problematic to engage in an 
active dialogue with the opposition. The most important demands from the public are 
staff reliability, trust to administrative institutions and the guarantee that no 
Chernobyl-like accidents are going to happen.129  
The views of the opposition were shaped mainly by the anti-nuclear theses. 
The history of the anti-nuclear movement was studied by Ruth Brandon in her 
Burning Question: The anti-nuclear movement since 1945.130 She provided a history 
of the anti-nuclear movement beginning from the reservations and concerns of 
scientists working the Manhattan project, and their effort to prevent the use of 
nuclear technology as an enormously powerful explosive. Afterwards civil society 
activities and movements followed. 
Bernard L. Cohen analyzed the perception of the society on nuclear energy, in 
Before It’s Too Late, A Scientist’s Case for Nuclear Energy.131 He found that fear of 
radiation and waste, and failure in understanding and describing the risk are the main 
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problems that led to misperceptions about nuclear energy. He looked at the role of 
the media which exaggerated the fears and directed attention towards anti-nuclear 
protests and the detainment of protesters. He made the distinction between scientists 
and environmentalists that the latter based its case on political philosophy while for 
the former, it was science. 
The political history of nuclear energy was provided by Bertrand 
Goldschmidt, in his The Atomic Complex, A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear 
Energy. He covered the developments until 1982 which missed Chernobyl- the 
landmark event that had effects on the development of nuclear power. The book 
includes a history of both the military and the civilian aspect. The fear from radiation 
and radioactive waste excited the public to demand impossible guarantees, which 
formed the psychological barrier against nuclear power, and which lies under the 
anti-nuclear movement.  
He explains how anti-nuclearism turned into an emotional conflict on the 
pursuit of nuclear power:  
 
In the early development of this situation, lack of understanding progressively grew 
on either side of the argument, until a substantial gap appeared which then 
continued to widen. Questions that should have involved no more than technical 
differences over the accurate evaluation of the risks of the new technology, or 
discussions of the criteria for determining an acceptable level of risk for the 
populations concerned, gradually degenerated in several Western countries into a 
profound emotional conflict, the issue at stake being whether to accept or to reject 
the production of electricity by nuclear means.132  
 
Goldschmidt saw that the public fear of radiation provided “a fertile breeding 
ground” for the anti-nuclear protest movement. Its political aspect was against the 
industrial type society, the technical aspect involved doubts over risks, and the 
philosophical aspect was nostalgia for a world “close to nature” which should not be 
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distorted by industry or commerce.133 He also looked at the arguments of the 
proponents and opponents. Nuclear power was promoted because there was no better 
alternative to Middle Eastern oil. It posed no environmental risk- an advantage for 
preventing climate change. The proponents regarded waste as manageable. The 
media exaggerated local action, and anti-nuclearism became a matter of political 
competition within parties, groups, trade unions, etcetera… 
Del Sesto studied the major elements of pro and anti-nuclear ideologies: He 
detected that the supporters first emphasize the promise of peaceful applications such 
as the positive impact on the standard of living, economic growth, fiscal well-being, 
energy generation, energy security and nonproliferation. They believe that science 
and technology would solve all political and practical problems associated with 
nuclear power. The opposition misrepresents and distorts facts, exaggerates and 
stimulates fears, and are unconvincing. The anti-nuclear ideology focuses on the 
legacy to future generations, and argues that nuclear power is morally indefensible, it 
is disadvantageous for democracy, nonproliferation efforts and peace. Science and 
technology are insufficient to solve the problems created of nuclear power. Since the 
use of nuclear power reinforces centralization in decision-making, regulations should 
be more responsive to civil society, and de-centralized, low-technology alternatives 
like renewable energy are preferable. Much like the supporters, the anti-nuclear 
groups also impeach the opposition by arguing that facts are misrepresented and 
distorted and that they lack credibility.134 
The International Politics of Nuclear Waste defines waste as the Achilles heel 
of nuclear technology, because perceptions of risk and public anxiety is a 
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phenomenon that governments and industries committed to nuclear energy have to 
deal with. It provides the history and background of the “waste issue,” and looks at 
how the conflict on waste disposal methods and choice of sites were waged in the 
United States and in Europe. The book finds that disputes over nuclear waste 
disposal and siting became political issues in mid to late 1980s.135 It gives attention 
also to the pro-nuclear arguments, and finds common grounds on which they base 
their arguments: 
  
Each side in the conflict over nuclear wastes represents a variety of interests-
professional advancement, electricity sales, energy security, public health and 
safety, environmental protection, economic development, and so on. Each side is 
intent on securing political clout and public acceptance of its arguments. 
 
According to the new social movements perspective, the anti-nuclear 
movement is one of the issues in the broader critique of political and economic 
systems. New social movements aim at a revolution in the principles of democratic 
capitalist systems, because they are critical of materialism, hierarchy and 
impoverishment of life under capitalism.136 New social movements are in a struggle 
against prevailing political and economic systems which try to “colonize the life 
world.”137 These movements aim at a fundamental restructuring of power relations in 
society, and anti-nuclearism is one of the means.138 
The existing literature does not contain any work that carried out a critical 
study of the competing discourses. At the national level, studies on the politics of 
nuclear power in Turkey are few: Mustafa Kibaroğlu’s article titled “Turkey’s Quest 
for Peaceful Nuclear Energy” provides detailed analysis of the attempts for 
generating nuclear energy since the 1960s. The dissertation made an extensive use of 
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the basis on the history of Turkey’s nuclear energy plans. An earlier work is Ernur 
Erden’s master thesis written in 1983, titled “Environmental Impacts of the Planned 
Nuclear Power Plant in Turkey”139. The main focus is on the choice of the nuclear 
plant site, and the probable environmental impacts. Gökçe Berberoğlu, in Contending 
Approaches to Nuclear Energy studies the contending arguments on nuclear power, 
by tackling the debate on an issue basis. However, the thesis does not analyze the 
arguments. Gülçin Kaya looks at Turkey’s road to nuclear energy and France as a 
model in her master’s thesis.140 She introduces the French model as a viable one for a 
country that will generate nuclear power for the first time. She compares Turkey with 
France from political and economic aspects, and particularly in terms of legislation 
which would provide the basis for legal infrastructure. 
Apart from academic works, there are a few books that represent the views of 
the contending parties. The late Ahmed Yüksel Özemre, former Chairman of TAEK, 
wrote his memoirs on Turkey’s plans for nuclear energy. In Turkey’s Chernobyl 
Conundrum, he took the Chernobyl accident and its impacts on Turkey’s pursuit of 
nuclear power. The public became aware of accident risk, and “radiation” was given 
a meaning of “lethal” regardless of scientific levels for lethality. In this sense, he 
drew attention to the “radiation paranoia.” In What I Suffered From the Atom! He 
focused on the history of Turkey’s attempts for nuclear power, and presented a 
critique of the anti-nuclear movement. Ali Külebi, in Turkey’s Energy Issues and the 
Necessity of Nuclear Power, singles out nuclear energy as the answer to the 
outstanding energy issues of Turkey, and goes further to assert that it will also be 
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conducive for a nuclear option. The edited volume by Atilla Sandıklı and Aslı 
Hüseyinoğlu focuses on the relevance of nuclear energy for sustainable 
development.141 On the side of the opposition, Arif Künar’s Anti-Nuclear Stories, 
Don Quichottes against Akkuyu, provides a history of the anti-nuclear movement in 
Turkey. In Why No to Nuclear Power Plants?,”142 he provides the reasons behind the 
opposition against nuclear power. The outstanding issues are radiation and waste 
management, which are seen as intolerable threats to human life and the 
sustainability of the environment. 
There is limited literature on the analysis of the opposing viewpoints on 
Turkey’s nuclear power plans. Environmentalism in Turkey, Between Democracy 
and Development? edited by Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel includes articles that 
study environmentalism and anti-nuclearism. Kamil Kaygusuz and Murat Arsel point 
out to two discourses on energy: Environmentalists (Greens) and Developmentalists. 
They find conceptual categories where these two discourses favor different policy 
outcomes. They are regulation, technology and political outlook. Regulation includes 
frameworks on energy and the goal of policy, such as state involvement and 
economic growth. The category of technology also has two variables: the 
relationship between technology and risk (such as risk avoidance versus scientific 
optimism), and the nature of technology implementation (such as alternative and 
small scale projects versus conventional and megaprojects). Political outlook 
includes ideology (for example human rights versus nationalism and sovereignty) 
and gains in international relations (win-win or zero-sum). 
Accordingly, Environmentalists favor environmental protection, small-scale 
energy projects in order to avoid risks to the environment. They uphold 
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multiculturalism and universal human rights, and believe that energy politics should 
be based on international cooperation with an increasing role for non-state actors.  
Developmentalists, on the other hand, prefer market-based mechanisms for 
regulation, and uphold economic growth. They believe that development is based on 
technological and scientific progress, thus they are more willing to take risks than 
Environmentalists. At the ideational level, megaprojects, such as hydroelectrical 
power plants and nuclear power plants symbolize the power of the state.143  
The dissertation also notices that the proponents favor development, and the 
opponents take the environment as their priority. However, discursive analysis of the 
arguments provides findings that have a larger explanatory power on how the two 
sides attain different policy prescriptions. The analysis also reveals a further 
difference within the opposition, namely between Environmentalist and Anti-
nuclearists, as opposed to Kaygusuz and Arsel’s depiction of a single standpoint on 
the part of the opposition. 
Çiğdem Adem, in “Non-State Actors and Environmentalism,” looks at the 
environmental movements in the historical timeline, and identifies four stages in the 
post-1980 period as: organization and institution building, social movements, 
professionalization and institutionalization, and internationalization and project 
based work.144 Zülküf Aydın, in “The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism” 
states that environmental activism in Turkey is on rise with the growing awareness of 
the environmental and social repercussions of economic policies based on growth, 
and the involvement of local communities in leading environmental movements, like 
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Akkuyu and Bergama. These movements put forward the demand from the state to 
change its policy because the development activities jeopardized the communities 
and the environment. Although local demands for changes in state policies received 
little support from the public, they have been successful to challenge the legitimacy 
of the states.145 
Aydın proposes that the state and the civil society “critically engage.” He 
refers to a process where they would come together and listen to each other although 
they may not agree on everything. The dissertation also proposes a process of 
dialogue to avert “absolute war.” It will fill in this process of “critical engagement” 
by finding the common grounds and points on which the two sides can talk on. 
Gül Göktepe studied the public opinion and behavior regarding nuclear power 
plants in her articles “Nükleer Santrallara Karşı Kamuoyu Davranışlarının 
İncelenmesi (The Analysis of the Public Behavior against Nuclear Power Plants),” 
and “2000 yılı Amerika’da Nükleer Rönesans Dönemi, Bizde Nükleer Santral 
İstemezük! (The year 2000 is that of Nuclear Renaissance in the United States, [we 
say] ‘we do not want nuclear power plants’).”  She focused on the similarities of 
anti-nuclear movements in Europe, the United States and Turkey, and proposed 
methods to cope with disinformation and misinformation.146 
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The international bearings of the arguments will be provided in the next 
chapter which will provide norms and belief systems on the pursuit of peaceful 
nuclear power, energy security, environmentalism and anti-nuclearism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
POWER RELATIONS AND BELIEF SYSTEMS THAT SHAPE 
ARGUMENTS 
 
 
 
 The conflict on the meanings of nuclear energy is an indication of power 
relations. This chapter aims at revealing the power relations at the international and 
domestic level regarding the pursuit of peaceful nuclear power. The arguments of the 
parties in the nuclear energy debate are in interaction with international norms of 
nuclear nonproliferation, the pursuit of peaceful nuclear power and energy security 
on the hand, and anti-nuclearism and environmentalism on the other. In this context, 
the chapter will also look at belief systems in terms of nuclear nonproliferation and 
energy security. At the international level, the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
legally established two categories of states as nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots. 
At the national level, beginning from the Republican era, development and economic 
growth has been seen as the main dynamics behind augmenting state power in 
Turkey. As a result the state is cautious to demands from the society that could slow 
down or prevent development projects, such as environmental protection. Universal 
norms on energy security are yet to be developed, because the definition of energy 
security is different by the main actors of the international system. The chapter will 
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identify power relations in terms of nuclear energy in international and national 
levels, then the international belief systems that affect the arguments at the domestic 
level. 
 
 
4.1. Power Relations on Nuclear Energy 
 
4.1.1. International level 
 
An important feature of nuclear nonproliferation regime is the distinction 
between nuclear haves and have-nots. This section will find out the power relations 
regarding nuclear nonproliferation and the pursuit of nuclear power as to who can 
possess nuclear weapons, pursue nuclear energy and how they can do it.  
The “truth” about nuclear weapons is that they increase the danger of nuclear 
war, which has catastrophic consequences. “Nuclear-weapon States” (NWS) are the 
legal possessors of these weapons, with the ability and the will to share the 
technology with “non-nuclear-weapon States.” Thus, they are positioned superior to 
the latter in terms of the experience and the definition of nuclear weapons in their 
military doctrines, that is, for defense rather than offense, and to prevent a nuclear 
catastrophe. The NPT strictly forbids horizontal proliferation, that is, the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States.  
 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the 
danger of nuclear war…Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful 
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which 
may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear 
explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the 
Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,… 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control 
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over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way 
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the 
transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept 
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the 
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under 
this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  
Article IX  
3…a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.147  
 
The drafters of the Treaty assume that “Nuclear-weapon States” are legal 
possessors of nuclear weapons and they hold the right to develop nuclear explosive 
devices, while “non-nuclear-weapon States” do not. Peaceful uses of nuclear 
technology should be promoted, and military uses should be prevented. By acceding 
to the Treaty, the latter voluntarily accept not to produce nuclear weapons. They are 
under the obligation to prevent diversion of nuclear technology to military purposes. 
Nuclear-weapon States are superior to non-nuclear-weapon States, and peaceful uses 
of nuclear technology are positioned superior to military use.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calls itself the “Atoms for 
peace” Agency,148 referring to the US President Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for 
Peace” speech to promote the peaceful uses of the atom. The objectives of the IAEA 
are stated in Article II of its Statute:  
 
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy 
to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is 
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able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or 
control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.149  
 
Peace, health and prosperity are global needs, and atomic energy contributes 
to their enhancement. The IAEA is the institution to provide assistance for the 
development of nuclear energy, to supervise and control its use. Nuclear technology 
should be used for civilian purposes and not for military, because it will engender 
peace while diversion will lead to conflict. The Agency establishes itself as the 
Institution that has the authority to promote the peaceful uses, and its “public” is the 
“world” which will obtain peace, health and prosperity through atomic energy. It 
serves as the intermediary to work towards “peace” and to prevent “conflict.” 
The fact that the nuclear-weapon States are also the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, with veto power, institutes their status as “great powers”, 
and reinforces the status of “lesser powers.” “Great power” status reproduces the 
power of these states as they can keep control of “threats” to their national security 
and can allow decisions that would increase their power. The decision-making 
process in the UN Security Council is explained as follows: 
 
Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes 
of all five permanent members. This is the rule of "great Power unanimity", often 
referred to as the “veto” power. Under the Charter, all Members of the United 
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While 
other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the 
Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated 
under the Charter to carry out.150  
 
It is taken for granted that “Great Powers” have the right to veto any decision 
in the Security Council that does not conform with their interests, but “lesser 
powers” have to abide by their decision even if it is not consistent with their national 
interests. Great powers are equal among themselves, but superior to others. The 
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Security Council is superior to national governments and the other organs of the 
United Nations. 
States not party to the NPT, but which possess nuclear weapons are India, 
Israel and Pakistan. North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003 and carried out a 
nuclear test in 2006. The international community is also concerned about Iran’s 
uranium enrichment program. The international discourse categorizes these states by 
calling on the first group to accede to the Treaty while acknowledging the reasons 
behind their possession of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran and North Korea 
are referred to as “rogue states” or “states of concern,” seeking nuclear weapons 
capability, hence threatening international peace and security. The following excerpts 
are chosen from the UN and IAEA, and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
focusing on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. 
 
India regards its nuclear and long-range power projection programs as instruments 
for maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These capabilities 
support New Delhi's claims to great power status, while also demonstrating that 
India's technical prowess is equal to that of developed countries'. Meanwhile, India 
continues to reject the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime on the grounds that 
it perpetuates an unjust distinction between a small group of states that are allowed 
nuclear weapons, and the rest of the world's states that are denied this right. India 
has also been highly critical of the nuclear weapon states' failure to meet their 
nuclear disarmament commitments.151  
 
It is assumed that stability in the Asia-Pacific is necessary. India’s nuclear 
capabilities are “legitimate” because it gives India the capability to “project power,” 
in order to maintain stability in the region. These “power projection programs” are 
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and they provide prestige and reinforce 
India’s status. It is recognized that the NPT legalizes inequality between states, and 
India falls at a disadvantage because it did not acquire its capability before 1967 
although it could be presumed as a great power. While India maintains nuclear 
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capability, they are for defensive purposes and New Delhi supports the disarmament 
goal of the regime. India’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles are predicated as 
“instruments for maintaining strategic stability,” which “support its claims for great 
power status,” and equate its technological development level with those of the 
developed countries.  
 
This agreement is an important step towards satisfying India’s growing need for 
energy, including nuclear technology and fuel, as an engine for development. It 
would also bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation 
regime… It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-
proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety…The 
agreement would assure India of reliable access to nuclear technology and nuclear 
fuel. It would also be a step forward towards universalization of the international 
safeguards regime…This agreement would serve the interests of both India and the 
international community.152  
 
The agreement between the United States and India was seen as a double-
standard, because India as a country possessing nuclear weapons but not a party to 
the NPT receives nuclear technology and fuel from the United States, the leader of 
the nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Baradei assumes that the rationale of 
technological cooperation with India is to promote nuclear power, which he 
predicates as “engine for development.” An India out of the regime is more 
dangerous, and cooperation will help the international community to keep control of 
the country and the technology. Thus, he constitutes the agreement “beneficial” and 
“in accordance” with nuclear nonproliferation goals. 
 
Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapon program in the early 1970s after its defeat 
and break up in the Indo-Bangladesh war of 1971. Islamabad regards nuclear 
weapons as essential to safeguard the South Asian balance of power and offset its 
conventional inferiority and lack of strategic depth against India. The technological 
complexity associated with nuclear weapons and their systems of delivery is also 
closely tied to Pakistan's post-colonial identity as the first Muslim nation to have 
acquired such a capability.153  
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It is necessary to maintain the balance of power in South Asia, where 
Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons came as a response to India. Pakistan was 
a former colony and is a Muslim nation, which are regarded as secondary in status. 
Therefore, nuclear capability increased its status. In this context, nuclear weapons 
became the element of security and stability rather than threat.  
 
Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-
related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement 
is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its 
“minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian 
military action.154 
 
It is assumed that Pakistan’s expansion of facilities related to the 
development of nuclear weapons is acceptable. It could be a reaction to the relative 
increase in India’s power. Pakistan’s nuclear capability is acceptable because it is 
regarded as a deterrent to India’s capability, and maintains stability. 
 
Situated in a high conflict region, Israel possesses advanced conventional military 
forces, including offensive and defensive missile capabilities. Israel is widely 
understood to possess nuclear weapons. Unconfirmed allegations, mostly by 
neighboring states, suggest that Israel may possess chemical and/or biological 
weapons. 155 
 
It is presumed that Israel is already under intense security threat which 
necessitated the development of advanced military capabilities as well as those for 
offensive purposes to ensure its security. However, Israel has not declared its nuclear 
weapons possession. Neighboring states to Israel do not acknowledge Israel’s 
security and threat perceptions. The former are positioned inferior to Israel, because 
they make allegations against Israel without tangible proof.  
 
As we face the future, other strategies must be found to enlist Pakistan and Israel as 
partners in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Whatever form those 
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solutions take, they will need to address not only nuclear weapons but also the much 
broader range of security concerns facing each country.156 
 
El Baradei takes it for granted that Pakistan and Israel had to develop 
nuclear capabilities as a consequence of the security issues in their region, 
and they do not pose a threat to international peace and security. To the 
contrary, they should be included in arms control and nonproliferation efforts, 
through strategies in various forms, which aim at addressing regional security 
issues in order to start de-nuclearization.  
 
Iran has been a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1970, and has possessed a nuclear 
program for more than fifty years, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. The nuclear 
program has advanced significantly in the past decade with Iran’s decision to enrich 
its own uranium. Tehran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its insistence on 
developing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle has invited intensified international 
pressure and led many states to worry that Iran’s true intention is to acquire nuclear 
weapons.157 
 
Iran agreed on a work plan to address all outstanding issues, with a defined timeline, 
which was an important step in the right direction… The earlier we move from 
confrontation and distrust, to dialogue and confidence-building, the better for Iran 
and for the international community.158 
 
Iran’s nuclear program has long been understood to be peaceful. The decision 
to have an independent uranium enrichment program is doubtful. It is presumed that 
when the international community expressed concern, Iran should have halted the 
program. Iran cannot and must not acquire nuclear weapons, because it is a NNWS 
Party to the NPT. “Insistence” on the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle 
constitutes Iran as a dissenter within the community, because once a country 
becomes self-sufficient in critical nuclear technology, what it takes is the political 
decision to go nuclear. The “insistence” is equated with a malign “intention” to 
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pursue a nuclear weapons capability. The IAEA Chairman’s remarks presume that it 
is the international community and the IAEA which is above individual states, and 
the latter should follow the directions determined by the community. Iran and the 
international community have been in confrontation, and the right way to move 
forward is Iran’s agreeing to discuss halting the uranium enrichment program along 
with confidence-building measures. Iran’s forgoing of its enrichment program is 
beneficial for the international community. The international community and the 
IAEA are positioned superior to Iran and its will. “We” denotes the IAEA which 
reinforces its position as the mechanism to verify states’ compliance with the Treaty, 
and serving as the forum for negotiation. 
 
North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device and has deployed short-range and 
medium-range ballistic missiles. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), the official name of the North Korean regime, conducted cruise missile 
tests in 1994, 1997, 2003, and 2007 and medium and intermediate-range ballistic 
missile tests in 1993, 1998, 2006 and 2009. North Korea’s 2006 test of the long-
range Taepodong 2 (also referred to as the Paektusan-2) failed less than a minute 
after its launch. In what was seen as defiance of UN resolutions passed after the 
2006 missile test, on 5 April 2009, North Korea once again tested a long-range 
missile, claiming it was a satellite launch. Launch of the three-stage rocket was seen 
as a technical failure with the first stage splashing down in the water between the 
Korean peninsula and Japan and the remaining stages, along with payload, falling 
into the Pacific Ocean. … concerns remain over the DPRK’s ambition for an 
intercontinental ballistic missile, particularly due to its nuclear aspirations and its 
role as a leading exporter of ballistic missile technology. (…) North Korea [tested] a 
nuclear device..on 9 October 2006…after Pyongyang withdrew from the Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January of 2003. Six-Party 
Talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United 
States began in 2003 to quell North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.159  
 
The word “regime” indicates the assumption that the state in North Korea is 
failed or undemocratic, which tries to sustain the status quo. Despite the several tests, 
its long-range missile program was a failure. “Less than a minute,” “splashing down 
in the water,” and “falling into Pacific Ocean” emphasize technological failure. 
States in “defiance” of the decisions taken by international community are not 
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acceptable. This phrase constructs DPRK as the “other.” Its nuclear ambitions should 
be repressed, but even the leading states of nonproliferation regime could not 
convince DPRK. Thus, it is a “rogue state.” 
 
[The DPRK’s test] create[s] tension in the region [and] will also pose serious 
implications to peace and security on the regional and global level…[It is in] 
flagrant violation of the Security Council Resolution 1718 which demanded that the 
country] not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile. (…)All 
these experiences, and my direct involvement, made me feel much more frustrated 
by the lack of control as to the denuclearization process, as had been agreed in the 
Six-Party joint statement.160 
 
 
The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, assumes that nuclear proliferation 
is a serious threat to international and regional peace and security, and the Security 
Council resolutions override national policies. He constitutes the DPRK as a country 
which is out of control and which does not abide by the decisions of the Security 
Council. So, its nuclear test is a demonstration of its defiance to the international 
community and to international and regional actors that were involved in Six-Party 
talks. 
The above analysis suggests that there is a hierarchy not only between 
nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, but also among “nuclear-
haves” (the P-5 and non-NPT nuclear weapon possessors). There is a further 
hierarchy between non-NPT states: While the nuclear capability of Israel, India and 
Pakistan are legitimized through various reasons, Iran and North Korea are presented 
as “out of the community” mainly due to “irrational leadership.” What determines 
the “rationality” of a government on the meaning and use of nuclear weapons is 
basically domestic politics, type of state, and so on… Accordingly, autocratic 
regimes will be more inclined to use force, because decision-making processes will 
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miss checks and balances against “irrational” individual or bureaucratic decision-
making.  
While the nuclear nonproliferation norm stresses that nuclear proliferation is 
a threat to peace and security, it acknowledges the existence of nuclear weapons at 
the hands of nuclear-weapon states as an element of security and stability, because 
they sustain the balance between great powers. The nonproliferation bargain involves 
the commitment of nuclear-weapon states for the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. The assumption is that the threat is “horizontal proliferation” which refers 
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state that did not have these capabilities 
before. Similarly, the increase in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, that is, 
“vertical proliferation” poses a challenge to the regime. In fact, increasing doubts on 
the nonproliferation bargain led non-nuclear-weapon states to adopt a resolution in 
2008 for a “renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons.”161  
 
The General Assembly… 
Stresses the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies 
to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the 
process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and 
based on the principle of undiminished security for all;… 
 
Non-nuclear-weapon states express their discomfort with the increasing role 
of nuclear weapons and the utility assigned to them in the security doctrines. Small 
powers view nuclear programs in the context of scientific and technological 
development: 
 
The General Assembly… (…) 
5. Considers the Israeli act of aggression to be a violation and a denial of the 
inalienable sovereign right of States to scientific and technological progress for 
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achieving social and economic development and raising the standards of peoples 
and the dignity of the human person, as well as a violation and denial of inalienable 
human rights and the sovereign right of States to scientific and technological 
development.162 
 
Having in mind the increasing significance of nuclear energy for economic 
development, and in particular, its important role in accelerating the development of 
the developing countries,…163 
 
Reaffirms its strong support for the indispensable role of the Agency in encouraging 
and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for 
peaceful uses, in technology transfer to developing countries and in nuclear safety, 
verification and security…164 
 
 
 
4.1.1.1. Turkey: A NNWS with nuclear power plans 
 
Turkey’s nuclear energy plans are evaluated within the international 
framework, as its neighbor, Iran, is under scrutiny because it “insists” on not 
ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol. Turkey’s security concerns and the extent to 
which it motivates the country to revise its decision are assessed together with the 
timing of the nuclear energy program. Although domestic politics in Turkey have 
less in common with Iran than with Europe, the history of the country and the issues 
with its democracy induce caution on the part of international actors. 
Any measures designed to enhance the credibility of NATO, the United States, and 
the European Union as reliable underwriters of Turkish national security will work 
to diminish the risk of a Turkish decision to acquire nuclear weapons…if Iran were 
to acquire nuclear weapons capability, the impact on Turkey would be powerful.165 
 
…Turkey’s [non-nuclear-weapon-state] status was contemplated as an asset rather 
than a deficiency…if the international community would sink into acquiescence 
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after the acquisition of nuclear weapons [by Iran], and the withdrawal from the 
Treaty [by North Korea], that would affect the norms of the regime: Possession of 
nuclear weapons would be considered as an act that could go with impunity, and 
non-possession as a security deficiency.166  
 
In 1981, the United States expressed concerns about a Turkish- Pakistani alliance on 
the grounds of alleged shipments from Turkey to Pakistan of strategic material with 
potential nuclear weapons implications. The United States feared that Turkey’s help 
would enable Pakistan go ahead with its quest for uranium enrichment technology. 
167 Western countries feared that Turkey would do what Pakistan did—modify the 
technology to gain the capability to build an atomic bomb.168 
 
It is inferred that Turkey’s nuclear motivations will be the result of a number 
of factors, but mainly that of the perception that its current status has become a 
security deficit. When other factors, such as NATO, the US commitment and the EU 
membership prospect erode, the utility of nuclear weapons will increase as tools to 
boost power or to make up the power gap; that is, to address the security dilemma 
due to Iran and the changing balances in the region. The risk of nuclear proliferation 
was perceived with regard to the connections with Pakistan, and the involvement of 
Turkish entities in proliferation-related trade.169  
The international community does not view proliferation by a country on an 
individual basis but with the regional consequences as it triggers security dilemma. 
The concern is a domino effect in a region, where states would engage in a re-
assessment of their position. What is at stake would be international nonproliferation 
regime. Put differently, if the ideational power provided by the “non-nuclear-weapon 
State status” and by the commitment to the regime –which guarantee the 
“acceptability” of the state within the “community,” and contribute to its security-, 
crumbles, this status would cease to be a constraint to proliferate, and would rather 
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become a motivation to go nuclear, hence diminish the security of the “great 
powers.”  
The (in)security dilemma is used widely in the discourses of those who favor 
Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons: They construct Turkey as a country “under 
threat” or a “second-tier” country, because it is a “Muslim country” which is kept 
“second-tier” on purpose. Nuclear weapons capability would make up the “security 
gap” and meet two goals, that is, enhancing the material power of the state vis-à-vis 
its neighbors, and ideational power by making Turkey a “first-tier” country. It will be 
studied in detail in the following chapters. 
 
 
4.1.2. Power relations at the national level  
 
This section will look at the power relations at the national level in terms of 
environmental protection and the ensuing opposition to nuclear power. Political 
parties, trade unions and chambers which are mainly located at the left of the 
political spectrum, subscribed to environmentalist and anti-nuclear arguments, and 
criticized the policies of the governments regarding their choice of nuclear energy. 
The opposition to nuclear power widened to include several civil society groups as a 
result of the activities and protests of the environmental organizations, and 
particularly after the arrival of Greenpeace in Turkey. Thus, this section will focus on 
state-civil society relations to see the latter’s effectiveness in policymaking.  
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4.1.2.1. The significance of development and economic growth for the 
state 
 
Capitalism, Westernization and environmentalism are the three major forces 
that shape environmental politics in Turkey.170 The Turkish state applied economic 
models based on capitalism since its inception, and it dictates economic growth-
which is also the basis of “development” as a national goal. Westernization demands 
social and cultural modernization. Inevitably, it requires openness to outside 
influences, and reform when necessary. Environmentalism does not reject 
development, but upholds “weak sustainable development” where natural capital 
should be substituted substantially by human-made capital.171  
Development and economic growth in Turkey, are national aspirations: At the 
ideational level, it legitimizes the state. At the practical level, it is equated with 
catching up with “contemporary civilization,” which is the cornerstone of national 
identity. This understanding assumes that it is the state that applies tasks for 
development for the society, and they are in cooperation.172 The state has been 
ineffective to balance the aims of economic development with the environmental 
problems it engenders, due to the treatment of the environment as a resource to be 
exploited. Since the Republican period, modern Turkey sought to promote industry 
and accumulation of capital, and until the 1980s, “Developmentalism” was the 
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preferred mode of capital accumulation and industrialization. Development was 
equated with economic growth at any expense.173  
Economic growth, integration with the European security system and 
alliances were the main aims of the newly established Turkish state. Integration with 
the European security system has been pursued since the Ottoman period, and was 
almost interchangeably referred to as Westernization, Europeanization and 
modernization. The aim was not limited to merely catching up with the West in 
military and economic terms, but aligning with the political and social system to the 
level of “contemporary civilization.” It was perceived that as long as the new country 
and the new nation remained “backward,” it could not preserve its unity and integrity 
within its borders, or ensure external security. Therefore, Westernization was 
perceived as a security strategy to guarantee the survival of the state.174 
Regarding energy policy, the dominant discourse has been “energy 
independence,” that is to say, increased domestic production.175 This strategy is 
based on Realpolitik view of international trade, which assumes dependency as a 
“security problem.” According to this view, energy is part of the geostrategic 
competition, and it is a zero-sum game. Therefore, control of energy resources gives 
the exporting country strategic advantage. In the post-Cold War period, the 
transportation of energy resources from the Middle East and Central Asia through 
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interconnected pipelines highlighted the need for integrating market mechanisms 
with energy production. This new policy direction has not totally replaced the 
“energy independence” approach, but it involves the logic of “energy 
interdependence.”176 Energy policies in line with sustainable development is not 
likely to create antagonism between state and the society, which are indispensible for 
environmental politics; however, the challenge lies in integrating the commitment to 
development with an emphasis on environmental protection.177 
As Turkey prioritized industrialization and capital accumulation over 
environmental problems, it curtailed its ability to address environmental issues and 
implement environmental laws, rules and regulations. The state could not adopt 
effective monitoring and enforcement measures despite the enactment of legislation 
as a result of increasing environmental problems and international pressures. 
Environmental issues were tackled independently from development until the late 
1980s and early 1990s. However, after 1990s, both environmental NGOs and the 
state considered environment and development issues together, particularly as a 
result of the “sustainable development” concerns of international organizations.178  
The concept of “sustainable development” was internationally recognized for 
the first time in 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio, Brazil. The concept refers to the use of resources for economic 
development in such a way that these resources and the environment will be 
protected for the benefit of future generations:  
 
In simple terms, sustainable development means integrating the economic, social 
and environmental objectives of society, in order to maximize human well-being in 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs. This requires seeking mutually supportive approaches whenever possible, 
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and making trade-offs where necessary. For developing countries, and for 
development co-operation, reducing poverty and meeting the International 
Development Goals are imperatives — within the broad context of sustainable 
development — for this generation. 179 
 
However, Türkel Minibaş observed that the targets of sustainable 
development could not compete with the priorities of the market economy and the 
capabilities of transnational capital, such as the use of cheap raw material and 
resources overseas, and the diminished effectiveness of the state to control 
investments.  Therefore, the meaning of sustainable development was transformed 
into “the sustainability of resources for maximum profit.”180 Greenpeace, one of the 
leading environmental organizations, foresaw this transformation when they 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the Rio Conference by saying that the planet was 
“sold out” to vested interests, and that the measures would not change the system.181 
Environmental movements in Turkey are newly developing.182 The limited 
development of the civil society was attributed to the “strong state” tradition 
inherited from the Ottoman past.183 The centralized bureaucratic élite have prevented 
activities which are outside the domain of the state, but which could exert pressure 
on the state. However, Z. Aydın argues that this view only provides a partial 
explanation to the failure of the civil society to reach full maturity in Turkey. He 
argues that after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the state has not had a 
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rigid position toward the civil society. Instead, the degree of its flexibility depended 
on political, economic and social factors in different periods. The import substitution 
period (1950s-1970s), military interventions and the state principle of preserving the 
unitary state prevented the development of civil society organizations based on class, 
ethnicity or religion.184  
Turkey’s integration with the global economy changed the nature of the 
Turkish bourgeoisie and the pattern of capital accumulation since 1980. The 
outward-looking economic system engendered a new bourgeoisie which started to 
endorse a liberal perspective on the role of the state. Consequently the pluralistic 
language of liberalism paved the way for freedom of expression and organization, 
and strengthened civil society in Turkey:185   
 
The neo-liberal view of the state gained ascendancy in the post-1990. According to 
this view, without personal and associational freedoms, and without the curtailment 
of state interference in economic life, development could not be possible. Turkey’s 
severe economic problems, its dependence on continued foreign aid and finance, 
and the declaration that membership of the EU would be a savior from the economic 
and political ills by the Turkish bourgeoisie, persuaded the nationalist and étatist 
elements within the state to ease their grip on civil rights.186  
 
Integration with the world economy and Turkey’s EU membership prospect 
required the retreat of the state from economic and social affairs. In this sense, the 
bourgeoisie upheld liberalization of economic, social and political life through which 
they saw better prospect for everyone concerned. Aydın calls it the bourgeoisie’s 
new modernization project.187 One can conclude that, the state will tend to be more 
flexible towards demands if they would contribute to the “modernization” of Turkey, 
because eventually, it would result in development.  
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“Modernization” is a key term for development and economic growth. 
Adaman and Arsel derive from this link that the nation is assumed to be “backward,” 
and the modernization process is not merely that of catching up with a developmental 
target, but one that is expected to clear the vagueness of the country’s geography and 
that would render it authentically “European.”188 The transition from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish Republic placed Westernization at its core, not to become 
“western” but to maintain the survival and strength of the state.189  Modernization 
was defined by the application of modern science and technology to economic 
processes, through which Europe achieved progress and advanced industries. In this 
sense, modernization policies in Turkey upheld the type of economic development 
which subjugated nature in the name of national progress.190  
The understanding that development would come with rapid economic 
growth which is essential for progress was not challenged by different ideologies 
except environmentalism, which problematized the implicit link between economic 
growth, societal development and national progress.191 The more powerful the 
environmental civil society challenges the legitimacy of the state, the more the state 
will take notice of their demands. Aydın evaluates that the state includes 
environmental issues in the agenda as a public relations exercise, or to maintain its 
image as a country that cares about environmental issues in international agencies or 
conferences.192  
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4.1.2.2. Environmentalism 
 
Between the early 1970s and late 1990s, international development agencies, 
like the World Bank, promoted the ideology of “small is beautiful,” and it coincided 
with the trend to increase the level of productivity with small-scale farming instead 
of giant projects for development. Environmental activism in Turkey gained pace 
with the growing awareness on the environmental and social repercussions of 
economic policies based on growth, and the involvement of local communities in 
leading environmental movements, like Akkuyu and Bergama. These movements 
expressed the demand for policy change, because the development activities 
jeopardized the communities and the environment. Although local demands received 
little support from the public, they have been successful to challenge the legitimacy 
of states.193  
 In the pre-1980 period, environmental movements were in their embryonic 
stage. Çiğdem Adem identifies four stages in the post-1980 period, as: organization 
and institution building, social movements, professionalization and 
institutionalization, and internationalization and project based work.194 Notable in the 
organization and institution building phase are the activities of the Green Party, 
established in 1988. Its existence encouraged activities against Akkuyu nuclear 
power plant and the Aliağa thermal power plant.195 This period witnessed the 
development of institutional and legislative bases of environmental protection: The 
1982 Constitution enshrined articles on the preservation of the environment. Most 
notably, Article 56 provided everyone the right to live in a healthy and sustainable 
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environment, and stipulated that environmental duties and obligations apply to the 
State and the citizens alike.196  
 In the social movements stage, the dominant theme of environmental action 
was energy-related issues. These energy debates helped politicize environmental 
movements, which marked a significant shift from the apolitical environmentalist 
and nature-conserving approach in the 1970s and early 1980s. This feature attracted 
people interested in politics and conscious of their environment as well as 
organizations without environmental expertise, like labor unions and chambers. The 
anti-nuclear platform (ANP) was formed in this period, in 1993, and consisted of 
labor unions, professional organizations including national and local NGOs.197 The 
ANP became the Platform for Anti-Nuclear Cooperation in 2000, and functioned 
until the tender for nuclear power plant was postponed in July 2000.198 In the 
professionalization and institutionalization phase, environmental activism was taken 
by the media, management consultants and policy experts financed by organizations 
like Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund (WWF).199 The revival of plans for the 
establishment of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant during the Erdoğan government, 
which presented a more vigorous project for nuclear energy, suggests that the anti-
nuclear coalition has not been effective to revert the policy decision. 
Civil society organizations emerging after 1980s expanded the space for 
mobilization and civil initiative, some of which were linked to transnational 
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networks and NGOs.200 The Turkish environmental groups recognized, as their 
transnational counterparts, that environmental problems were not national but global 
in scale. Thus they could not be tackled by the nation state, and should be addressed 
at local, national and international levels.201 They cooperated with them, and used 
similar pressure methods to be effective on governments.202  
Transnational networks could be founded by economic actors and businesses, 
scientists who want to affect policy making, or by activists who seek to make their 
voices heard on a specific issue.203 Transnational networks are useful in providing 
information, and supporting their members with well-defined goals. What they use is 
“information politics,” that is, activists make use of the information networks, 
become a powerful actor vis-à-vis their contenders. The networks can increase their 
effectiveness with the help of the activists who defend their interests against their 
opponents.204  
 Transnational environmentalist organizations, like Greenpeace, seek to raise 
awareness at the individual level to challenge policies at the national level, which are 
deemed harmful to the environment. It was not until the arrival of the Greenpeace in 
1992 that the first systematic anti-nuclear transnational network was established in 
Turkey. Scientists, activists, and artists principally from Germany, Canada, Sweden 
and Australia formed the other external links of the movement. They made use of the 
experiences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident and the atomic bombs dropped on 
Japan during World War II, to support their arguments that nuclear reactors are lethal 
for humans and environment. The most popular groups in the network are 
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Greenpeace, the Nuclear Awareness Project from Canada and the International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The transnational network to ANP in 
Turkey provided technical and scientific information about nuclear issues.205  
 These movements put the receiving and providing countries, as well as their 
publics and companies under intense pressure. The developmental view of the state 
was challenged by the transnational network which provided necessary information 
to the civil initiative critical of state policies and the opportunity for their expansion. 
The transnational network played a significant role to widen the space of 
environmentally concerned civil society to face up to the state. Information about the 
potential problems of nuclear waste and accidents were used in order to sensitize the 
public opinion to the nuclear energy project. The government could not apply 
repression because the involvement of Greenpeace meant that any such action would 
be immediately visible, which could lead to the condemnation of Turkey’s 
performance in respecting human rights.206  
 
 
4.1.2.3. Managing the conflict  
 
The state and the civil society tried to manage the conflict over 
developmental and environmental priorities through a new process of political 
accommodation which shows the first signs of “critical engagement.” Critical 
engagement refers to the mutual recognition by the state and NGOs of the other’s 
capabilities, and the understanding that the qualities of each party are necessary to 
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address social and environmental problems.207 Power relations between the state and 
the civil society are unequal, so critical engagement involves cooperation and 
conflict when they discuss social and environmental issues. The aim is to prevent the 
conflict to get out of hand: 
If NGOs openly condemn state policies, they would risk their power to exert 
pressure on the state. On the other hand, if the state completely ignores the views of 
NGOs on environmental issues, it may lose legitimacy. Critical engagement would 
help environmental organizations to influence policy-making, and to contribute to the 
process of democratization. Also, the state, by engaging with the NGOs would show 
the public that it is receptive to their views and priorities.208  
Environmental activism was not perceived as a challenge as long as it did not 
focus on issues that could impede economic growth. The priorities of the state and 
dominant classes regarding development prevent them to receive the demands of 
environmental civil society organizations, as well as similar international movements 
with which the former forms alliances.209 The primary concern of the state regarding 
“critical engagement” with the NGOs and other civil society organizations was the 
consequences of dialogue with NGOs on development, and whether it would allow 
further demands that might jeopardize the state’s preferred development strategy.  
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4.2. International Belief Systems and Norms Shaping the Arguments: 
 
4.2.1. International norms of pursuing peaceful nuclear power and 
Turkey’s policies on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear power 
 
International norms of pursuing peaceful nuclear power sprung from those on 
nuclear nonproliferation, because military use preceded civilian uses, and the transfer 
of nuclear technology forms an important part of the problematique of nuclear 
proliferation. Articles III and IV of NPT regulate the transfer of nuclear technology 
for peaceful purposes. NNWS have the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes and their facilities will be under the safeguards of the IAEA to verify that 
they are in compliance with the Treaty. In return, nuclear-weapon states gave the 
commitment to non-nuclear-weapon states for complete disarmament, and agreed to 
share nuclear technology with them for civilian uses. Articles II, III, IV and VI 
express this “nonproliferation bargain”: 
 
… all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange 
of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other 
States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes, … 
 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the 
transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept 
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency … for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to 
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. 
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Article IV 
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of 
this Treaty. 
 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.210 
 
After the Soviet Union attained nuclear capability in 1949, the nuclear arms 
race began. Following the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 
(1952), France (1960) and China (1964) acquired nuclear weapons. Apart from its 
enormous power of destruction and significance in the military arsenal, nuclear 
weapons granted prestige and status to their possessors. The Cuban missile crisis in 
1961 demonstrated that the world could not live on the threat of a nuclear exchange 
between superpowers, and further nuclear proliferation should be prevented. That 
resulted in a draft text for a treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. States started to 
consider nuclear weapons not “as another weapon” but those of deterrence. New 
lines of contact were set up between Washington, D.C. and Moscow in order to 
prevent misunderstanding. Arms control talks also began in this period (1969-1972, 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I).  
The context of the Cold War contained conflicts and motivations for 
proliferation, but the determining factor to decrease the utility of nuclear weapons for 
state power was the end of the Cold War. Several states having nuclear weapons or 
nuclear programs acceded to the NPT and strengthened the norm of non-nuclear-
weapon state. South Africa possessed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but 
abandoned them in the early 1990s. Pretoria acceded to the NPT in 1991, and 
became active in nuclear nonproliferation efforts: It joined the Zangger Committee 
                                               
210 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970. 
74 
 
and Nuclear Suppliers’ Group for the control of nuclear materials trade, and was 
influential in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It also led the “New 
Agenda Coalition” which was effective in the landmark decisions taken in the 2000 
NPT Review Conference. 
  After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine-
which had nuclear capabilities on their territories- acceded to the NPT in 1992 as 
non-nuclear-weapon states. They agreed to free their territory of nuclear weapons in 
return for international recognition. 
 
In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty 
of the Republic of Belarus, which has been given constitutional status, Belarus will 
take all the measures to achieve the status of a non-nuclear state.211  
 
Argentina and Brazil pursued ambitious nuclear power and missile programs 
beginning from 1960s, but by 1990s, they put their facilities under bilateral 
inspections to verify that they are used for peaceful purposes. They became party to 
the NPT in 1995.  
The peaceful use of nuclear technology is an important part of the 
nonproliferation bargain. The limits on the uses of nuclear technology and IAEA’s 
role are openly stated in the IAEA Statute: 
 
The Agency … shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at 
its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further 
any military purpose.212 
 
To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable 
and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available 
by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in 
such a way as to further any military purpose …213 
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Before approving a project under this article, the Board of Governors shall give due 
consideration to: (…) 4. Include undertakings by the member or group of members 
submitting the project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a 
way as to further any military purpose…214 
 
In addition to the IAEA, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group have guidelines to prevent nuclear proliferation: 
 
Our Committee … was formed … to serve as the “faithful interpreter” of … [the] 
Article III, paragraph 2 [of the NPT], to harmonize the interpretation of nuclear 
export control policies for NPT Parties. The Committee has been focusing on what 
is meant in Article III.2 of the Treaty by “especially designed or prepared equipment 
or material for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.” 
The Zangger Committee maintains a Trigger List (triggering safeguards as a 
condition of supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in 
identifying equipment and materials subject to export controls.215 
 
The NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not 
contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
which would not hinder international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field. The 
NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the 
means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be 
implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation 
norms.216  
 
Turkey acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1980 (signed in 
1969, ratified in 1980). Ankara endorses the norms of international nonproliferation 
regimes, and upholds cooperation in order to achieve arms control and disarmament 
goals. Following are some official statements demonstrating Ankara’s commitment: 
 
Turkey attaches particular importance to arms control and disarmament issues. An 
active participation in international efforts in these areas, adherence to the relevant 
international agreements and observance of their full implementation, as well as 
maintaining the coordination among relevant institutions are important elements of 
Turkey’s national security policy. As a result of the momentous changes that took 
place in the European security architecture over the last decade, the general 
aspiration for a new security system based on cooperation has given a fresh impetus 
to arms control and disarmament endeavors, which was welcomed by Turkey.217  
 
Ankara understands that nonproliferation goals are attainable by cooperation, 
that is to say, multilateral efforts rather than unilateral initiatives or bilateral 
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agreements are effective to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
International institutions and regimes ensure mutual trust among states, which are 
expected to contribute to arms control and disarmament efforts. These, most of the 
time, require steps that are counter to the “rational choices” of states operating in 
terms of Realpolitik. Ankara also welcomes the emphasis on cooperation in the 
European security zone, because thereby the institutions of European security will 
facilitate the endeavors and substantiate nonproliferation norms. Ankara gave the 
following commitments with the Safeguards agreement: 
 
Article I 
According to Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, in accordance with its 
provisions, Turkey commits itself to accept safeguards inspections for verifying that 
sources or fissile material used in all peaceful nuclear activities in any place within 
the country, -under its authority and control- are not diverted into nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices.  
 
Article 28  
The purpose of the safeguards inspections… is to timely detect the diversion of 
significant amount of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for an 
unknown purpose, and to deter such diversion with the risk of early warning.218 
 
Turkey, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, signed a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA, and accepted IAEA inspections for the verification of 
compliance with the Treaty. This commitment is integral for the transfer of civilian 
nuclear technology to NNWS. After the 1991 Gulf War and the ensuing UN 
inspections in Iraq, it was seen that safeguards regime was insufficient to prevent 
Iraq to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Thus, efforts began in 1993 to draft an 
Additional Protocol to strengthen and expand the existing IAEA safeguards in order 
to ensure an effective safeguards regime. Signing the Additional Protocol acquired a 
further meaning than a mere political act: It demonstrates a country’s commitment to 
the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and its transparency about nuclear 
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facilities under its control. Therefore, it keeps the country as “part of the 
community.” The following text is an excerpt from the Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards agreement signed between Turkey and the IAEA: 
 
Departing from the fact that the Government of the Republic of Turkey…, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency…, are parties to the Implementation of the 
Safeguards Agreement as part of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 
 
Aware of the international community’s desire to widen nuclear nonproliferation 
through strengthening and augmenting the effectiveness of the safeguards 
inspections system of the Agency (…) 
 
Article I 
The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement will be applied to this Protocol in the 
case that they are related and consistent with this Protocol. In the case that there is 
an inconsistency with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this 
Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol will be implemented.219 
 
The Additional Protocol is superior to the previously existing safeguards 
agreements, because its provisions ensure a more effective inspections system. 
Signatory states accept sacrifice from their sovereignty in order to strengthen the 
system.  
Regarding nuclear power generation, TAEK cooperates with international 
institutions, and works on national and international law in the nuclear field.220 It 
provided a technical assessment that technology for commercial nuclear reactors was 
insufficient to equip non-nuclear-weapon states with the means to acquire nuclear 
weapons. 
 
Nuclear power plants established to generate energy do not have anything to do with 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. States signatory to the “Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”-of which Turkey is a party-are subject to 
international inspections. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, … the 
International Atomic Energy Agency is involved in continuous inspection activities. 
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In addition, the existence of nuclear power plants in a country is not sufficient by 
itself to manufacture nuclear weapons. For such an endeavor, other facilities should 
be established.221  
 
TAEK, as the sole authority on atomic energy, decouples the existence of 
nuclear power plants from the manufacture of nuclear weapons, implicitly referring 
to the absence of fuel cycle and critical technologies. Nuclear power generation is 
considered beneficial, and in order to prevent diversion, IAEA is in charge. TAEK 
underlines Turkey’s commitment to the regime and the absence of critical facilities is 
put forward as the indicator for a technological gap and Turkey’s sincerity. 
 
 
4.2.2. International views on Energy Security 
 
A core element for the development and maintenance of state power is the 
possession of, or reliable access to, strategic natural resources.222 The Industrial 
Revolution established an inextricable link between energy and power: In order to 
maintain its military, political and economic power, a state needs affordable, reliable, 
diverse, ample223 and continuous supplies of energy resources.224The field of security 
was confined to Strategic Studies during the Cold War, but new sectors of security 
emerged in the post-Cold War period, including economic, societal, and 
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environmental.225 The dependency of the economic and military sectors of state 
power on the security of the energy supply has become increasingly visible after the 
1990s. Environmental sector defines the criteria for the type of energy that would 
provide sustainability, that is to say environmental protection. It was included after 
the 1990s as awareness increased regarding environmental problems, and when states 
incurred threat to their security from environmental degradation and resource 
scarcity. 
Demand for fossil fuels -coal, oil and natural gas- shifted in the post-Cold 
War period. Petroleum became too valuable for heating purposes, and coal would not 
meet the sustainability criteria. The use of natural gas increased as reserves in the ex-
Soviet space became available for international markets. Its use for heating and 
power generation increased the demand and the competition for supply, particularly 
in the late 1990s. Resource-poor and energy-hungry states needed to diversify 
resources and multiply their providers in order to decrease dependency. However, 
there is not a single global set of energy security criteria. There are three principal 
views championed by the West (United States and Europe), Russia and China. 
Turkey’s understanding of energy security is in accordance with that of the American 
and European views.  
The International Energy Agency defines its priorities as “Energy Security, 
Growth and Sustainability through cooperation and outreach.”  
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an intergovernmental organization which 
acts as energy policy advisor to 28 member countries in their effort to ensure 
reliable, affordable and clean energy for their citizens. (…) Its mandate has 
broadened to incorporate the “Three E’s” of balanced energy policy making: energy 
security, economic development and environmental protection. Current work 
focuses on climate change policies, market reform, energy technology collaboration 
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and outreach to the rest of the world, especially major consumers and producers of 
energy like China, India, Russia and the OPEC countries.226 
 
It defines energy security as ensuring reliable, affordable and clean energy. 
The change in energy markets included two new dimensions to its tasks, that is to 
say, economic development and environmental protection. Those correspond to the 
twin goals of developing countries which seek resources for sustainable 
development. 
The American view on energy security is revealed by the Department of 
Energy’s definition of its mission: 
 
The Department of Energy's overarching mission is to advance the national, 
economic, and energy security of the United States; to promote scientific and 
technological innovation in support of that mission… [p]romoting America’s energy 
security through reliable, clean, and affordable energy, (…) [s]trengthening U.S. 
scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and improving quality of life 
through innovations in science and technology, [and] [p]rotecting the environment 
by providing a responsible resolution to the environmental legacy of nuclear 
weapons production.227 
 
The criteria of energy security largely overlap with that of the IEA. Science 
and technology rest at the basis of promoting economic and energy security, which is 
at the top of the strategic priorities of the United States. 
The European continent is poor in energy resources and is dependent on 
foreign markets for energy. Security and sustainability of the energy supply are top 
priorities for the EU. Dependency on Russian natural gas increases the uncertainty of 
supply and creates vulnerability. The solution to this problem rests, for Europe, with 
diversification of transportation routes and suppliers. 
 
A European Energy Policy will firmly commit the European Union (EU) to a low 
consumption economy based on more secure, more competitive and more 
sustainable energy. Priority energy objectives involve ensuring the smooth 
functioning of the internal market in energy, security of strategic supply, concrete 
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reductions in greenhouse gas emissions caused by the production or consumption of 
energy and the EU's ability to speak with a single voice on the international stage. 
(…) Minimizing the EU's vulnerability concerning imports, shortfalls in supply, 
possible energy crises and uncertainty with respect to future supply is a clear 
priority. This uncertainty is all the more problematic for Member States dependent 
on one single gas supplier. The new energy policy emphasizes the importance of 
measures which ensure solidarity between Member States and of the diversification 
of supply sources and transportation routes. Measures supporting strategic oil stocks 
must be reinforced and the possibilities for improving the security of gas supply 
must be explored. Increased security of electricity supply, which remains crucial, 
must also be guaranteed.228 
 
 
Russia’s view of energy security is expressed in its Energy Strategy paper as follows: 
It is foreseen that by the end of the first phase (2009-2010) the initial phase of 
energy sector reforming will be completed resulting in a creation of a basis for its 
progressive development with different scenarios of social and economic 
development in Russia, including: (…) 
 -realization of the export potential of oil and gas complex and attainment of stable 
positions of energy companies at the internal and external fuel and energy 
markets… (…) The State energy policy must be directed on the change from the 
role of supplier of raw resources to the role of substantive member of the world 
energy market. The strengthening of Russian positions on the world oil markets and 
on the gas markets is a strategically important task nowadays. (…) The new factor 
for the period up to 2020 will be the participation of Russia, as a large supplier of 
energy resources, in securing of the world energy safety. Forming of the common 
energy and transport infrastructure in the regions of Europe and Asia, development 
of the international energy and transport systems, providing of the undiscriminatory 
transit of energy answer the strategic interests of Russia. In order to reach these 
aims, the state will foster the participation of Russian joint-stock companies in 
development and realization of the great international projects of transport of gas, 
oil and energy both in western and eastern lines… Russia has all the necesary 
premises for being provided with energy resources, their effective export and 
receiving of a good income from its transit functions. 229 
 
Instead of the basis to sustain the power base, energy is basically seen as an 
instrument of foreign and security policy from the Russian perspective. That is to 
say, control of supply and transportation routes determines the country’s status not 
only in the energy market, but also in the world. Thus, Russia aspires to retain its 
advantageous position as one of the main suppliers of energy, and as the country in 
control of transportation routes. Securing its energy basis underlies its national 
security.  
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China enjoyed its supply of natural resources, however, with industrial 
development and increasing demand for energy, it also imports oil. It pursues a 
policy of securing energy supply with long-term contracts with foreign companies, 
instead of relying on spot trading of crude oil, particularly because of the instability 
in oil prices. The official position is explained as follows: 
  
China’s energy development is based on the principle of relying on domestic 
resources and the basic state policy of opening to the outside world. The country is 
striving to ensure a stable supply of energy with a steady increase in domestic 
energy production and promote the … development of energy around the world. 
(…) For a fairly long time to come, international energy trade will remain a major 
way by which China utilizes foreign energy resources. China will actively expand 
international energy trade, …and change the current situation of relying too heavily 
on spot trading of crude oil, encourage the signing of long-term supply contracts 
with foreign companies, and promote the diversification of trading channels. China 
supports direct overseas investment by domestic qualified enterprises to engage in 
transnational operation, and encourage such enterprises to participate in 
international energy cooperation and in the construction of overseas energy 
infrastructure, and steadily expand cooperation in energy engineering technology 
and services in accordance with international practice and the rules of the market 
economy. Energy security is a global issue. Every country has the right to rationally 
utilize energy resources for its own development, and the overwhelming majority of 
countries could not enjoy energy security without international cooperation.230  
 
 China’s view, like Russia, is based on a Realpolitik conception of energy 
security. Cooperation and trade, for China, means bilateral contracts with resource-
rich countries and their companies. To overcome dependency on fossil fuels, China 
prefers to locate and reserve resources in these countries, and promotes direct 
investment in the form of constructing the energy infrastructure. Thereby, it creates 
new fields that it can explore for decades.  
Turkey’s energy strategy has more overlapping points with Europe and the 
United States than the Russian and Chinese views of energy security:  
Turkey's energy policy principally aims at: providing safe, green, cost-efficient and 
sustainable energy for our country, securing a strong position for our country in 
regional and global trade of energy, [and] increasing energy efficiency.231 The limits 
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of Turkey’s domestic energy sources in light of its growing energy demand have 
resulted in dependency on energy imports, primarily of oil and gas. (…)Turkey 
attaches utmost priority to further diversification of imports in both type and origin. 
(…) Turkey attaches great importance to more efficient and rational functioning of 
the energy sector for promoting the competitiveness of the national economy. 
Substantial progress has been achieved in restructuring and liberalizing the Turkish 
electricity and gas markets in pursuance with the EU Directives for the purpose of 
integration with the EU Internal Energy Market…232 
 
 Energy security policy is determined predominantly in accordance with the 
EU criteria. In addition, the criteria for the choice of resources overlap with the 
European and American definition.  
 
4.2.3. International belief system of anti-nuclearism and 
environmentalism 
 
The domestic opposition was overwhelmingly affected by international 
movements of anti-nuclearism and environmentalism. What lies behind the anti-
nuclear and environmental movements is the questioning of modernity and industrial 
production for development due to their adverse effects on the environment and 
human health.233  
Widespread environmental degradation began as a result of the industrial 
revolution, and public concern followed. With scientific progress and the 
dissemination of information, the public became increasingly aware of the adverse 
impacts of industrialization. Concerns on environmental problems increased after 
World War II, and environmentalism became a social movement by the 1960s. 
Several organizations on conservation were founded under the United Nations. The 
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environmentalist literature accumulated with Our Synthetic Environment which 
examined the harmful environmental impacts of industrial production,234 Limits to 
Growth, which argued that the exponential growth will result in an environmental 
crisis,235 and The Blueprint for Survival, which shared the same idea and argued that 
population growth and environmental degradation required changes in human 
practices.236 Small is Beautiful stressed that values shaped economics, and the 
possibility of an alternative economic system which would improve the quality of 
life, instead of just focusing on improving the quality of work. Limits, self-reliance, 
self-sufficiency, zero population and economic growth are the key words of 
ecological environmentalism.237 It upholds equality among humans and the nature in 
the sense that the nature deserves respect for its own sake, and not because it is 
useful to humans.238  
These ideas had a significant influence on the UN Conferences on 
environment. The 1972 UN Conference in Stockholm recognized that environmental 
problems should be tackled by the state. The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 ended 
with the Rio Declaration, which enshrined “sustainable development.”239 The end of 
the Cold War spared room for other issues than military security in the agenda, and 
environmental security was one of them.  
In addition to such environmental approaches that adopt a liberal view, that 
is, the protection of the environment within the norms of the prevailing system, there 
are others which demand change in favor of ecology. Organizations like 
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Worldwatch, International Panel on Climate Change and the Institute for 
Environmental Security adopt the first approach: 
 
Worldwatch Institute delivers the insights and ideas that empower decision makers 
to create an environmentally sustainable society that meets human needs. 
Worldwatch focuses on the 21st-century challenges of climate change, resource 
degradation, population growth, and poverty by developing and disseminating solid 
data and innovative strategies for achieving a sustainable society. (…)Worldwatch 
seeks innovative solutions to intractable problems, emphasizing a blend of 
government leadership, private sector enterprise, and citizen action that can make a 
sustainable future a reality.240 
 
The assumption is that the environment should be preserved for the sake of 
human needs instead of an ecocentric approach. The focus is on the sustainability of 
the environment regarding the challenges of the new era. The inclusion of the 
government, private sector and citizens suggest cooperation at all levels to meet these 
challenges.   
 
The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change is the leading body for the 
assessment of climate change, … to provide the world with a clear scientific view 
on the current state of climate change and its potential environmental and socio-
economic consequences. (…) Because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature, 
the IPCC embodies a unique opportunity to provide rigorous and balanced scientific 
information to decision makers. By endorsing the IPCC reports, governments 
acknowledge the authority of their scientific content. The work of the organization 
is therefore policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive.241 
 
The Panel assumes that climate change will have serious impacts on not only 
the environment, but also the economy and the society. It takes governments, 
thereby, states as the main actors to deal with the issue, and acknowledge their 
authority by emphasizing that their proposals will be relevant for state-level policies. 
 
To the extent humankind neglects to maintain the globe’s life-supporting eco-
systems generating water, food, medicine, and clean air, current and future 
generations will be confronted with increasingly severe instances of 
environmentally induced changes. Such events will test our traditional concepts, 
boundaries, and understandings of national security and alliance politics and, if 
taken for granted, may lead to conflict, including violent conflict, from the global to 
the regional, national, local or human level. Environmental security, broadly 
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defined, affects humankind and its institutions and organizations anywhere and at 
anytime.242 
 
The Institute also assumes human life as the referent. Therefore the 
environment should be preserved to sustain life. Furthermore, environmental 
degradation is constituted as a threat to the international system, institutions and 
organizations, because it has the potential to trigger conflict. 
Organizations like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and World Wildlife Fund 
take up a “Green” approach that prefers a change in the system to the benefit of the 
ecology. They assume that the current political system and consumption patters 
challenge the sustainability of the environment and wildlife.  
  
Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organization that acts to change 
attitudes and behavior, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote 
peace by catalyzing an energy revolution to address the number one threat facing 
our planet: climate change. (…) … by challenging wasteful and destructive fishing, 
and creating a global network of marine reserves… [and] by tackling the causes of 
conflict and calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.243 
 
Greenpeace is critical of the existing modes of behavior, which it assumes are 
threatening the environment. They favor the use of alternative energy resources, 
particularly to address climate change, which is deemed as the primary threat. The 
environment is the main referent that needs to be guarded from activities that seek 
economic gain. They also uphold peace and assume that existing nuclear weapons 
pose a grave threat to peace. 
 
We want a healthy planet and a good life for everyone on it.244 We stand for three 
big ideas: (…) We need to use the planet like there is a tomorrow. This means living 
within the limits of the natural world. (…) Everyone, everywhere, now and 
tomorrow, deserves to have a good life. (…) We need to change the rules so that the 
economy works for people and the environment, not pit one against the other.245  
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Friends of the Earth is critical of short-term economic considerations, because 
they assume that the environment is being harnessed for “today” without considering 
that it should be sustained for “tomorrow.” They also assume that global income is 
unfairly distributed leaving some to live a life below basic needs. The emphasis on 
change suggests a critical view of the prevailing political and economic system that 
sacrifices the environment for the people. 
 
WWF's mission is the conservation of nature. We are committed to reversing the 
degradation of our planet's natural environment and to building a future in which 
human needs are met in harmony with nature. We recognize the critical relevance of 
human numbers, poverty and consumption patterns to meeting these goals.246 
 
The WWF considers human needs and the preservation of the environment 
equal in importance, and favors measures that will reverse the degradation of the 
environment. It stresses that these measures should focus on reducing population 
growth rate, poverty and consumption patterns, which are the main challenges to the 
environment. Therefore, it envisions a different system from the current one. 
Anti-nuclearism started as a movement against nuclear weapons, and then 
included opposition to nuclear power particularly in response to “radiation risk” and 
radioactive waste disposal issues. The seeds of the anti-nuclear movement were 
planted following the reservations of scientists working in the Manhattan Project to 
prevent the use of technology for an atomic bomb. Afterwards, civil society activities 
and the “nuclear freeze” movement followed.247 The opposition to nuclear energy 
has its roots in the United States. Ralph Nader, a lawyer who worried about 
operational safety and the nuclear waste issue, established a civil society group, 
called “Critical Mass Energy Project,” referring to the “critical” number of people 
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who will gather to oppose the establishment of a nuclear power plant. He organized 
the first national anti-nuclear gathering in 1974, which was a conference to bring 
together diverse groups and to inform them on how to put the “safe energy 
movement” into action. The movement supported the activists financially. Anti-
nuclear rallies that took place in New York City and Washington, D.C., attracted 
many people and drew media attention. The accidents in Three-Mile Island and 
Chernobyl increased public fear.248  
Fear of radiation provided a “fertile breeding ground” for anti-nuclearism, 
which then spread to Europe (mainly Western Europe). It was composed of minority 
protest groups and ecological movements taking advantage of the public fear of 
radiation. They had doubts about the organization of the modern society and its link 
to industrial production. Politically, it was a protest against the industrial type of 
society, technically, it involved doubts about risks, and philosophically, it foresaw a 
lifestyle close to nature which should not be distorted by industrial production.249 
Bertrand Goldschmidt also shows that the opposition to nuclear power was supported 
by US nonproliferation policies in order to prevent the production of fissile material 
through the establishment of commercial breeder reactors: 
 
In general, the opposition chose to concentrate its activities on proposals for new 
nuclear power plants, although in the most advanced countries, it was also 
especially concerned with problems of wastes, reprocessing plants and breeder 
reactors-all facilities where large quantities of plutonium would be involved. This 
opposition drew much strength and inspiration from US nonproliferation policies; a 
report presented in 1978 to Congress on the subject of antinuclear protest in Europe 
removes any doubts as to the link. Without going so far as to welcome the 
development of the protest movement in Europe, the report emphasized the 
importance for American nonproliferation policies of an effective opposition to the 
commercialization of breeder reactors and to the use of plutonium as nuclear fuel. 
The opposition therefore carried out its campaign on three fronts: on the local level, 
over the choice of sites; on the national level; and on the level of advanced 
techniques and waste disposal problems.250  
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According to the new social movements perspective, the anti-nuclear 
movement is one of the issues in the broader critique of political and economic 
systems. New social movements aim at a revolution in the principles of democratic 
capitalist systems, because they are critical of materialism, hierarchy and 
impoverishment of life under capitalism.251 New social movements are in a struggle 
against prevailing political and economic systems which try to “colonize the life 
world.”252 These movements aim at a fundamental restructuring of power relations in 
society, and anti-nuclearism is one of the means.253 
The Greenpeace movement started with protests against nuclear testing in 
the Bering Sea. The protesters used a ship named “Greenpeace” with the aim of 
preserving the environment and peace at the same time. They considered humankind 
and environment interdependent, thus they named their manifesto as the “Declaration 
of Interdependence:”  
 
With nuclear reactors proliferating and over 900 species on the endangered list, 
there can be no further delay or our children will be denied their future. The 
Greenpeace Foundation hopes to stimulate practical, intelligent actions to stem the 
tide of planetary destruction. (…) [E]cology teaches us that mankind is not the 
centre of life on this planet. (…) Ecology has taught us that the entire Earth is part 
of our 'body' and that we must learn to respect it as much as we respect ourselves. 
(…) Ecology has provided us with … three “Laws of …:” … All forms of life are 
interdependent, (…) the stability (unity, security, harmony, togetherness) of 
ecosystems is dependant on diversity (complexity), (…) [and] all resources (food, 
water, air, minerals, energy) are finite and there are limits to the growth of all living 
systems. (…) If we ignore the logical implications of these Laws of Ecology, we 
will continue to be guilty of crimes against the earth. (…) The destruction of the 
Earth will lead, inevitably, to the destruction of ourselves. So let us work together to 
put an end to the destruction of the Earth by the forces of human greed and 
ignorance. Through an understanding of the principles of ecology, we must find new 
directions for the evolution of human values and human institutions. Short-term 
economics must be replaced with actions based on the need for conservation and 
preservation of the entire global ecosystem.254 
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The declaration assumes that nuclear power plants are dangerous, and further 
establishment of nuclear reactors will be disastrous, thus they should be stopped. 
Otherwise, the world will cease to be a place to live. Ecology should be the top 
priority of humanity, because it is what sustains life for all living things on Earth. 
What destroys the world is human greed and ignorance, which sacrifices the 
environment for short-term economic gains. Earth is personified, and is taken as the 
referent with phrases like “crimes against the Earth.” These crimes are committed by 
short-term economic gains, that is, the environment has been sacrificed, whereas it is 
indispensible for humans. The “cause,” that is, protection of ecology gives 
Greenpeace the “mandate” to stimulate action against any “crime” committed against 
the environment. 
Among other items, disarmament is one of the priorities of Greenpeace for 
“peace.” They are openly against nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and the first 
action of Greenpeace was against nuclear testing. In the Greenpeace international 
website, Turkey is one of the few countries included in the list of polls carried out to 
see public opinion towards nuclear weapons.255 
 
Greenpeace has been shouting about nuclear dangers for over 30 years, … when a 
group of North American peace activists … sailed from Vancouver towards the US 
nuclear testing zone near Amchitka, Alaska. The Greenpeace ship and crew were 
arrested by the US coastguard, but the press reports about the expedition put 
pressure on the US government. Four months later, the US canceled the test series. 
Since then we have campaigned against both nuclear weapons and nuclear power. 
Bearing witness in test zones, supplying scientific data and measurements on human 
and environmental impacts and by conducting direct non-violent actions to call 
attention to the problem. (…) Since then, we have tracked plutonium and nuclear 
waste shipments around the globe, highlighted the dangers of reprocessing, 
protested against nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships or submarines and 
confronted the nuclear weapons states about their weapons programs. And people 
are with us: the majority of people and states want disarmament now! We can stop 
the nuclear threat with the voice of the second superpower: public opinion.  And 
that voice is getting louder and louder. Public opinion polls conducted in nuclear 
and non-nuclear weapon states show large majorities favoring the abolition of 
nuclear weapons: (…) In 2004, an Infakto poll, commissioned by Greenpeace, 
found that 72% of Turkish people supported the idea of making Turkey a nuclear-
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free zone and 75% would support Turkey leading an international campaign for 
international nuclear disarmament. 256 
 
Greenpeace experienced the power of media attention on the governments. 
The arrest of “activists for peace” forced them to revise their policies on nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power. Thus, for activists, public opinion is the object that 
should be manipulated through media in order to apply pressure on decision-makers. 
Anti-nuclear activism is something that should be pursued for the benefit of 
humanity. Greenpeace aims at disarmament of nuclear weapons, and they could 
create the fear from radioactive waste.   
IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) is 
specifically established to prevent nuclear war and work towards the elimination of 
nuclear weapons.  
 
IPPNW is the only international medical organization dedicated to preventing 
nuclear war and abolishing nuclear weapons. We recognize that the catastrophic 
health and environmental consequences of a nuclear war are at the extreme end of a 
continuum of armed violence that undermines health and security. IPPNW is 
committed to ending war and advancing understanding of the causes of armed 
conflict from a public health perspective.257 IPPNW was founded in 1980 by 
physicians from the United States and the former Soviet Union who shared a 
common commitment to the prevention of nuclear war ... Citing the first principle of 
the medical profession -that doctors have an obligation to prevent what they cannot 
treat- a global federation of physician experts came together to explain the medical 
and scientific facts about nuclear war to policy makers and to the public, and to 
advocate for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world’s arsenals.258 
 
Public health is the referent of the activities of IIPNW, which assumes that 
policymakers are not cognizant about the probable effects of nuclear war on the 
environment and human health. Their reasoning is that disarmament will prevent 
nuclear war, hence the survival of people. Preventing nuclear proliferation 
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engendered the position that civil applications of nuclear technology are risky.259 
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was established in 1945 by scientists who worked 
in the Manhattan Project. They aim at informing the public about the possible 
dangers of nuclear weapons:  
 
[The Bulletin] warned about two major sources of potential catastrophe: the perils of 
27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, 2,000 of them ready to launch in minutes, and 
the destruction of human habitats from climate change. (…)The Bulletin publishes 
information from leading scientists and security experts who explore the potential 
for terrible damage to societies from human-made technologies. We focus as well 
on ways to prevent catastrophe from the malign or accidental use of nuclear, carbon-
based, and biology-based technologies. After all, these technologies are ones that we 
create; it is in our power to channel them solely for benign purposes.260 
 
 
4.2.3.1. Domestic anti-nuclear groups 
 
The government’s decision to pursue nuclear power united the groups which 
are against the establishment of nuclear power plants and the generation of nuclear 
energy. The “not-in-my-backyard” syndrome in Mersin (by the Mediterranean) and 
Sinop (by the Black Sea) -the two regions where nuclear power plants will be 
established- created a public which is concerned about and essentially against the 
projects. The Sinop anti-nuclear platform (Sinop Nükleer Karşıtı Platform/NKP) is 
one of the ardent voices within the anti-nuclear platform-the umbrella organization. 
The history of the Akkuyu power plant is rather long compared to that of Sinop, and 
the residents by the Mediterranean are somewhat used to the cancellation of projects. 
In addition, the memories of Chernobyl nuclear plant accident are still fresh in the 
minds of the residents by the Black Sea region. Put together, the residents of the 
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Black Sea are more sensitive to the establishment of a nuclear power plant than those 
of Mersin.  
Other local organizations261 join the Sinop NKP to create public awareness. 
The Mersin NKP demands from the government that the infrastructure for renewable 
energies and energy efficiency be developed instead of nuclear energy. In the 
regulations of the Mersin and Sinop anti-nuclear platforms, being anti-nuclear is the 
condition for membership, and promoting alternative resources is the top priority: 
 
The platform is composed of political parties, democratic civil society 
organizations, trade unions, chambers and associations that are against the 
establishment of nuclear power plants in the world, in Turkey, or only in Sinop, and 
which are sensitive to environmental problems. Protection of the environment and 
being anti-nuclear rest at the top [of the criteria for membership].262  
 
We, demand from the government, to develop the infrastructure that will open the 
way for the generation of energy from renewable resources and the efficient use of 
existing energy.263  
 
Turkish anti-nuclear groups are harbored under the roof of the Anti-Nuclear 
Platform. They include, inter alia, the Electrical Engineers’ Chamber (EMO), 
Environmental Engineers’ Chamber (ÇMO), Geological Engineers’ Chamber (JMO), 
Civil Engineers’ Chamber (İMO), The Confederation of the Public Servants Trade 
Unions (KESK), Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK), 
Turkish Medicals’ Association (TTB), Greenpeace Mediterranean, European 
Renewable Energy Association Turkey Chapter (EUROSOLAR Turkey), Greens, 
The Ecology Collective,  the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP), and 
environmental associations from Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.264  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE HISTORY OF TURKEY’S PLANS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR 
POWER AND THE ANTI-NUCLEAR CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
This chapter will provide a sketch of Ankara’s energy policy and its attempts 
to generate nuclear power. It starts with an introduction of key concepts: “Energy,” 
“energy security,” and “nuclear power.” It will then present the administrative 
structures related to energy, and the evolution of Turkey’s energy policies since the 
Republican times, including its current status. Turkey’s attempts to build nuclear 
power plants for electricity generation date back to late 1950s, to meet energy 
shortages in the future. The history of nuclear power plans along with the anti-
nuclear protests is provided in terms of decades. 
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5.1. Nuclear Power in Turkey’s Energy Strategy  
 
5.1.1. What is energy and nuclear power?  
 
The term “energy” tends to be used interchangeably with “fuel.” D. Elliot 
explains the terms of energy production as follows:  
Energy is a concept rather than an actual thing… Energy is never created or 
consumed; it is converted from one form to another. The term power is used to 
describe the conversion capacity of any specific device, that is, the rate at which it 
can convert energy from one form to another, and the unit most commonly used is 
the watt. Strictly, it is a measure of the “capacity to do work.”… The amount of 
energy converted or more accurately, the actual “work” done, is defined by the 
power of the device multiplied by the time for which it is used (that is, 
Watts*hours). It is usually measured in kilowatt hours or (kWh)… The total amount 
of energy used is often measured in terms of primary energy consumption; that is 
the amount of energy in the basic fuels used by energy conversion devices, whether 
for electricity production, heating or transport.265  
 
Until the Industrial Revolution, human effort, like the use of slaves, animals, 
or wind provided the power to operate simple machines. For heating, cooking and 
processing materials, natural fuels like wood were used along with windmills and 
watermills as new energy sources in the Middle Ages. It was coal which boosted the 
Industrial Revolution in the mid-18th century. It was used in factories, to operate 
steam engines of trains and ships. Thus, it facilitated the transportation of raw 
materials and finished products between sites, factories and markets. Coal was 
rivaled by petrol (petroleum spirit extracted from oil) that operated vehicles with 
internal combustion engine by the beginning of the 20th century. Between the two 
Wars, oil and gas (produced from coal) became more important than electricity 
which was used in several sectors of the economy.266  
Following World War II, oil became increasingly significant in the 
economies of the advanced industrial countries. The first oil crisis of 1973-74 proved 
                                               
265 David Elliott, Energy, Society and Environment: Technology for a Sustainable Future, London, 
New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 17, 18. 
266 Ibid, pp. 22-3. 
96 
 
how reliant these countries were on imported oil. Apart from technical, political and 
military efforts to secure the supply of Middle Eastern oil, in order to diversify 
resources, alternative sources like the renewables (such as wind and solar energy) 
were explored. Natural gas took over the use of gas produced from coal. In addition, 
developed countries started using nuclear technology for energy generation.267 
Extensive fossil fuel use during the Industrial Revolution resulted in environmental 
degradation. Since they are hydrocarbons, fossil fuels emit CO2 when burnt. 
Although there was enthusiasm for nuclear power plants as they emitted water 
vapor,268 public opposition, mainly based on safety concerns made them hard to 
support. The accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl substantiated these 
concerns.269 
Nuclear technology is a product of the scientific research on the connection 
between mass and energy. The atomic fission occurs when a fissile isotope splits and 
leads to a chain reaction. It yields large amounts of heat by boiling water and 
producing steam that can be used to generate energy in a power plant. However, 
along with the heat, nuclear fission yields nuclear radiation and a range of 
radioactive fragments that are detrimental to living organisms if safety measures are 
not observed. The nuclear materials that sustain the chain reaction are called fissile 
materials (that go into fission-split of atoms), and they are obtained from the uranium 
element.270 Nuclear reactors could be water-cooled, or gas-cooled, but most of the 
                                               
267 Ibid, pp. 23-4. 
268 Although the most notable greenhouse gases are carbon emissions, environmental organizations 
also cite water vapor as an important factor for greenhouse effect. Source: “Water vapor rules the 
greenhouse system,” Geocraft.com, (Date accessed: March 15, 2010), 
<http://www.geocraft.com/WVFossils/greenhouse_data.html>, “Water Vapor Confirmed as Major 
Player in Climate Change,” NASA, November 17, 2008, 
<http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/vapor_warming.html>. 
269 Elliott, Energy, Society and Environment…, 1997, p. 29. 
270 Uranium-235 is a fissile isotope, which is found in meager amounts in the uranium ore. Plutonium 
is also fissile, and it can be obtained from the spent fuel in conventional reactors through a chemical 
separation process.  
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reactors are of the first type, based on the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).271 
Another method of generating vast amounts of energy is through fusion reaction, 
whereby the atoms of hydrogen element are induced to fuse at very high 
temperatures to form helium. Scientific research is in progress for controlling the 
reaction. While it is theoretically possible to sustain the reaction and to have a fusion 
reactor, it is still commercially unfeasible.272  
 
 
5.1.2. Current energy security model  
 
The link between energy and state power became inextricable with the 
Industrial Revolution: For the continued development of national power, a state 
needs to have the ability to access energy resources. Specifically, in order to maintain 
its military, political and economic power, a state needs affordable, reliable, diverse, 
ample273 and continuous supplies of energy resources.274 Therefore, energy and the 
need to secure its supply have become a vital state interest; and these criteria form 
the basis of energy security. Kalicki and Goldwyn define energy security as “…the 
assurance of the ability to access the energy resources required for the continued 
development of national power.”275 The goal of energy security policy is to provide 
affordable, reliable, diverse and ample supplies of key resources and establishing a 
sufficient infrastructure to deliver them to the market.276  
                                               
271 Elliott, Energy, Society and Environment, 1997, p.66 
272 Ibid, pp.74, 75. 
273 Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security…, 2005, p.9. 
274 The Term, basically covers the commodities that are used to generate electricity or those that are 
used in internal combustion engines, which are integral for transportation, agriculture, economy, 
industry, military, communications and household use. These may include, inter alia, coal, oil, natural 
gas, nuclear, renewables (hydro, wind, solar), and biomass. 
275 Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 2005, p.9. 
276 Ibid. 
98 
 
In this definition, “affordable energy” refers to stable and reasonable prices, 
because price volatility in prices shocks and destabilizes the global economy. 
Predictability and minimum vulnerability are the key terms for defining a “reliable 
energy supply.” After the end of the Cold War, such stability is disrupted 
increasingly from domestic level developments, such as revolutions, civil unrest, 
economic failure and terrorism, which cannot be addressed by traditional Cold War 
strategies, but by conflict prevention and diplomacy. “Access to diverse and ample 
supplies” is about ensuring that states possessing energy resources (basically 
strategic ones) produce them for the global market.277  
The current energy security model was shaped as a result of the 1973 oil 
shock. In this sense, energy policy is based on criteria, which seek resources that are 
cheap, easily accessible and reliable with unabated flow and more recently 
environment-friendly.278 States seek to diversify their resources in order not to be 
dependent on a certain source of energy, or its supplier(s). Thus, energy policies are 
devised on the basis of not only technical and economic criteria, but also political 
criteria. The 1973 oil shock made diversification of energy resources a strategy to 
maintain power or to avoid falling at a disadvantage. The oil shock showed that oil 
producers would not refrain from using it for political ends. Thus, it became 
necessary to find substitutes-at least for some of the uses of oil in order to respond to 
the challenge by national resources to avoid dependency on foreign sources. In this 
context, nuclear energy became relevant in the energy portfolio to decrease 
dependency on oil and to generate electricity from a “national” (meaning controllable 
                                               
277 Ibid, p.10. 
278 The environmental sector has been recently included in the study of security. For a detailed 
discussion of Security Studies in the post-Cold War, see Buzan, People, States and Fear…, 1991. 
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rather than domestic) resource.279 Disruption of fuel would not result in dramatic 
consequences as in oil, and vast amounts of energy could be generated compared to 
thermal power plants operated by coal, oil or natural gas. Renewable energy 
resources (hydro, wind, solar) and biomass are included in the category of 
“alternative resources,” -meaning that they can be complementary and not the 
primary resources in the energy strategy. 
 The demand for nuclear energy remained high until the 1970s. The number of 
plants continued to grow until 1985, but starting from the mid-1970s, the demand 
declined sharply due to several reasons: They include lower than expected economic 
growth with a parallel decrease in the demand for electricity, rise in the price of 
nuclear energy, inefficiency of the industry and accidents in nuclear power plants.280 
During the 1990s, there was little interest in nuclear energy in the West. However, 
with the new century, the United States, China and India showed renewed interest in 
nuclear power. It was deemed by some as a “renaissance,” particularly considering 
the expected increase in the global primary energy demand.281  
According to 2009 figures, there are 436 commercial nuclear reactors with a 
total capacity of 372,000 MWe in 30 countries, providing around 16% of the world’s 
electricity.282 As of May 2009, some 45 power plants are under construction and 112 
                                               
279 The use of nuclear technology for electricity generation is only one of its peaceful applications. 
The need to add “peaceful” emanated from the fact that the initial application of nuclear technology 
was for military purposes, and that not until 1953, peaceful use was proposed. Nuclear technology is 
used in various fields including agriculture, medicine and electricity generation. In fact, the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 (Entry into force: 1970) promoted nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes in return for the commitment not to produce, manufacture or transfer nuclear 
weapons or related material. The IAEA was assigned the task of verifying states’ compliance with the 
Treaty, that is, under the safeguards agreement with states having nuclear reactors, the IAEA would 
verify that the technology is not diverted to misuse. 
280 “Outline History of Nuclear Energy,” World Nuclear Association, October 2009, 
<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf54.html>. 
281 “World Energy Outlook 2007,” OECD/IEA, 2007, available at: 
<http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/weo_2007.pdf >. 
282 “Nuclear Power in the World Today,” World Nuclear Association, March 2009, 
<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.html>. 
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are planned.283 Despite the renewed interest in nuclear energy, the following factors 
are likely to determine its future: Economic competitiveness, concern for climate 
change, safety and security issues related to nuclear technology, public perception 
about the energy source and the quest for energy security.284 It is safety and 
proliferation risks which set nuclear energy apart from other sources (economic 
competitiveness, global warming concerns, public perceptions and energy security 
considerations are common to other sources). The following section looks at 
Turkey’s energy security policy and policymaking structures related to energy issues. 
 
5.1.3. Overview of Turkey’s energy policies: Energy policymaking 
structures and nuclear energy as an option in Turkey’s resource 
portfolio  
 
Turkey is a developing country with a vibrant economic sector and its energy 
needs go in tandem with the pace of development as well as rising living standards. 
Energy is integral for the industry, agriculture, transportation and household 
consumption: Electricity can be generated from hydrocarbon resources such as oil, 
natural gas and coal, or non-hydrocarbon resources, such as water, wind or solar 
energy. Transportation and heating involves demand for oil, natural gas or coal. The 
historical account of electricity generation that follows will provide the objectives 
and principles of Turkey’s energy policies. 
During the period between 1923 and 1930, the Izmir Economy Congress was 
instrumental in trying to set up the principles. The bulk of the installed capacity was 
constituted by thermal power plants. Between 1930 and 1950, to boost the 
                                               
283 “World Nuclear Power Reactors 2007-2009 and Uranium Requirement,” World Nuclear 
Association, May 3, 2010, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html>. 
284 Moeed Yusuf, Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future?, Pardee Papers, No. 3, November 2008, p. 4. 
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industrialization process, Turkey engaged in an effort to increase electricity 
production, and to decrease dependency on imported goods (mainly interim goods). 
The sources were diversified as coal, hydro and diesel. In the period between 1950 
and 1960, the mixed economic policies were promoted with private sector and 
foreign investors along with the public sector. However, the latter developed faster. 
In this period, new thermal and hydro power plants were constructed in parallel with 
the growing economy.285  
The following period lasted until 1980, which can be called as the planned 
economic system.286 Resources could not be fully utilized, dependency on imported 
electricity rose to 50%. The disequilibrium between energy consumption and 
production resulted in energy shortage. This led Turkey to harness other sources such 
as dung, lignite, petroleum, natural gas and asphaltite, in addition to hydro power and 
coal. The two petroleum crises of 1973 and 1977 caused economic distress, and 
Ankara decided for the construction of lignite-fired power plants.287  
After 1980, liberal economy replaced state-controlled economy, particularly 
as an initiative of the late Prime Minister Özal. Thus, the share of the public sector 
was decreased, hence energy investments. The Constitutional Court defined 
electricity production and distribution works as strategic and fundamental public 
services, and foresaw their privatization. However, privatization efforts did not 
produce the desired result: The aim was to move away from state funding and/or 
participation in the economy, but the investments needed by the electricity sector 
required that the state continue financing them. Therefore, the government 
                                               
285 A. Osman Yılmaz and Tuncay Uslu, “Energy Policies of Turkey During the Period 1923-2003,” 
Energy Policy, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, pp. 259-261. 
286 See Salih Öztürk and Deniz Yakışır, “Türkiye Ekonomisinde 1980 Sonrası Yaşanan Yapısal 
Dönüşümlerin GSMH, Dış Ticaret ve Dış Borçlar Bağlamında Teorik bir Değerlendirmesi (A 
Theoretical Assessment of the Structural Transformations in the Turkish Economy after 1980 in terms 
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No. 94, October 2005, <http://www.mevzuatdergisi.com/2005/10a/01.htm>. 
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102 
 
introduced new models for new investments by the private sector, such as “build-
operate” or “build-operate-transfer.”288  
Economic growth and rising living standards stimulated the demand for 
electricity. In late 1980s, there was an increasing tendency in Turkey to meet the 
energy demand from imported resources.  Thermal power plants had a primary share 
of 57% in total installed capacity, and hydroelectric and other power plants had a 
share of 43%. After 1998, there was a significant increase in the share of thermal 
power plants.289 As a result of the economic crisis in 2001, the demand for natural 
gas declined in the industrial sector, and excess supply was channeled for electricity 
generation. Thus, it paved the way for the highest share of natural gas in total 
electricity generation. By 2003, the ratio of natural gas in the production of 
electricity increased to 60%. Although in 2003, almost the entire country was 
connected to the grid, the demand could not be met completely, and Turkey became 
heavily dependent on other countries for energy.290  
Energy strategy and policymaking is carried out by the Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources (Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı-ETKB with Turkish 
acronyms) with inputs from the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı- DPT with Turkish acronyms), and by regulations from the Energy Market 
Regulation Authority (Enerji Piyasası Denetleme Kurulu- EPDK with Turkish 
acronyms). In addition, the Ministry of Environment, Turkish Atomic Energy 
Agency (along with their other tasks), TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological 
Research Council of Turkey), the Supreme Council for Science and Technology 
                                               
288 Nazif Hulagu Sohtaoğlu, “Analysis of Created Value Added in the Electrical Power Sector: A Case 
Study of Turkey,” Energy Policy, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, pp.195-202, cited in Yılmaz and Uslu, 
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(Bilim ve Teknoloji Üst Kurulu, the highest body for science and technology policy 
making) and universities contribute to research and development.  
The DPT prepares a development plan every five years. According to the 
Eighth Five-Year Development Plan for the period 2001-2005, the energy policy 
objectives are in accordance with the energy security model: First and foremost, 
Turkey’s objectives in its energy policy is to “ensure sufficient, reliable and 
economic energy supplies in order to support economic and social development,”291 
followed by maintaining the security of energy supply. To that end, the aim is to 
encourage investments to meet the growing energy demand. The Development Plan 
listed other objectives, such as focusing on energy security to address increasing 
demand and import dependence, taking environmental concerns into account for 
sustainable development, strengthening research and development in energy 
technologies, and “[r]eforming and liberalizing the energy sector to increase 
productivity and efficiency and to enhance transparency.”292 
Some of the main principles of Turkey’s energy policy and strategy the 
ETKB specified are as follows: 
 Enhancement in oil and gas (the strategic resources) storage capacity,  
 Resource and (supplier) country diversification,  
 Prioritization of domestic resource utilization and development, 
 Making the best of the country potential to become an energy hub, 
 Participation in the transportation of the Middle Eastern and Caspian oil and 
gas to world markets, 
                                               
291 “Uzun Vadeli Strateji ve Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 2001-2005, (Long-Term, Strategy 
and the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan 2001-2005),” DPT, 2000, p. 27, available at: 
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 Structuring the energy sector as a functioning transparent and competitive 
market, 
 Participation and integration to regional cooperation projects, and 
 Considering environmental impacts at all levels (production, distribution, 
etcetera...).293  
Based on these principles, Turkey’s energy policies aim at the liberalization 
of the energy sector and creating a competitive structure in order to increase 
productivity and to enhance transparency; diversification of resources to decrease 
dependency and to ensure energy security; transportation of resources in the East-
West energy corridor through Turkey; and last but not least, advancement of studies 
on new energy technologies, including nuclear power.294 
 The considerable increase in net energy imports and the concomitant rise in 
import dependency since the early 1990s created energy security concerns. In order 
to reduce the risk of supply security, the government assigned a high priority to the 
use of domestic energy resources and to diversification in the type and origin of the 
imported energy resources. Since the share of natural gas has increased the most (by 
16 Mtoe), the government aimed at increasing the share of renewables and domestic 
coal (lignite). 295  
A longer-term option is the use of nuclear power to address the dependency 
issue. It is expected to contribute 6.6% to electricity generation in 2020.296 Indeed, 
the DPT, in its 9th Five-Year Development Plan for 2007-2013, included nuclear 
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and Natural Resources, 2006, p. 1, available at: 
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power among electricity generation resources in order to achieve diversification of 
the electricity supply. It was deemed integral to keep environmental impacts 
minimal, and to use energy efficiently and effectively from the production of energy 
until its final use. Second, in order to increase supply security, in terms of primary 
energy resources, the policy should be a balanced diversification of resource and 
supplier country. Increasing the share of domestic and renewable energy resources in 
the production system should be the target. Before the establishment of nuclear 
power plants, the plan foresaw detailed plans regarding waste disposal and storage as 
well as public relations.297  
 
 
5.1.3.1. Energy Policy Administration 
 
The main agencies involved in energy policymaking are, the ETKB and the 
DPT, along with the Ministry of Environment, TÜBİTAK, TAEK and universities as 
the institutions involved in the definition of research and development priorities. The 
Supreme Council for Science and Technology is the highest body for science and 
technology policymaking. The Supreme Council proposed nuclear power for 
Turkey’s science and technology policy in 2005.298  
Regarding the legislative process, the process in Turkey works as follows: 
Draft laws prepared by the government are submitted to the Speaker’s Office with 
signatures of all ministers and accompanied with their legal bases. The President of 
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the Parliament passes on these drafts directly to the relevant Parliamentary 
Commissions.299 Proposals for laws submitted by MPs may have one or more 
signatures, and they too are transferred to Commissions directly by the Speaker’s 
Office.300 Draft laws are first discussed in the relevant Parliamentary commission 
and are submitted to Parliamentary vote, and if accepted, they are sent to the 
President for final approval. The President of the Republic, after reviewing them, 
may approve, disapprove or send them back to the Parliament for review. There are 
sixteen commissions in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM with Turkish 
acronyms), and the commission that tackles energy issues is the commission on 
“Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Science and Technology”. Since 
energy also pertains to a country’s security, energy policies and/or strategies, it may 
be discussed in the National Security Council to conform to the country’s security 
interests.  
 The Energy Ministry formulates and implements energy policies, makes plans 
and programs in co-ordination with dependent and related institutions and other 
public and private entities. In addition to these, it is charged with preparing and/or 
supervising programs in conformity with energy policy, ensuring the implementation 
of the programs, and supervising and controlling all exploration, development, 
production and distribution activities for energy and natural resources.301 Research, 
Planning and Coordination Board (Araştırma Planlama ve Koordinasyon-APK), 
coordinates the activities of the dependent and related institutions and implements 
energy policy, and supports these tasks by conducting long-term energy planning and 
                                               
299 Parliamentary Regulation, No: 14506, , Chapter IV, Article 73, (Entry into force: 13 April, 1973), 
available at: <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ictuzuk/ictuzuk.htm > 
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developing different policy scenarios. The main policy-making body of the Ministry 
is the General Directorate of Energy Affairs (Enerji İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü-EİGM). 
The EİGM coordinates the natural gas and electricity sector reform programs, carries 
out studies on energy and environmental policies, renewable resources and energy 
efficiency.302 The DPT is an advisory body for the Prime Minister and helps the 
government in determining economic and social objectives and the policies to be 
adopted. Its tasks related to the energy sector are preparation of the five-year 
development plans with the Energy Ministry and the industrial sector, and preparing 
demand projections.303  
Regarding electricity generation, in 1993, the Turkish Electrical Authority 
(TEK) with Turkish acronyms) was split into two state-owned companies, the 
Turkish Electricity Generation-Transmission Corporation (TEAŞ), and the Turkish 
Electricity Distribution Company (TEDAŞ). With the Electricity Market Law, no. 
4628, issued in February 2001, TEAŞ was also divided into three companies, as 
Electricity Generation Company (EÜAŞ), Turkish Electricity Transmission 
Company (TEİAŞ) and Turkish Electricity Wholesale Company (TETAŞ). 
According to the same law, distribution companies should prepare their demand 
forecasts and submit them to TEİAŞ, which will prepare its transmission planning 
based on these forecasts and will submit it to the regulator for approval.304 The same 
law established the Energy Market Regulatory Authority as the independent 
regulatory authority for electricity. EPDK was also assigned other tasks in natural 
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gas and oil sectors after the enactment of the Natural Gas Market Law (May 2001) 
and the Petroleum Market Law (December 2003).305 
 
 
5.1.3.2. The Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK) 
 
The institution that is responsible with determining the framework of the 
country’s policy on nuclear energy and the peaceful uses of the atom is the Turkish 
Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). It was established in 1956, by the Law No. 6821, 
as the General Secretariat of Atomic Energy Commission as part of the Prime 
Ministry. In 1982, it was restructured with the Law No. 2690 as the Turkish Atomic 
Energy Agency (TAEK), and is under the auspices of the Prime Minister.306 
 TAEK is primarily assigned with determining the main elements of the 
national policy for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and submit them 
to the approval of the Prime Minister. Under the TAEK statute, duties, 
responsibilities and powers of the Agency include research and development, 
analysis and study for making use of atomic energy for the country’s scientific, 
technical and economic development, and promoting and coordinating the studies 
carried out to that end.307 It is also assigned the authority to give approval, license 
and permits regarding site selection, construction, management and environmental 
safety for nuclear power and research reactors and fuel cycle facilities; and to 
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regulate nuclear and radiological activities regarding nuclear safety and security, 
radiation safety, waste and transport safety and safeguard. 308 In addition, TAEK is 
also charged with ensuring the safety of the public, of workers and of the 
environment from radiation’s hazardous effects, determining the defense strategy 
against nuclear hazards and threats, raising personnel, cooperating with international 
institutions on nuclear field, working, and informing the public regarding nuclear 
issues.309 It also performs inspections for special nuclear materials, radioactive 
materials and nuclear facilities. Concerning research, it engages in experimental and 
theoretical studies at research centers in cooperation with universities and other 
related institutions, such as the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center 
(ÇNAEM), which particularly carries out research and development programs 
addressing the issues for nuclear reactor and fuel technology.310   
The Atomic Energy Commission (Atom Enerjisi Komisyonu-AEK) prepares 
draft laws or regulations on nuclear issues, and submits them to the Prime 
Ministry.311 The Nuclear Safety Department (Nükleer Güvenlik Dairesi-NGD) 
carries out the duties regarding nuclear safety, site selection for nuclear facilities, 
construction, system engineering, hiring, management, physical prevention and 
prevention from radiation, nuclear material safety and control, and environmental 
safety services.312  Turkey is a party to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
Convention on Nuclear Safety but it has not signed or ratified the Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management or the Joint Convention of Radioactive 
Waste Management. The NGD also evaluates licensing applications for nuclear 
installations under the coordination and supervision of the TAEK Vice President in 
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charge of nuclear power and safety. The application requirements and procedures of 
licensing activities for all nuclear installations are regulated by the “Decree 
Pertaining to Issue License for Nuclear Installations.”  
Regarding research and exploration of resources, including thorium and 
uranium, it is the Mineral Exploration and Research Directorate (Maden Tetkik ve 
Arama-MTA), which is tasked with systematic investigation and research. In 
addition, the related departments of some universities in Turkey are engaged in 
research and development activities in nuclear technology, such as the Nuclear 
Energy Engineering Department of Hacettepe University in Ankara. TAEK also has 
programs for the education of personnel in the nuclear field at its research and 
training centers, laboratories, test facilities, pilot plants (without energy producing 
purposes), and it also cooperates with universities. Nuclear research and 
development (R&D) in Turkey comprises reactor technologies, fuel cycle 
technologies and technologies for agricultural, industrial and medical applications.313 
The pilot fuel plant (ÇNAEM) facilitates R&D on the front-end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, such as uranium purification and pellet production. Other activities include 
radioisotope production, neutron activation analysis, material testing, and training. 
Turkey has a nuclear research reactor in operation since 1962.314   
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5.2. The History of Turkey’s Plans for Peaceful Nuclear Technology 
Transfer 
 
 Turkey’s plans to build nuclear reactors for energy generation date back to 
the 50s, but the decades that followed were marked by a series of unsuccessful 
attempts. This section will provide an historical account of these attempts by looking 
at the decades they were made315.  
 
5.2.1. The 50s and 60s: Initial attempts 
 
 With the “Atoms for Peace” proposal of the US President D.D. Eisenhower in 
1953, the United States promoted the peaceful uses of the atom. In the Geneva 
Conference of 1955, some secrets were revealed for the use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes.316 Following these developments, Turkey decided to step into the 
“nuclear age,” and signed an agreement with the United States on “cooperation on 
the civilian use of the atomic energy” on 10 June 1955.  The agreement stimulated 
both the state and the academia to take the initiative to establish the necessary base 
for skilled personnel, and scientific and technical infrastructure. In 1956, Istanbul 
University (İÜ) and Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ) came together in a joint 
committee- the “İÜ-İTÜ Reactor Committee- in order to build a joint nuclear 
research center (ÇNAEM) and a research reactor.317 ÇNAEM was opened in 1961. 
Meanwhile the TR-1, a 1 MWe research reactor was installed between 1959 and 
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317 Ahmed Yüksel Özemre, Ah Şu Atomdan Neler Çektim (Oh What I Suffered From The Atom!), 
İstanbul: Pınar, 2002, p.135.  
112 
 
1962. In February 1962, the TR-1 reactor went critical318, and the center was 
officially inaugurated in 27 May 1962. Physics, chemistry, radiobiology departments, 
and supporting technical departments, like, mechanical workshop, electronics and 
reactor management, were established in this center. In addition, in 1967, the Ankara 
Nuclear Research and Training Center (ANAEM) was launched.319 
The TR-1 reactor was used for 15 years to produce radioisotopes, and several 
neutronic experiments. To meet the gradually rising demand for radioisotopes, it was 
shut down in September 1977 and a new reactor with a 5 MWe power, the TR-2, was 
designed and launched just for isotope production, and it went critical in December 
1981. Furthermore, the Triga Mark II reactor with 250 kW power started functioning 
in Istanbul Technical University-Nuclear Energy Institute in March 1979. It was used 
particularly for research, and partly for isotope production.320  
On August 27, 1956, the Law on the Atomic Energy Commission, No. 6821, 
entered into force. It led to the establishment of an institution under the auspices of 
the Prime Ministry, which would administer all nuclear activities, such as the 
processes to build nuclear research and training centers, and issuing licenses for 
nuclear power plants.321 In 1957, with the Law No. 7015, it was agreed that Turkey 
would become a member of the IAEA. In 1958, the İÜ-İTÜ Reactor Committee was 
abolished and its duties were transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1959, 
the Law No. 7091, established the legal framework for isotope production. With new 
laws passed between 1959 and 1961, new regulations were made regarding the 
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applications of nuclear technology. With the Law No. 2690, the Turkish Atomic 
Energy Agency was established in 1982.322 
 Although courses on nuclear physics were taught by the beginning of the 
1950s, particularly in the İÜ Faculty of Science and Ankara University’s Faculty of 
Science, the systematic education on nuclear energy started in 1961 with the 
establishment of the Nuclear Energy Institute in Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ-
NEE with Turkish acronym). In 1982, the department of nuclear engineering was 
opened in Hacettepe University in Ankara. Besides, between 1960 and 1980, in the 
Aegean (Izmir) and Bosphorus Universities (Istanbul), nuclear energy institutes were 
established, and in the Middle East Technical University’s Mechanical Engineering 
Department, a nuclear engineering track was launched.323  
As a result of these efforts for education, between 1957 and 1987, some 1000 
nuclear engineers, nuclear experts, nuclear physicists, nuclear technicians were 
educated at home and abroad, and formed the technical personnel infrastructure. 
However, because of the interruptions in the tender processes, and the abolishment of 
some institutions, these personnel were employed either in TAEK or in universities. 
Few of them were employed on site, some of them were retired, and some were lost 
in brain drain.324  
The idea that Turkey should have a nuclear power plant was first proposed 
openly in the first Atomic Energy Commission. However, the first studies on the 
plants were carried out by a working group under the Electricity Works Studies 
Department (Elektrik İşleri Etüd İdaresi- EİEİ) beginning from 1965. A consortium 
composed of an American, a Swiss and a Spanish firm advised the EİEİ. In their final 
report in 1969, they recommended that the first nuclear power plant be 400 MW 
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pressurized heavy water reactor operating with natural uranium. The then 
government planned to start construction in 1970. However, domestic political 
developments in early 1970s and changes resulted in a decision that all electrical 
works be re-structured under Turkish Electrical Authority. Interest waned on nuclear 
power, and the lack of a strong political commitment failed to generate a decision to 
start construction.325 
 
 
5.2.2. 1970s: Proposal for a nuclear plant in Akkuyu, Ecevit-Erbakan 
government.  
 
In 1972, the Nuclear Power Plants Department was established in Turkish 
Electrical Authority (TEK). It was agreed in 1974 that a nuclear power plant would 
be established. Comprehensive feasibility, site selection and bid specification studies 
were initiated between 1972 and 1974 for a 600 MWe nuclear power plant.326 As a 
result of these studies, the Akkuyu region along the Mediterranean sea, situated 80 
km west of Silifke-Mersin, was found suitable for a nuclear power plant site.327  
TAEK licensed Akkuyu in 1976 by looking at the results of seismic studies, 
soil mechanics research, meteorological and oceanographic evaluation and research. 
TEK decided on Akkuyu with reference to the criteria of electricity consumption, 
convenience for transportation, closeness to the sea, seismic tests, and population 
rate.328  
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Apart from all these criteria, regarding the risks, and spread of radioactive 
elements to the nature and people, Akkuyu was chosen. Around such plants, a 
circular area with a 1.2 km-diameter is left uninhabited, and the area with 18 km in 
diameter following that circle is chosen according to the sparse population.329 The 
studies on Akkuyu went on with the help of some 40 domestic and foreign scientific 
institutions until 1982. Later on, TAEK invited an expert group from the IAEA, 
which reviewed these studies and prepared a report until 1983 verifying that the 
studies carried so far were accurate, and the selection of Akkuyu for a nuclear power 
plant was appropriate. In 1977, talks started with Swedish firms but were cancelled 
in 1979. The talks did not end in an agreement mainly due to the lack of political will 
to finalize the process,330 and the military coup in 1980.  
 
 
5.2.2.1 Protests start against Akkuyu 
 
 In 1976, the chairman of a local organization for fishery and agriculture, who 
was inspired by anti-nuclear protests in France, along with some journalists, revealed 
that the research activities carried out in the region was for the establishment of a 
nuclear power plant. They also informed the local fishermen about the disadvantages 
and risks of nuclear power plants. They continued their activities to raise awareness 
through articles in the wide circulation media, books, and anti-nuclear themed 
posters and conferences. They could attract local civil society organizations as well 
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as national ones, such as the TMMOB (The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers 
and Architects-Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği). 331   
 
 
5.2.3. 1980s: Özal and a new economic system; political concerns 
 
Early 1980s mark the beginning of a new era characterized by the 
performance of the late Prime Minister Turgut Özal. He envisioned that Turkey 
would be integrated with the rest of the world, as opposed to the previous economic 
models shaped by inward-looking economic policies. In 1982, TAEK was 
established as a governmental organization under the direct supervision the Prime 
Minister.332 Studies for site selection for another nuclear power plant began in early 
1980s, and İnceburun-Sinop was selected by the Nuclear Power Plants division of 
TEK.333 Without a tender process for the nuclear power plant, in 1982, the Atomic 
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Siemens-Kraft Werk Union (KWU) of Germany 
and General Electric (GE) of the United States were asked to submit bids. The 
Statute No. 7405, on “Licensing Nuclear Facilities” entered into force in 1983. In 
November 1983, the negotiations with AECL, KWU and General Electric started.334  
The expert team by General Electric concluded that a nuclear power plant in 
Sinop was not feasible, because of the insufficient studies on earthquake zones under 
the Black Sea. While talks with the Americans stalled, they continued with the 
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Canadian and German firms.335 Although in August 1984, there was an agreement, 
the government declared that it changed the basic provision of the tender from turn-
key to build-operate-transfer (BOT). However, it discouraged the KWU and General 
Electric. On the basis of the turn-key agreement, it was agreed that a PHWR 
(Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor) and PWR would be built in Akkuyu, and then 
two BWR power plants in Sinop, where the site-selection process was going on.336 A 
pre-agreement was signed with AECL on the basis of the BOT model. However, the 
attempt failed due to the lack of will as a result of the government’s inclination 
towards thermal power plants, and as a result of the Canadian government’s decision 
that the BOT was too risky.337 Then, the AECL also faced financial problems when it 
asked a loan guarantee from the Canadian government and banks, and could not 
receive it from the former.338  
Without a tangible result from the talks with Canadian and German firms, 
Turkey sought other cooperative ventures in the nuclear field, and signed a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Argentina in May 1988.  The agreement foresaw 
transfers of technical assistance, such as front-end nuclear fuel cycle research and 
development, and research on power and research reactor planning, construction, 
quality assurance, operation and regulation. It also included provisions about IAEA 
safeguards to apply to all nuclear material designed for the use of nuclear technology 
to be transferred.339 Turkey also engaged in talks with Argentina for the construction 
of the CAREM-25, an Argentine-made 25 MWe nuclear reactor in Ankara which 
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included representatives from the Turkish firm STFA and TEK and two Argentine 
firms.340 However, there was no progress because of political concerns, which will be 
dealt with in more detail below. 
Because of the failures of the attempts, there was a sense that Turkey was 
done with nuclear power plants, and the related personnel started to move gradually 
to other institutions, that is, there was disintegration in the cadres. The new 
administration of the TEK closed the Nuclear Power Plants Department in 1988 on 
the grounds that it was no longer necessary. In TAEK several skilled personnel either 
went to other institutions or went abroad.341  
   
 
5.2.3.1. Political concerns during the talks 
 
Turkey committed in both AEK and TAEK establishment laws that it would 
use nuclear power for civilian purposes. Still, proliferation concerns of the 
governments of the firms or international actors were important factors that 
prevented the finalization of tenders during the 1980s. Ankara ratified the NPT in 
April 1980, and committed itself not to produce nuclear weapons, and not to help 
states seeking nuclear weapons. In addition, by the safeguards agreement of 1981 
with the IAEA, it agreed for inspections in all existing and prospective nuclear 
facilities.  
There were allegations at this period that Turkey and Pakistan were illicitly 
cooperating on nuclear matters. The United States was concerned about Turkish-
Pakistani cooperation in 1981 on strategic nuclear material trade with the potential of 
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military applications.342  During the talks with Canadian and German firms, political 
considerations of their respective governments were conducive to their withdrawal. 
The KWU was probably discouraged from an agreement because of the reaction of 
the West German government to Turkey’s improving relations with East Germany. 
The Canadian AECL most likely bowed to pressure from Western countries which 
were concerned about the possibility that Turkey may build a nuclear bomb based on 
CANDU (Canadian Deuterium-Uranium) technology.343 The Greek, Israeli and 
French opposition impeded financing for the project, because Western countries 
worried that Turkey would follow Pakistan by modifying the technology to gain the 
capability to build an atomic bomb.344  
The talks with Argentine firms could not advance because of the decision to 
appoint the former head of Argentina’s nuclear energy commission as the new 
ambassador to Turkey. This decision caused unease on the part of the United States, 
the Soviet Union, Germany and Brazil. The United States worried that this 
technology could be transferred to Pakistan.345 On the other hand, regarding the 
Akkuyu bid, where German, Canadian and American firms were involved, officially, 
the United States rejected the existence of proliferation concern resulting in the 
cancellation of the project. A US official stated that despite the concerns with some 
dual-use exports from Turkey to Pakistan, the United States did not act to prevent US 
vendors to build a nuclear reactor in Turkey on suspicions that Turkey might have a 
clandestine nuclear program in the future. He added that if there were such concerns, 
                                               
342 Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Quest…” 1997, p. 35. 
343 “Canadian Firm Drops Bid to Build Nuclear Plant,” Nuclear Developments, February 25, 1988, p. 
39. 
344 Ibid. 
345 “Argentina to Help Acquire ‘Nuclear Technology’,” Nuclear Developments, June 21, 1988, p. 39; 
“Nuclear Pact With Argentina ‘Secretly Signed’,” Nuclear Developments, November 15, 1990, pp. 
29-30; “‘Secret Talks’ With Argentina on Nuclear Plant,” Nuclear Developments, October 6, 1989, 
pp. 31-32, cited in Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Quest…” 1997, p. 37. 
120 
 
they would not have allowed the American firm, General Electric to bid from the 
outset.346  
Turkey’s attempts for nuclear technology transfer were short of alleviating 
the fears of the West about proliferation. Moreover, particularly after the nuclear 
plant accident in Chernobyl in 1986, there was heightened awareness on 
environmental issues, and public opinion turned against nuclear power plants.  
 
 
5.2.3.2 Chernobyl and the birth of the anti-nuclear platform 
 
The anti-nuclear groups organized a signature campaign after Chernobyl. It 
remained limited, but the “triumph” of the environmental protests against the 
establishment of thermal power plant in Aliağa, by the Aegean Sea, gave spur to 
similar protests against the power plant in Akkuyu. The forerunners of the movement 
wanted to publish a journal for media attention. The Greens and environmental 
organizations supported the project, and in September 1992, the Ağaçkakan 
(Woodpecker) journal was published that contained the file on “Nuclear 
Honeymoon.” In the same period, Greenpeace initiated its first campaign in Turkey. 
The anti-nuclear platform was launched in 1993 with the call from the Ağaçkakan 
journal to local organizations. Anti-nuclear meetings were held in big cities, 
including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Zonguldak and Mersin. The protesters of 
nuclear power plants started confronting with the officials in panels on the one hand, 
and organizing protests, signature campaigns, and mailing to the President, Prime 
Minister and MPs on the other. The platform decided to organize a “counter-
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conference” at the time when there would be nuclear technology conference in 
Ankara, and they found support from various newspapers, trade unions and civil 
society organizations. Similar activities were organized in 1994 in Istanbul and 
Izmir, particularly street protests and campaigns that coincided with energy 
congresses.347  
 Rock bands played an important role in the formation and strengthening of 
the anti-nuclear public opinion in the United States and in Europe, and the same 
method was followed in Turkey: Public figures were extensively involved in 
campaigns and activities against the establishment of nuclear power plants. Rock 
bands and musicians performed in anti-nuclear campaigns beginning from 1993. 
Writers, caricature artists, graphic artists, film makers contributed to these campaigns 
with their works. Photo exhibits concerning the impacts of radiation on people were 
utilized to raise awareness at the public level and strengthen the opposition.348  
 
 
5.2.4. 1990s: Ecevit-Yılmaz government, Akkuyu and Financial 
constraints  
 
A 1992 Energy Ministry report presented nuclear power as an indispensable 
option to prevent the energy shortage in the following two decades.349  The then 
Minister of Energy Ersin Faralyalı, stated that a consensus in the Parliament would 
create a positive public opinion and would precipitate the generation of nuclear 
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power.350  In 1993, the Higher Council of Science and Technology identified nuclear 
technology among the top five technologies as a national goal.351 In 1995, TEAŞ, in 
order to make the preliminary analysis of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) tender, 
awarded a consultancy contract to a South Korean firm, the Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI), for the construction of 1,200 MWe nuclear plant to be 
built in Akkuyu.352  
The tender announcement specified that the bids would be turnkey and with 
100% financing. In early 1997, TEAŞ announced the bidders to construct the 
Akkuyu nuclear power plant.353 The period between 1996 and early 1997 was the 
initial phase of the bidding process, and during that time, it was reported that the 
AECL tried to convince Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan on the grounds that the 
Canadian technology would render Turkey self-sufficient in nuclear power, because 
it used natural uranium instead of enriched uranium, by which TEAŞ could exploit 
domestic uranium resources. After the Erbakan government ended with a crisis in 
early 1997, he was succeeded by the Mesut Yılmaz government. Yılmaz was 
determined to strengthen relations with the United States. The United States, 
Germany and France stepped up their lobbying activities respectively for 
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Westinghouse, and for the NPI (Nuclear Power International: The Siemens-
Framatome Consortium).354 
The Yılmaz government lasted until 1999. Out of the 1999 election, a new 
coalition government was formed, which included The Democratic Left Party (DSP 
with Turkish acronyms, left), and Bülent Ecevit as the Prime Minister, the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP with Turkish acronyms, far right) and the Motherland 
Party (ANAP). The Energy Minister of the new coalition government under Ecevit’s 
premiership, Cumhur Ersümer, from ANAP, was very determined for the 
establishment of the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.355 Enis Öksüz, the then Minister 
of Transportation, and from the same party, was less polite and called those against 
nuclear power plants “idiot.”356 However, the Treasury did not give purchase 
guarantees, and this decision was supported also by the IMF and World Bank.357 The 
project ran into hurdles and was followed by corruption lawsuits.358 The bidding 
companies were in dispute;359 the nuclear project competed with defense projects; 
360and there were proliferation concerns.361  
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s relations with the newly independent 
states in Central Asia and Caucasus increased international concerns, since some of 
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them possessed nuclear facilities.362 In April 2000, the Energy Minister, Ersümer, 
declared the decision by the government to postpone the nuclear-plant project until 
July 2000 due to financial constraints as a result of the IMF-backed economic 
program.363 On 25 July 2000, the late Prime Minister Ecevit declared that the tender 
for the nuclear power plants was cancelled due to the shortage of funds to construct 
the power plant. He drew attention to the TAEK report that in 15-30 years, there 
would be problems with natural gas, and suggested that there would be a need for 
several nuclear power plants, not one nuclear power plant. Therefore, if Turkey 
invested on this project on borrowed funds, it would jeopardize the economic 
program which aimed at decreasing inflation. So, if the available funds were pushed 
to limits and a large amount of foreign loans were taken for financing, then, inflation 
would increase.364  
Ecevit drew attention to the fact that in the meantime, the applications of 
wind and solar energy could be widened, and suggested that the abundant thorium 
reserves in Turkey could substitute the current input of nuclear reactors, that is, 
uranium. At the same time, hydraulic and natural gas projects should be accelerated 
without delay, and wind and solar energy should be utilized. He also added that the 
losses in the electrical grid should be addressed, and extravagant use of electricity 
should be prevented. 365  
The tender process led to several rows and rumors on corruption cases, and it 
was one of the reasons of the postponement by the government.366 It was also argued 
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that Ecevit cancelled the tender because whichever firm the tender for the Akkuyu 
power plant would be granted, the rest of the two would sue the winning consortium 
for the cancellation of the tender. This in turn, would strengthen the arguments on 
corruption, and would extend the criminal activity web to irritate some ministers, and 
as a result would destabilize the coalition.367  
In the 1990s, Turkey faced financial problems for new projects on energy 
which were based on generating electricity from water and coal, therefore it became 
necessary to seek alternative energy resources. Overall, the attempts failed because 
of the absence of a national energy strategy coupled with international concerns for 
proliferation and domestic political reasons. 368 Nuclear energy was seriously 
contemplated to meet the growing demand and with a national source (to decrease 
dependency)- which motivated the Justice and Development Party government to 
make nuclear technology a part of its policy.  
 
 
5.2.4.1.Anti-nuclear movement becomes national in scope 
 
As the government announced the tender for Akkuyu in 1996, the anti-
nuclear platform organized annual fests in the town, which brought together activists 
and the local residents. In this period, chambers got involved and helped the 
movement to become national.369 The protests in Bergama had reversed the 
government decision for gold mining in the region, and in 1999, the residents of 
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Bergama joined those in Akkuyu for a more effective resistance. The cancellation of 
the tender in 2000 gave confidence to the anti-nuclear movement. Greenpeace 
supported the movement with demonstrations, conferences and reports. Their 
protests in front of governmental buildings, such as the Turkish Electrical Authority 
and the Energy Ministry received media attention. They carried out a symbolic 
referendum in Akkuyu in 1999 with an 84% against. Greenpeace called the Energy 
Minister to stop the tender by putting a giant poster on the Bosphorus Bridge.370 
After Akkuyu, anti-nuclear platforms were formed in Mersin, Sinop and Izmir. 
 
 
5.2.5. 2002-present: Erdoğan government re-tabled nuclear plans  
 
The Erdoğan government re-tabled nuclear power as one of the alternative 
energy sources to reduce supply security risks caused by the dominance of imported 
fuels and to ensure diversity in power generation. In 2004, the Energy Ministry 
revived the nuclear project and launched studies for a long-term and comprehensive 
nuclear power program. Turkey and the United States agreed to cooperate on the 
civilian uses of nuclear energy, and the agreement was ratified by the Parliament on 
January 14, 2004.371 A 2004 report by the Turkish Electricity Transmission Company 
foresaw that between 2011 and 2015, a 4500 MW nuclear capacity would be 
installed on the basis of the assumption that the energy demand would increase by 
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7.9% between 2005 and 2020.372 At the end of 2005, the government announced the 
plans to have at least three nuclear power stations with a capacity of 5000 MW in 
operation by 2012.373 In January 2006, The Energy Minister declared the date launch 
of nuclear power would take place in 2015.374 
The Ministry foresaw that it was necessary to make new investments of 
56.500 MW in high scenario, and for 40.500 MW in low scenario, until 2020.375 The 
ETKB report warned that Turkey’s dependence on foreign resources was around 
72%, and if no measures were taken, this would increase to 80%. After the meetings 
on the relationship between energy and climate change, the Energy Ministry reported 
to the Environment and Forestry Ministries that the most convenient options for 
sustainable development were renewables, the efficient use of energy, clean coal 
technologies and nuclear energy.376 
Since 2003, the Justice and Development Party (AKP with Turkish acronyms) 
government stated its determination to make use of nuclear power to meet Turkey’s 
energy needs for the future. Nuclear energy was also in the AKP’s 2002 elections 
declaration, where it was stated that AKP’s energy policy was based on cheap and 
reliable access to energy, a competitive energy market, decreasing the burden on 
public budget, and the preservation of the environment and human health. Their 
rationale was to provide an alternative or a substitute to the natural gas-operated 
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power plants, which were basically dependent on foreign sources, and with an aim to 
observe environmental safety.377  After assuming power, the AKP included this 
policy in its government program: To avoid energy shortage, “environmentalist 
nuclear energy sources”378 would be introduced (meaning those technologies not 
posing a threat to the environment or human health), along with energy resource 
diversification.379  
The official statement of the Energy Ministry explained the rationale behind 
the nuclear energy project on the basis of the criteria that made up Turkey’s energy 
strategy: That nuclear energy was cheap and environment-friendly, which would 
boost Turkey’s development, and would help establish the high-technology products 
and infrastructure.380 The Energy Ministry and TAEK prepared a “National Nuclear 
Technology Policy.” In addition to the utilization of domestic resources for energy 
supply, they foresee the establishment of a 5,000 MWe nuclear production capacity 
until 2015 with reactor technologies using natural uranium and pressurized water 
reactors.381 The policy aimed at the formation and development of the legal, 
institutional, industrial and personnel infrastructure in accordance with up-to-date 
technologies. It also included support for research and development activities in the 
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nuclear field, and at the same time would encourage the participation of the private 
sector in nuclear technology investments.382 
Regarding the applications of nuclear technology, the policy sought to widen 
the uses of nuclear technology to fields like, medicine, industry, agriculture, animal 
husbandry, environment and food. As the raw material for nuclear fuel, uranium and 
thorium would be produced out of domestic reserves in order to decrease dependence 
on foreign sources. To address the issue of radioactive wastes, studies would be 
carried out to minimize these wastes in order to decrease their impact on human and 
environmental safety. A “Nuclear Technology Center” would be established to carry 
out scientific and technical studies, which would include research reactors and pilot 
facilities. In order to raise the human capital to apply the nuclear technology policy, 
nuclear training centers would be set up. A “National Nuclear Coordination Board” 
would be established in order to effectively sustain nuclear and radiation safety in all 
applications of nuclear technology. In addition, to develop the measures, legal and 
R&D infrastructure would be ameliorated.383 
Following the TAEK proposal for some eight locations as the nuclear power 
plant sites, in April 2006, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that the government 
chose Sinop, İnceburun.384 The Ministry stated that according to the plans, there 
would be a need for a 4,500 MWe nuclear energy by 2020, and that it was not 
possible to generate it by one reactor.385 Right after the declaration, the Energy 
Ministry held a two-day nuclear energy summit in mid-April 2006. The first one was 
with the representatives of the private sector, and the second was held with some 150 
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participants from academia, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry and Gülhane 
Military Medical Academy in the TAEK headquarters, to discuss the technology and 
what the nuclear technology center would encompass.386 The Energy Minister 
convened the representatives of some leading Turkish firms387 to discuss the plans to 
build nuclear power plants. In addition to the private sector, energy and economy 
bureaucracy was also present in the meeting. The talks focused on the investment 
models and concerns over the possible risks due to the use of nuclear energy.388  
The government also worked on the legal infrastructure for licensing, 389 
nuclear fuel deals,390 and allocated funds for research on domestic technology. 391 
The most important issue was financing. 392 The law on the establishment and 
operation of nuclear power plants passed from the Parliament in early May 2007. 
However, during the deliberations the government and the opposition party were at 
odds.393 It was first vetoed by the then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The law 5710 
passed from the Parliament after making the changes that were proposed and was 
issued in the Official Gazzette on November 21, 2007.394 The law defined the 
process of competition (tender) and the selection process for the nuclear power 
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plants, the determination of the establishing firm, and the principles on the sale of the 
electricity generated. The law foresaw that TETAŞ would purchase the electricity on 
the basis of an agreement with the firm. The law also formed two different funds for 
costs regarding the management of radioactive waste and for decommissioning of the 
power plant. 395 
While the licensing work was continuing for the Sinop site, the government 
opened the tender (which it calls a “competition”) for Akkuyu (which already had a 
license) and on September 24, 2008, some six consortiums responded, with only one 
filing a proposal: The Atomstroyexport-Inter Rao-Park Teknik consortium. Those 
outside the competition, presumably were dissatisfied with guarantees and subsidies, 
and had expected Treasury guarantees. The consortium proposed to establish four 
units of VVER1200 (AES-2006) design reactors, which is the Russian type 
pressurized water reactor. The nominal electrical power of each unit proposed for 
Akkuyu would be around 1200 MWe, and the total power of the nuclear power plant 
composed of four units would be approximately 4800 MWe. On December 19, 2008, 
TAEK announced that the evaluation of the proposal is complete,396 and confirmed 
that the proposal met the criteria. It was then submitted to TETAŞ, the authorized 
institution to open the third letter submitted by the consortium, which contained the 
price per kWh. On January 19, 2009, TETAŞ declared that the Turkish-Russian 
consortium’s offer was 21.16 cents per kWh, which far exceeded the expectations for 
an economical energy investment.397 Although it was acknowledged that nuclear 
power plant investments were expensive, this price tag was unaffordable for the 
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government and did not meet the policy criteria of cost-effectiveness. The acceptable 
price would be in the range of 10-12 cents. 
In late 2009, the Council of State halted the execution of some articles of the 
nuclear power plant tender regulation, and the tender for the Akkuyu plant was 
cancelled.398 Later on, the government decided to sign bilateral agreements at the 
governmental level for nuclear power plants, that is to say, without issuing tenders. 
The first one was signed with Russia for a power plant in Akkuyu,399 and then with 
South Korea for another in Sinop.400 
Turkey’s new plans coincide with an increasing interest in nuclear power in 
its region,401 and with an international security environment that de-stabilizes 
regional security. In this context, it is important to present Turkey’s non-nuclear-
weapon-state status in order to understand the arguments that uphold nuclear power 
for a latent nuclear capability. 
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5.3. Turkey’s non-nuclear-weapon state status  
 
Turkey’s security policy is primarily shaped on the basis of the strategy of 
deterrence.402 In 1980, Turkey ratified the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, and 
became party to other agreements regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. Turkey could maintain its non-
nuclear-weapon status relying on its deterrent capabilities, and later its strategic 
relations with the United States and Israel in military matters. There were other 
elements that sustained this policy as a security asset.403  
Turkey is a signatory to the NPT and all other nonproliferation of WMD 
regimes; so first and foremost, Turkey is legally and politically committed to keep its 
NNWS status. Ankara’s international commitments go beyond legal constraints, and 
build an image of a dedicated member of the regime, and confirm the country’s 
status as an “accepted” state among the community of nations. Nuclear 
nonproliferation regime was bolstered after the Cold War -by the extension of the 
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NPT, denouncement of nuclear weapons by a number of states and their NPT 
memberships, success of the UN inspections in Iraq, and cooperation between the 
United States and Russia to prevent proliferation. Being a NNWS, thus, became the 
accepted norm of international community, as opposed to the past decades, where 
possession of nuclear weapons was a sign of prestige and status. In this sense, 
Turkey’s status was contemplated as an asset rather than a deficiency for national 
security. 
Regarding nuclear nonproliferation at the institutional level, the NPT aims at 
the total and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, and forms the cornerstone 
of the regime. NNWSs benefit from “negative security assurances”404 and 
international cooperation to deal with proliferation risks. In terms of security, 
Turkey’s ties to the West, particularly its EU perspective constitutes a political 
constraint, which makes a nuclear Turkey suicidal to its EU membership bid. At the 
domestic level, there has not been a passionate call from the military, politicians or 
the public for Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons. 
The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 was a turning point 
for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and US foreign and security 
policy. Iran’s nuclear program became worrisome, and North Korea carried out a 
successful nuclear test on the grounds of national security reasons. On the other 
hand, the United States initiated nuclear cooperation with India, which is not party to 
the NPT. Soaring relations with the United States, increasing rate of anti-American 
public opinion, Iran’s nuclear program with a rough diplomatic process, and North 
Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT had an impact on the pillars that sustained 
Turkey’s status. However, it should be underlined that proliferation is a political 
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decision, and that Turkish policymakers would need to go through a cost-benefit 
analysis.405 
 In terms of nuclear technology transfer for energy generation, the debate 
revolves mainly around the energy axis rather than proliferation. The next chapter 
will provide the positions of the involved actors and their arguments. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
ARGUMENTS IN THE DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
 
 
 This chapter will present the actors and their arguments regarding the pursuit 
of nuclear power in Turkey. Although it is not the immediate concern, it will not 
exclude views on the military use of nuclear technology, which either consider it as a 
desired option, or as a despised choice. The concerns on nuclear power increased 
since the late 1980s, particularly because of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, 
and the opposition is vocal since the early 1990s, notably after the arrival of 
Greenpeace.  
The 1960s and 1970s did not witness a debate, because there was lack of 
environmental sensitivity under the stress of the Cold War. The aim of the 
governments was to acquire the technology and the main question was site selection 
to establish the NPP, rather than a debate on its necessity.406 Scientific communities 
were gradually growing and academicians were trying to raise skilled personnel who 
would work in NPPs.407 The 1986 Chernobyl accident had a serious effect on the 
perception of nuclear power plants, as “nuclear” was then associated with “threat,” 
instead of “energy,” so the connotation changed. After the Greenpeace activists 
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visited Turkey in 1992 and opened a branch, environmental sensitivity increased 
particularly as a result of demonstrations, protests and signature campaigns that 
created awareness at the public level. 
The debate is not within the policymaking circles, but rather between 
individuals, political parties and civil society. It is characterized by a conflict 
between two positions which try to ascribe different meanings to nuclear power, and 
in turn to affect the energy policy outcome. The arguments of the actors will be 
presented by starting with the government, that is, the civilian government, foreign 
ministry, and energy bureaucracy including the Energy Ministry, TAEK and the 
EPDK. The role of the military in the making of security policy is important in 
Turkey. Nuclear issue has a military connection, therefore, it is useful to include the 
viewpoint/position of the military in order to provide inputs for the assessments on 
nuclear proliferation for the future. Next in line are political parties and politicians. 
They will be followed by the views of the economic and business élite and the 
energy sector both in and abroad, who are concerned with the input costs, supply 
security and lucrative sales. Last but not least, is the civil society, which includes the 
media, non-governmental organizations and academics.  
 
 
6.1. Government 
  
The views and policies of the governments during the nuclear technology 
transfer attempts were provided in the previous chapter. The AKP government, as its 
predecessors, tabled the nuclear power project in order to address energy shortage. 
Starting from late 1990s, Turkey grew increasingly dependent on natural gas and to 
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its main providers (Russia and Iran). This resulted in an unsustainable energy policy. 
Nuclear power emerged as a viable alternative, because it would ensure supply 
security, contribute to environmental sustainability, provide diversification in the 
resource portfolio and reduce dependency.  
Nuclear technology has critical components which can be used for civilian 
and military purposes, and the peaceful nuclear technology is inextricably linked to 
the norms of international nuclear nonproliferation regime: States party to the NPT 
as non-nuclear-weapon states have the right to pursue peaceful nuclear power and 
they commit not to divert the technology to military use. Thus, nuclear power 
projects, unlike other energy projects, involve an international security dimension 
and are related to a country’s international relations, that is to say, the home 
countries of the firms which (would) table proposals in the tender(s). There have 
been proliferation concerns during the tenders,408 although the debate in Turkey 
focuses more on the energy aspect and the “necessity” question. The Turkish 
Foreign Ministry emphasizes Turkey’s international standing as a committed nation 
to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, referring to the NPT and to other 
nonproliferation treaties, agreements and protocols to which Turkey is a party.   
The Energy Bureaucracy for nuclear power includes the Energy Ministry, 
TAEK and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority.409 Former Energy Ministers, 
                                               
408 During the 1980s, there were concerns regarding Turkey’s relationship with Pakistan. During the 
tender process that started in 1996 and ended in 2000, the United States was concerned about the 
involvement of Turkish entities in proliferation-related trade: Letter of Transmission to the Congress 
from President George W. Bush for the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, January 
22, 2008,  
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080123-6.html>. 
409 Although the EPDK does not have a role in formulating the policy, it incurs the results of the 
policy. 
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Deniz Baykal410 and Recai Kutan411 had indicated urgency for nuclear energy. After 
the AKP government re-tabled plans for nuclear power, the Energy Ministry 
defended the project on the basis of environmental-friendliness and cost-
effectiveness.412 Former Energy Minister, Hilmi Güler, underlined that energy 
shortage, dependency on energy imports, climate change and insufficiency of local 
resources made nuclear energy a “necessity” and not a choice.413 The Minister saw 
the project as a nuclear technology program, and not just the establishment of nuclear 
power plants.414 The Energy Ministry also planned the establishment of a nuclear 
technology center in Sinop.415 Güler also stated that plans to acquire both the fuel 
technology and to make a national prototype.416  
 TAEK is responsible for determining the essence of nuclear policy and of the 
strategy for defense against nuclear hazards. Official statements by TAEK 
acknowledge the benefits of nuclear technology for energy generation. There were 
also unofficial statements: In the first Energy Council which convened in December 
1998, the “Nuclear Energy Commission”417 submitted a report that stressed the 
significance of nuclear energy and provided guidance on the development of the 
infrastructure.418 
                                               
410 The remarks of Deniz Baykal, the then Minister of Energy, The 3rd Energy Congress, November 
20, 1978, The archives of the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Press, Media and Information, 
November 1978, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/ayintarihi/1978/kasim1978.htm>. 
411 “Turkey Nuclear -2: Govt To Invite Bids In October” Emerging Markets Report, August 29, 1996.  
412 “Nuclear Power,” Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 
413 “Nükleerde Son Perde (The Last “Scene” in Nuclear [Plans]),” 2007, p. 34; TGNA Minutes, 22nd 
Term, 5th Legislative Year, 38th Session, 20 December, 2006. 
414 “Nükleerde Son Perde (The Last “Scene” in Nuclear [Plans]),” 2007, p.33.  
415 The remarks by Hilmi Güler, former Minister of Energy, TAEK, Ankara, 12 February, 2008. 
416 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
417 The Commission included the TAEK Chairman, former Chairman and several nuclear and physics 
engineers along with the representatives of the firms which participated the nuclear power plant 
tender. 
418 1. Enerji Şurası, Nükleer Enerji Komisyonu Raporu, (The Nuclear Power Commission’s Report, 1st 
Energy Convention), December 1998, 
<ozemre.com/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=37&Itemid=53>. 
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 As the government re-tabled plans for nuclear energy, TAEK issued the 
National Nuclear Technology Policy report,419 and a series of brochures on the 
benefits of nuclear power plants: TAEK sets energy supply portfolio as a national 
priority. It would achieve the aim to decrease dependency, maintain secure and 
continuous supply of resources against price fluctuations and possible limitations in 
the flow of energy. The report compared nuclear power plants on the basis of 
economic and technological criteria with other sources, and established its benefits 
and necessity for Turkey. It listed the advantages of nuclear energy as: diversification 
of energy sources, stability in electricity generation costs (compared to the 80% of 
fuel cost in natural gas operated thermal power plants, nuclear fuel constitutes only 
20% of the electricity generation cost), secure base-load energy (which will not be 
affected by climatic changes or environmental factors), and decreasing the CO2 
emissions. In addition, the facilities that would be established to produce nuclear 
energy would contribute to the development of science and technology 
infrastructure.420  
EPDK is responsible for reviewing applications in the energy sector, and for 
giving licenses. It is not an institution of energy policymaking, so it cannot affect 
policy. However, a former EPDK Chair, Yusuf Günay, expressed concern on the 
liberal characteristic of the energy market. He warned that it would be disrupted 
because of the government purchase guarantee on nuclear energy.421 He also 
suggested caution against regulations that could discourage private sector to invest in 
nuclear energy.422 
                                               
419 “Ulusal Nükleer Teknoloji Politikası (The National Nuclear Technology Policy),” 2009. 
420 Nükleer Enerjinin Ülkemize Kazandıracakları (What the Nuclear Power Plants Would Provide to 
Our Country), Ankara: TAEK, 2008. 
421 “Nükleerde Son Perde (The Last “Scene” in Nuclear [Plans]),” 2007, p. 34.  
422 EPDK Başkanı Yusuf Günay’ın LPG Piyasası’nda İlk Lisans Verme Töreninde Sorulara Verdiği 
Cevaplar (The Answers of The Chairman of EPDK, Yusuf Günay, to Questions in the First Licensing 
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6.1.1. Military 
 
The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is not directly involved in the nuclear 
energy debate, but its views are important for assessments on diversion of technology 
to military use. It has become an important actor because of proliferation concerns 
during some of the tenders. The official position of the military423 is maintaining the 
non-nuclear weapon status of Turkey, which is committed to the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, and which ensures its security through alliances.  
Iran’s nuclear program is cause for concern: A nuclear capable Iran would 
trigger a regional security dilemma, challenge the effectiveness of international 
institutions and of the international nonproliferation regime. Although Turkey’s 
security policy is not just shaped by Realist parameters, strategic assessments may 
not exclude symmetric responses to proliferation. In fact, Ret. Captain (N) Yılmaz 
Aklar, drew attention to the strategic priority for deterrence in the Turkish military. 
In the case of a security deficiency due to the non-nuclear weapon status of Turkey, 
he is not restrained to suggest that Turkey should take the decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons. He reasons that because in the unstable neighborhood, Turkey must have 
nuclear capability.424 This line of argument is not confined to the military but other 
individuals who engage in a “strategic assessment” for Turkey’s security policy 
options.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
in the LNG Market Ceremony) February 11, 2006, 
<http://www.epdk.org.tr/basin/2006/2006konusma/2006-02-11-LPG.html>. 
423 Kitle İmha Silahlarının ve Bunların Fırlatma Vasıtalarının Yayılmasının Önlenmesine İlişkin Genel 
Politika (The Policy on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery 
Systems), Turkish Armed Forces, (Date accessed: May 8, 2006), 
<http://www.tsk.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_20_Kitle_Imha_Silahlari/Kitle_Imha_Silahla
ri.htm>. 
424 Interview with Ret. Captain (N)Yılmaz Aklar, March 30, 2006, Ankara. 
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6.2. Political Parties and Politicians 
 
The conflict over nuclear power continued between political parties as well: 
The following remarks are chosen from among the politicians and MPs from AKP 
(and its predecessors the Welfare Party-RP and the Virtue Party-FP425) and other 
mainstream parties such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP), Democrat Party (formerly True Path Party-DYP), the Motherland 
(ANAVATAN) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP).426  
The AKP government re-tabled the plans for generating nuclear power, and 
several MPs defended the project in the Assembly General Board sessions. Remzi 
Çetin advocated nuclear power on the basis of energy shortage (expected for 2010s 
and 2020s) and the procurement of advanced technology for scientific and industrial 
development.427 Mustafa Öztürk, prescribed NPPs a leading role for progress in 
industry and several sectors. Because it is relatively easier and cheaper to store the 
nuclear fuel, nuclear energy would contribute to the energy supply security. Öztürk 
saw nuclear power plants also as an instrument of prestige.428 
Afif Demirkıran promoted nuclear power to address energy shortage and 
dependency, and saw the inclusion of nuclear energy in the energy portfolio as an 
obligation.429 Cahit Can, an MP from Sinop, which is the town where the 
government plans to build nuclear power plants, supported the decision, and soothed 
the worries on the risks of accident and waste by pointing out the safety measures 
                                               
425 The Welfare Party and the Virtue Party were closed down by the Constitutional Court due to 
activities against secularism. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) were established afterwards 
by the “reformist wing.”  
426 They are chosen from the TGNA General Board Minutes, in mid-1990s until today. The 70s and 
80s until the Chernobyl accident was not quite a scene of disagreement and debate. The parties are 
listed in alphabetical order. 
427 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year, 61st Session, February 9, 2006. 
428 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
429 Ibid. 
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and the re-usable character of waste.430 Öner Gülyeşil referred to the efforts of anti-
nuclear lobbies to prevent the establishment of NPPs through civil society 
organizations, like Greenpeace, relying on his personal experience.431  
Soner Aksoy served as the Chair for the parliamentary commission on 
industry, trade, energy, natural resources, information and technology. He stated that 
nuclear power would help diversification, and would increase investments in 
electricity generation. Since the operations, maintenance and fuel costs of nuclear 
power plants are less than those of fossil fuel-operated plants, NPPs would be 
important instruments to provide stability in electricity production costs, hence long-
term price stability.432  
ANAVATAN (The Motherland Party)433 was home to both views: Miraç 
Akdoğan, supported nuclear energy, as opposed to Züheyir Amber from Hatay, and 
Hüseyin Özcan from Mersin, the region where Akkuyu is located. For Miraç 
Akdoğan, uninterrupted energy resources must supplement renewable energy 
resources, that is, because they are dependent on natural processes.434 Züheyir 
Amber, shared the arguments usually brought forward by the anti-nuclear groups.435 
Hüseyin Özcan, conveyed the party position that favored sustainable development. 
That is to say, the Party was not against the production of nuclear energy, but upheld 
measures that would minimize environmental degradation, and promote the 
establishment of an infrastructure that would be more environment-conscious. In 
addition, the Party prioritized the use of natural resources and riches instead of 
                                               
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. 
432 “Nükleer Enerji Yatırımlarını Da Özel Sektör Yapmalı (The Private Sector Should Also Undertake 
Nuclear Energy Investments),” 2007. 
433 The party was merged to Democrat Party in October 2009. 
434 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 38th Session, December 20, 
2006. 
435 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
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nuclear energy, and encouraged the acquisition of up-to-date technologies of 
NPPs.436 
BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) views nuclear energy as a “threat to the 
nature.”437  
CHP (The Republican People’s Party) is the main opposition party. It 
stands in the left of the political spectrum, and is inclined to reject nuclear power for 
ideological reasons. As a matter of fact, Onur Öymen, the chief advisor to the CHP 
in foreign affairs, underlined that renewable resources are underutilized. He also 
drew attention to the loss of electricity in transmission lines. He stated that the CHP 
was not against the transfer of nuclear technology, but that Turkey should decide in 
accordance with international developments in scientific matters, such as fusion 
technologies.438  
Mustafa Özyürek underlined that the CHP was for environmentalism, social 
justice, equality and takes “human first.” He argued that NPPs would certainly have 
adverse consequences on the environment.439 Sedat Uzunbay pointed at the high 
risks of NPPs, and stated that Turkey would still be dependent on fuel, because the 
NPPs would use enriched uranium, and the local uranium and thorium reserves 
would lie idle.440 As an alternative for nuclear power, he proposed wind energy 
systems, and small hydroelectrical power plants. He promoted energy efficiency in 
household and industrial consumption.441  
Engin Altay, an MP from Sinop, firmly opposed the decision to establish a 
NPP, and particularly the absence of the public interest on what he termed as “a vital 
                                               
436 Ibid. 
437 Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi Programı (The Peace and Democracy Party Program), (Date accessed: 
May 15, 2010), <http://www.bdp.org.tr/hakkimizda/program.html>. 
438 Interview with Onur Öymen, March 27, 2006, Ankara. 
439 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 1st Legislative Year, 52nd Session, March 21, 2003. 
440 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
441 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 3rd Legislative Year, 39th Session, December 24, 
2004. 
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issue”. For him, the decision was an imposition and undemocratic.442 Ahmet Rıza 
Acar was concerned about nuclear waste and implicitly referred to plutonium in that 
“waste” that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. 443 Vahit Çekmez, MP 
from Mersin, argued that the Akkuyu NPP would threaten tourism and agriculture in 
Mersin, and the entire Mediterranean. Another shortfall was with the cooling water 
which may disrupt the ecological balance of the sea. He questioned the waste 
disposal sites not only for Akkuyu plant but also for other plants to be established in 
Turkey. He argued that public health would be sacrificed at the expense of political 
gains.444 
Retired Ambassador Umut Arık, advisor to the DP (Democratic Party; 
formerly DYP-True Path Party), underlined that the transfer of nuclear technology 
would mean the development of energy technology, and it must be the aim to have 
optimal technological mix to realize development. Ret. Ambassador Nüzhet 
Kandemir explained the DP’s position on the nuclear energy as the use of the 
technology only for peaceful purposes and dealing with states of concern at the 
diplomatic level.445 During the previous attempt in the 1990s, the MPs from the DYP 
in general supported the plans to establish NPPs in Turkey. For instance, Halil Yıldız 
was critical of the opposing groups for having “backward” ideas. However, by the 
establishment of high-technology NPPs with Western technology, Turkey would be 
in the league of those states having nuclear energy technology, and it would become 
a regional power.446  
                                               
442 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year 91st Session, April 20, 2006. 
443 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
444 Ibid. 
445 Interview with Ret. Ambassadors Nüzhet Kandemir and Umut Arık, March 24, 2006, Ankara. 
446 TGNA General Board Minutes, 20th Term, 2nd Legislative Year, 33th Session, December 14, 
1996. 
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As far as the DSP (The Democratic Left Party) is concerned, in 2000, the 
Ecevit government abandoned the nuclear power project on the basis of unfavorable 
financial situation. In the 2003 party program, the party supported primarily coal, 
national resources, and any fruitful project for electricity generation. During the 
Erbakan government, the nuclear power issue was mainly criticized by the DSP. For 
instance, Fikri Sağlar, an MP from Mersin, contested the government on whether 
their main goal was producing energy or nuclear bomb. He was convinced that if the 
single aim was to produce energy, the government could have tried to keep control of 
the loss and theft in energy that amounted almost to 40% of the supply.447 However, 
when the DSP came to power in 1999, and continued with the project, there was a 
change of tone. Ziya Aktaş supported nuclear technology “for the future of Turkey.” 
In this respect, he argued that the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu would contribute to 
a great extent to acquire know-how.448  
The RP (Welfare Party) saw nuclear technology as that of the future449  and 
for some MPs, it would establish Turkey as a “Muslim and powerful country.” 
Cemal Külahlı referred to a suspicion during the 1980s, that Turkey’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would be disadvantageous; so he argued that Turkey’s project-as 
a Muslim and powerful country- was disrupted.450 He urged the immediate 
finalization of the tender for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, and argued that it was 
impossible to stay away from the technology of the future. The FP (Virtue Party) 
was established after the Welfare Party was closed down,451 and it continued to 
support the nuclear project for strategic reasons and as an alternative type of 
                                               
447 TGNA General Board Minutes, 20th Term, 2nd Legislative Year, 66th Session, March 11, 1997. 
448 TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 1st Legislative Year, 24th Session, June 27, 1999. 
449 TGNA General Board Minutes, 20th Term, 2nd Legislative Year, 33th Session, December 14, 
1996. 
450 Aslan Polat’s remarks, TGNA General Board Minutes, 20th Term, 1st Legislative Year, 41st 
Session, April 20, 1996. 
451 The Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court on June 21, 2001, due to activities against 
secularism. 
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energy.452 They had concerns about external actors who were effective in the 
cancellation of the tenders. 453 
MHP (The Nationalist Action Party) is a nationalist party, and may have a 
tendency to perceive civilian nuclear technology as an infrastructure for military 
capability. MHP upholds that the TAF should attain the most advanced military 
status in terms of weapons and equipment (which may mean the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons as well). However, they also see nuclear energy and technology as a 
capability that would raise the image of a country, and one that accords prestige. 454  
MHP also sees the economic benefits of nuclear power and its contribution to 
industrial development: Mustafa Yaman prescribed nuclear energy to address the 
increasing prices and the energy demand considering the limited reserves of oil and 
natural gas. In addition, Turkey needed to add new production techniques to the 
existing ones in order to expand its economy. Otherwise, he warned that Turkey 
would be in the dark considering the fact that it already utilized the water potential 
that was saved for 2000.455 
Former Minister of Energy, Cumhur Ersümer, stood firm against anti-
nuclear energy protests. Greenpeace protesters identified him with the Akkuyu 
nuclear power plant: They put a placard on the Bosphorus bridge saying: “Stop 
Ersümer.” He challenged them that even they wrote “stop” on the sky, his 
government would finish the project, and that the opposition is influenced by oil and 
                                               
452 Remarks by Hüseyin Kansu, TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 2nd Legislative Year, 14th 
Session, November 3, 1999. 
453 Remarks by Ahmet Derin, TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 2nd Legislative Year, 14th 
Session, November 3, 1999; Remarks by Veysel Candan, TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 
1st Legislative Year, 42nd Session, July 30, 1999. 
454 Mehmet Kaya’s remarks, TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 1st Legislative Year, 36th 
Session, December 17, 1999. 
455 TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 2nd Legislative Year, 42nd Session, December 24, 
1999. 
148 
 
gas lobbies.456 The former Minister of Transportation, Enis Öksüz called the 
opponents “idiot,” by giving the example from Europe, where kids played next to the 
power plants. He referred to “a game” that aimed at destabilizing the country by 
making it to buy expensive energy, and to prevent its development. He argued that 
firms which wanted Turkey “in their hands,” used environmental groups.457 
 
 
6.3. Economic and Business Élite 
 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Associations are influential pressure groups 
within the civil society. TÜSİAD (The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s 
Association) is one of the most influential pressure groups on government policies. 
The Association welcomed the decision to include nuclear energy into the energy 
production basket: They emphasized development, welfare and increasing the 
competitive power in international trade. TÜSİAD upheld having timely, sufficient, 
reliable, and environment-friendly energy supply with competitive prices, in order to 
maintain high economic growth and to support the endeavors for social development. 
They endorsed nuclear power considering that it was clean, economical, and did not 
emit greenhouse gases.458 
                                               
456 See Cumhur Ersümer’s remarks, “Türkiye’de Nükleer Enerji Yarışması Başlarken Ortamın 
Değerlendirilmesi (An Assessment While the Nuclear Energy Competition Begins),” EkoEnerji 
(EcoEnergy), No. 21, September 2008, p. 62, available at: 
<http://www.ersumer.org/EkoEnerji__eylul_panel_pdf.log.pdf>; Also See “Ersümer’den 
Greenpeace’e rest (Ersümer’s Challenge to Greenpeace), Sabah, October 21, 1999, 
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1999/10/21/p03.html>, and “Nükleer santrale ihtiyacımız var (We need the 
Nuclear Power Plant),” Sabah, January 10, 2000, 
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2000/01/10/e10.html>.  
457 “Nükleer santrale karşı çıkanlar geri zekalıdır (Those Against the Nuclear Power Plant are Idiot),” 
Sabah, December 5, 1999, 
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1999/12/05/p07.html>.  
458 “Nükleer Santral yapılması gecikmiş ancak olumlu bir adım (Nuclear power plant is a positive but 
belated step),” TS/BAS-BÜL/06-29, TÜSİAD, May 5, 2006. 
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In their report, Turkey’s Energy Economy and the Future of Oil, MÜSİAD 
(Private Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) welcomed the nuclear 
power project and stressed its necessity.459 ASO (Ankara Chamber of Industry), 
supported the project on the basis of energy security through diversification.460 The 
Chairman of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), 
Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, also underlined diversification to avoid dependency, and argued 
that Turkey had been late to make use of nuclear power.461  
The ATO (Ankara Chamber of Commerce) report on Urgency in Nuclear 
Energy, issued a warning against a serious energy crisis. The report emphasized high 
energy prices, inefficient use of national resources, theft and loss in transmission. 
ATO promoted nuclear power as a need and not a choice.462  
 
 
6.4. Energy Firms 
 
Nuclear power plants are costly projects and Turkey is an attractive customer. 
Local energy firms are interested in nuclear energy projects, because the demand for 
electricity is increasing, and beginning from the mid 2000s, energy became the 
prominent issue in the economic agenda. According to Zafer İncecik, the chairman of 
                                               
459 Türkiye’nin Enerji Ekonomisi Ve Petrolün Geleceği (Turkey’s Energy Economy and the Future of 
Oil), MÜSİAD Araştırma Raporları (MÜSİAD Research Reports), No. 49, February 2006, p.116, 
available at: <http://www.musiad.org.tr/img/arastirmalaryayin/pdf/arastirma_raporlari_49.pdf>. 
460 “Nükleer enerji olmazsa doğalgazın esiri oluruz (Without nuclear, we will be captive to natural 
gas),” Yeni Şafak, May 8, 2006, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2006/mayis/08/e02.html; Also See the 
summary of the ASO Energy Summit held on May 15, 2006 in Ankara at: 
<http://www.kojenerasyon.com/duyurular/2006/09/18/2.htm>. 
461 Remarks by Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, See “Uluslararası Enerji, Kojenerasyon ve Çevre Teknolojileri 
Konferansı Yapıldı (The International Energy, Cogeneration and Environmental Technologies 
Conference was Held),” May 30, 2007, <http://www.tobb.org.tr/haber_arsiv2.php?haberid=1394>. 
462  “ATO Başkanı Aygün: ‘2009’da Karanlığa Gidiyoruz’ (ATO Chairman Aygün: We’ll be in Dark 
by 2009),” ATO, July 24, 2007, <http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/index.php?p=1111&l=1>; Also See 
“Ekonomik Gelişim için Nükleer Şart (Nuclear is a Must for Economic Development),” ATO, 
November 24, 2007, <http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/index.php?p=1441&l=1>. 
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the executive board of Siemens, Turkey should follow a balanced energy policy. He 
refers to one that is based on utliczing abundant natural resources and nuclear 
energy. For, it is clean and more advantageous than natural gas or hydroelectrical 
power, particularly considering a crisis with Iran.463 Other interested firms are the 
Sabancı Holding,464 the Akkök Group,465 and the Alarko Holding.466 They support 
nuclear power for energy security and demand state involvement in projects. 
  
 
6.5.  International Actors 
 
International actors include states and energy firms. The main providers of 
nuclear technology and the leading states in nonproliferation efforts have had 
concerns on proliferation during Turkey’s attempts to transfer nuclear technology for 
civilian purposes. Others were mainly concerned about accident risks in the region or 
were engaged in a commercial rivalry. In 1980, the then Minister of Energy Esat 
Kıratlıoğlu recalled that after the talks were finalized with the Swedish firms, there 
was a referendum in Sweden to decide whether to make the transfer to Turkey or not. 
                                               
463 Eylem Türk, “Çernobil korkusu yersiz, beş nükleer santral gerekli, (The fear of Chernobyl is 
baseless, [we] need five nuclear power plants),”  Milliyet, February 5, 2006, 
<http://www.milliyet.com/2006/02/05/ekonomi/axeko02.html>; Interview by Çağrı Bilgin with Zafer 
Incecik, “Türkiye açısından nükleer enerji birkaç kamyonluk küçük mesele, (For Turkey, nuclear 
power is a small issue of a few trucks),” Radikal, July 31, 2006, 
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=194402>. 
464 Interview with Ahmet Dördüncü, the CEO of Sabancı Holding by İbrahim Ekinci, the Chief 
Economist of the daily Milliyet, June 22, 2008,  
<http://www.sabanci.com/sabanci_basin_bultenleri_detay.asp?N=353>. 
465 Interview with Mehmet Ali Berkman: “Akkök Grubu'ndan dev yatırım planı (The Giant 
Investment Plan of the Akkök Group),” Rota Haber, March 16, 2008, 
<http://www.rotahaber.com/haber/20080316/Akkok-Grubundan-dev-yatirim-plani.php>; Also See the 
Interview by Volkan Akı with Ömer Dinçkök, “Devlet nükleerde model getirmeli (The State should 
provide a model [of investment] on nuclear [power]),” Akşam, May 1, 2006, 
<http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazar.asp?a=38311,10,118&tarih=01.05.2006>. 
466 “Alarko Holding Nükleer Enerjiyle İlgileniyor (The Alarko Holding is interested in nuclear 
power), Interview given to Enerji Gündemi, May 1, 2006, 
<http://www.alarko.com.tr/haber.asp?ID=914>. 
151 
 
The result was positive, but ironically the correspondence of approval reached to the 
Minister the day before the military coup took place (September 12, 1980). 
Afterwards, the transfer was cancelled.467 Turkey’s contacts with Pakistan during the 
1980s arouse suspicions about intentions for military cooperation including nuclear 
field. When Argentina and Turkey signed a nuclear technology cooperation 
agreement in 1988, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of 
Germany contemplated that Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear technology would be 
disadvantageous.468  
During the nuclear power tender in the 1990s, there was a competition among 
the participating companies, which had a dispute on the awarding of the tender. The 
Westinghouse Electric Co. (Britain) and AECL (Canada) firms were at odds with the 
NPI (France), which they claimed did not satisfy the conditions in tender terms.469 In 
the meantime, the then Minister of Transportation, Enis Öksüz, member of MHP, 
was quoted as promoting Turkey’s right to build nuclear weapons through the 
establishment of nuclear power plants.470 However, he then refuted the statements 
attributed to him. It was also claimed that the government favored the design by 
                                               
467 Esat Kıratlıoğlu’s remarks, Panel on Nuclear Power, June 4, 2008, Ankara. 
468 Atilla Atakan, “Argentina to Help Acquire Nuclear Technology,” Hürriyet, May 25, 1988, pp. 3, 
15. Publicly, American and Turkish governments firmly denied any interference with the Akkuyu 
project, and put forward the change in the financing model as the exclusive reason. Washington also 
declared that if they had suspected Turkey of having an unclear program, they would have prevented 
General Electric from participating to the tender. However, Nevzat Şahin, the Nuclear Projects 
Manager at TEAŞ at the time, asserted that the opposition groups to the establishment of nuclear 
plants were also funded by sources in the United States or Europe. Source: Mark Hibbs, Regional Gas 
Market Keys to Turkey’s Akkuyu Project, 1997. Information confirmed by Nevzat Şahin on May 9, 
2009. 
The media also drew attention to the possibility that oil and coal cartels would aim at preventing the 
widespread use of other energy resources which could be an alternative to coal and oil. Accordingly, 
they would support some environmentalist national or international institutions, academicians or 
media members in order to create a collective hysteria starting from extreme sensitivity and extending 
to paranoia for the public regarding nuclear energy. See Harun Odabaşı, “Akkuyu Nükleer Savaşı 
(The Akkuyu Nuclear War),” Aksiyon, November 18, 2002, 
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Canada, which also provided the possibility for nuclear bomb making. On the other 
hand, the AECL suspected that this piece of news was served to the media on 
purpose in order to decrease the chances of the company and Canadian reactors, that 
is, CANDUs, on the grounds that they are less proliferation resistant. Still, the 
opponents in Canada argued that if a right wing party came to government, Turkey 
would have long-term military ambitions with nuclear technology.471 
Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration have been concerned about 
Turkey’s plans to build a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu because of its possible 
impacts for the Mediterrenean region. A former Environment Minister, Costas 
Petrides expressed concern for the construction of an NPP in an area of high seismic 
risk opposite their northern coast.472 Also, a former spokesperson for the Greek 
government, Dimitris Reppas stated that in case Turkey took the decision to build a 
nuclear power plant, Athens would use every legal right to oppose it.473 After the 
devastating earthquake in August 1999 in Turkey’s northwest, the then Greek 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Yannos Kranidiotis urged Turkey to reassess its 
plans to build nuclear reactors, because Akkuyu was also within an earthquake zone. 
He added that Greece would oppose the project which would threaten the entire 
region. In early 1999, the Greek Ministry for the Aegean Sea initiated an 
international campaign on environmental grounds to oppose the Akkuyu plant.474 
The United States also promotes Turkey’s EU membership bid, and works to 
ensure that it defines the energy security of the EU as part of its energy policy. Hence 
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produced,” The Globe and Mail, April 14, 2000, p. A2.  
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June 26, 1997. 
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the Bush administration signed the decision that allowed cooperation and technology 
sharing on civilian nuclear energy with Turkey. 475  
 
In my judgment, entry into force of the Agreement will serve as a strong incentive 
for Turkey to continue its support for nonproliferation objectives and [to] enact 
future sound nonproliferation policies and practices. It will also promote closer 
political and economic ties with NATO ally, and provide the necessary legal 
framework for US industry to make nuclear exports to Turkey’s planned civil 
nuclear sector.476 
 
 
6.6. Civil Society 
 
The civil society involved in the nuclear energy debate is mainly composed 
of environmental NGOs, unions, chambers, media, and scientists. The anti-nuclear 
movement in Turkey gained momentum particularly after the Chernobyl accident as 
a result of awareness in the public about safety and waste issues. After the arrival of 
Greenpeace in 1992, they organized demonstrations, protests and campaigns against 
nuclear power. Local groups and organizations make extensive use of the expertise 
of and the information supplied by transnational environmental groups.477 
  
 
6.6.1. Anti-nuclear groups 
 
The Anti-nuclear platform includes some 50 civil society groups that are 
either anti-nuclear or environmentalist.478 They are against nuclear power and 
                                               
475 “Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey 
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” January 22, 2008. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Anti-nuclear arguments mimic those of Greenpeace, IPPNW and Friends of the Earth.  
478 Participating groups include: 
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nuclear weapons. They uphold energy efficiency, conservation, amelioration of 
transmission lines to prevent lost and/or stolen energy, and the use of national and 
renewable energy resources. They try to raise public awareness on the dangers of 
NPPs, particularly in provinces where NPPs are planned, like Sinop and Mersin. 
Their activities range from campaigns, publications, demonstrations, development of 
education materials, to forming commissions to develop relations with the media.  
When the government took the initiative to prepare the law on the 
establishment of nuclear power plants, some 165 academicians put their signature 
under the “The Declaration by Scientists Against Nuclear Power Plant.”479 They 
criticized the way the NPP issue was tackled in Turkey, mentioned waste and 
radiation risks, and drew attention to the absence of a definition for crime and 
punishment in the law. They stressed that NPPs were not the solution for global 
warming, but a restraint on the use of fossil fuels and conservation.480 Shortly before 
the Law was discussed in the relevant Parliamentary commission, the anti-nuclear 
platform members (from Istanbul, Mersin, Sinop, Adana and Samsun) collected 
some 100,000 signatures for a petition to prevent the establishment of the NPP They 
presented nuclear power plant as “lethal.”481  
The Chamber of Electrical Engineers (Elektrik Mühendisleri Odası-
EMO) is one of the most ardent voices in the anti-nuclear groups, and is inclined to 
                                                                                                                                     
Batı Karadeniz Çevre Patformu/BAKÇEP(Western Black Sea Environment Platform), Doğu Akdeniz 
Çevre Patformu /DAÇE(Eastern Mediterranean Environment Platform), Ekoloji Kollektifi (The 
Ecology Collective), Eurosolar Türkiye, Greenpeace, Mersin Çevre Dostları Derneği (Mersin Friends 
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Environment Association), TMMOB Çevre Mühendisleri Odası (Environmental Engineers’ 
Chamber), TMMOB Elektrik Mühendisleri Odası (Electrical Engineers’ Chamber), TMMOB İnşaat 
Mühendisleri Odası (Civil Engineers’ Chamber), TMMOB, The Greens. 
479 Nükleer Santral Karşıtı Bilim İnsanları Bildirisi (Declaration of Scientists Against Nuclear Power 
Plants), March 10, 2007, Elektrik Mühendisliği Dergisi (Electrical Engineers Journal), Vol. 430, 
April 2007, pp. 105-107, <http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/8ec7fefbec9864f_ek.pdf?dergi=457>. 
480 Ibid, p. 107. 
481 “Nükleere karşı 100 bin imza TBMM'ye teslim edildi (100 thousand signatures against nuclear 
were submitted to the Turkish Parliament),” EMO, November 24, 2006  
<http://www.emo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=50723&tipi=2&sube=0>. 
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look at the issue from an economic perspective.482 The Chamber of Environmental 
Engineers (Çevre Mühendisleri Odası-ÇMO), is also against nuclear energy and 
nuclear power plants, not only because of the accident risks and waste issues, but 
also due to the double-use nature of critical nuclear technologies.483  
TEMA (Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları 
Koruma Vakfı - The Turkish Foundation for Combating Erosion, Reforestation 
and the Protection of Natural Habitats), also favors renewable energy resources 
over nuclear power.484 Greenpeace has played an important role in supporting anti-
nuclear activities in Turkey through its local chapter. They emphasize that energy 
generation should be clean, cheap and fast. Nuclear, for them, is expensive, dirty and 
inefficient, and is a type of technology that is old, cumbersome and dangerous.485 
The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis 
ve Mimar Odaları Birliği-TMMOB) demanded the withdrawal of the Law on the 
establishment of nuclear power plants. The Chairman of the TMMOB, Mehmet 
Soğancı, argued that the government exposed people to “threat” under the pressures 
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of nuclear lobbies. Energy shortage is exaggerated, and the solution is appropriate 
energy planning and not nuclear power.486  
Women’s groups reacted to Minister Güler, after his remarks that the issue of 
nuclear power plants became a “matter of honor” for them.487 Bilge Seçkin from the 
Association of Working Women’s Human Rights, stated that the concept of honor 
was an institutionalized discourse to maintain dominance through pressure over 
women. In the same way, nuclear power plants were used as the tools to continue this 
dominance through nature.488 
 
6.6.2. Pro-nuclear Groups 
  
Pro-nuclear civil society groups are much fewer in number compared to the 
opposition groups. The Nuclear Engineers’ Association criticized the government’s 
decision to cancel the Akkuyu tender in July 2000, pointing out to the shortcomings 
in the government’s rationales.489 The Nuclear Technology Information Platform 
(Nükleer Teknoloji Bilgi Platformu-NÜKTE) was established by nuclear 
engineers who favored the establishment of nuclear power plants in Turkey. They 
aim at providing responses by physics and nuclear engineers against anti-nuclear 
arguments. Their membership includes several academics who are experts in nuclear 
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or physics engineering, and who participated in the drafting of the law on the 
establishment of nuclear power plants.490  
  
 
6.6.3. Media 
 
The media in Turkey did not carry the nuclear energy debate in the first 
pages; rather the issue was reflected in the sections related to economy or in 
columns. Doğan Heper, columnist in Milliyet, favored the transfer of nuclear 
technology not only for energy, but mainly for military purposes. He argued that the 
criteria in such a transfer should be benefit and safety,491 and that Turkey should be 
ready for all circumstances, especially considering nuclear proliferation in its region. 
He referred to Iran and to the meaning of nuclear capability for a strong Muslim 
state. Considering the vagueness of the EU integration process and of the US security 
guarantee after March 1st 2003,492 he questioned restraint if neighboring countries 
acquired such capability.493 Heper advocated Turkey’s having a nuclear capability to 
provide nuclear balance in the region, like the one in Cold War, and argued that it 
would increase Turkey’s prestige.494 Like Heper, Rıza Zelyut, columnist in Güneş 
daily, is in favor of Turkey’s acquiring a nuclear weapon.495 He made it clear that to 
get cheap energy, and to avoid making expenses for a cumbersome army, nuclear 
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technology was a must for Turkey. He contemplated that the transfer would also 
increase the legitimacy and popularity of the government.496   
Metin Münir, from Milliyet, is one of the columnists who wrote extensively 
on the nuclear issue. While questioning the plans on the establishment of nuclear 
power plants and criticizing the government, he also stressed that being against 
nuclear power was to remain “backward.” He acknowledged that nuclear power 
would not ease Turkey’s dependence on foreign sources. Instead the aim was to 
diversify the sources and to alleviate the risk. 497 Erdal Sağlam, from Hürriyet, 
argued in line with the government that the nuclear power plant issue should not only 
be tackled from an electricity generation perspective, but the acquisition of nuclear 
energy technology.498 
Meral Tamer, columnist in Milliyet, has been the most vociferous regarding 
the disadvantages and irrelevance of nuclear power. She pointed at nuclear lobbies 
who tried to sell outdated nuclear technology to developing countries since they were 
no longer demanded in the West.499 She explained the decrease in the demand for 
nuclear reactors in the West with the expectation for new generation reactors.500 She 
also noticed the discrepancy between the estimates of the government and the EMO 
for electricity demand: Thus, she argued that due to the exaggerated demand, the 
government created urgency for energy shortage.501 Tamer believed the officials 
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were not qualified enough to comment on the nuclear issue,502 and proposed that 
conservation/saving energy might save Turkey from the need to build nuclear 
reactors.503 
Şahin Alpay, from Zaman, wrote about the dangers of nuclear power and 
explained the rise of demand for nuclear power as a consequence of international 
economic situation and climate change, instead of a conscious or well-thought 
choice.504 Some columnists criticized the anti-nuclear movement: Hıncal Uluç, 
columnist in Sabah, categorized himself as “anti-environmentalist”, because he 
noticed that environmental groups were against all energy types that could be 
harnessed from national sources, but interestingly not against oil and gas.505 Can 
Ataklı of Vatan daily is also critical of environmentalist groups, particularly 
Greenpeace. He wondered whether Greenpeace and like-minded groups were against 
nuclear energy solely on the basis of environmental concerns, or whether they 
received the financial backing of those who wanted to introduce other energy sources 
for service.506  
 
6.6.4. Academics 
  
Scientists joined the debate with diverging convictions about nuclear power. 
Istanbul Technical University, Bosphorus (Boğaziçi) University and Hacettepe 
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University are the primary institutions with departments and institutes on nuclear 
engineering and/or nuclear energy. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Bayülken, from the Energy 
Institute of the Istanbul Technical University, argued that nuclear power plants 
would also introduce nuclear technology that could be used in other fields of science 
or industry. For him, the ratio of 5% for nuclear energy in meeting Turkey’s energy 
demand was a significant number considering the depletion rate for other sources 
like water and coal.507 Prof. Dr. Hasan Saygın, from the İTÜ Energy Institute, 
suggested that Turkey adopt “wait and see” policy, because there were uncertainties 
regarding the evolution of nuclear power plants. He underlined that the absence of 
the fuel cycle technology would create dependence.508  
As opposed to their colleague, some seven academics from the İTÜ Energy 
Institute’s Nuclear Researches Department, signed a letter in support of nuclear 
power. In that, Prof. Dr. Melih Geçkinli, Prof. Atilla Özgener Assoc. Prof. Akif 
Atalay, Assoc. Prof. Murat Aydın, Assoc. Prof. Ahmet Durmayaz, Assoc. Prof. 
Bilge Özgener and Asst. Prof. Nesrin Kara Altınsoy argued that Turkey, which 
was late for nuclear energy and lagged behind several of her neighbors, should 
endorse it particularly in the new century, in which the significance of energy will 
increase.509  
Hacettepe University has a Nuclear Engineering Department, whose title in 
Turkish implies that nuclear power is only for civilian purposes (Nükleer Enerji 
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Mühendisliği-Nuclear Energy Engineering).510 Prof. Dr. Okan Zabunoğlu from 
Hacettepe University’s Nuclear Engineering Department underlined that nuclear 
technology is a sine qua non, while it is energy planners who would determine 
whether Turkey needs nuclear energy. That is, Turkey should aim at acquiring 
nuclear technology and not just operating a few power plants. He deemed nuclear 
technology as a step in development, and if that is missed at the “nuclear age”, it will 
be hard to reach to the next age. Referring to the difference between “base load” (the 
power that should exist at a constant rate to meet demand) and “peak load,” (which is 
needed when demand is high), he maintained that fossil fuels and nuclear are 
unrivalled in terms of providing the base load. Renewables, on the other hand, are 
dependent on geography and climatic conditions, which is why they are more 
suitable for peak loads. He stated that Turkey had enough skilled personnel and 
infrastructure in terms of working within the safety culture.511 Prof. Dr. Mehmet 
Tombakoğlu from the same department underlined the safety measures in NPPs by 
referring to the containment structure that was absent in Chernobyl, but which exists 
in the power plants in the United States and Europe. It is a cement structure with 1-
1.5 meter width resistible to a plane crash. Even if an accident occurs, noone would 
incur the effect. 40% of the investment for NPP goes to safety, therefore costs are 
high.512 
Prof. Dr. Haluk Utku from Hacettepe University’s Institute of Nuclear 
Sciences, looked at the nuclear power issue from the perspective of climate change: 
He referred to the Kyoto Protocol, and the international sanctions it would engender 
after 2012. During the debates whether nuclear energy should be included in the 
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Protocol as a clean resource, he saw that the investments for the use of fossil fuels 
would become problematic and carry nuclear energy as an option of precedence. He 
showed that if Turkey ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it would need to give up 
investments on energy generation based on coal. From the strategic perspective, 
while oil and gas routes involved political and military risks and have price 
fluctuations, nuclear fuel could be obtained from countries which were politically 
more stable, like Canada and Australia. He urged policymakers to consider the need 
for skilled personnel for the planned NPPs considering the insufficient number of 
universities offering courses on nuclear technology. Thus, the government should be 
investing for education parallel to the investments on NPPs.513  He also urges the 
stability of frequency in the grid that will not allow more than ±20 Mhz deviation. 
Nuclear power generation would allow this stability, and provide the opportunity for 
electricity imports. 
Prof. Dr. Osman Kadiroğlu, a retired professor from Hacettepe University’s 
Nuclear Engineering Department, argued that Turkey did not have any other choice 
than nuclear, and that nuclear energy was entirely advantageous. Kadiroğlu argued 
that the main defect in Turkey was the lack of nuclear energy planning. For instance, 
in the previous attempt (90s), he observed that people without enough expertise were 
appointed to the technical commission of the tender.514 Nuclear engineering track 
was established in Middle East Technical University -Mechanical Engineering 
Department, but it was closed down after the nuclear power project was shelved. 
Still, some 25 students obtained an MA degree, most of whom left to study abroad. 
Prof. Dr. Orhan Yeşin taught courses on nuclear energy in the department. He 
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favored nuclear power for resource diversification, affordable energy supply and 
environmental friendliness.515  
The late Prof. Dr. Ahmed Yüksel Özemre was the former Chairman of 
TAEK, and wrote extensively on nuclear power.516 He also advocated nuclear power 
because of its contribution for energy security and technological progress.517 He also 
recommended that the choice of nuclear technology be within a national strategy that 
upheld national interest. It should take into account, along with economic concerns, 
the capacity of national industry, of the national transmission network and national 
raw material.518 He added that the institution that should decide for the choice of 
nuclear technology should be the Science and Technology Higher Authority after 
taking the opinion of experts.519  
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Özcan Ültanır, professor in Ankara University, argued 
that nuclear energy was a “reality” of the current era. He prescribed nuclear power to 
make up the energy shortage of the next decade and was convinced that the problem 
will not be addressed unless nuclear energy is included in the basket. He was critical 
of the anti-nuclear lobbies for deceiving local people, and for being against 
contemporary technology, welfare and civilization.520 Prof. Dr. Cemal Saydam, 
from Hacettepe University’s Environmental Engineering Department and an expert 
on oceanography, clarified that nuclear power plants would never give harm to the 
seas, particularly for the seas surrounding Turkey. For him, nuclear power plants are 
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Suffered from the Atom!), 2002, p. 141. 
517 Özemre, Ah Şu Atomdan Neler Çektim! (Oh What I Suffered from the Atom!), 2002, p. 141. 
518 Ibid, p. 142.  
519 Ibid. 
520 Mustafa Özcan Ültanır, “Nükleer Enerji Neden ve Nasıl bir Çare? (Why and How is Nuclear 
Energy a Remedy?),” İşveren (Employer), February 2006, pp. 63-67. 
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the only sources of energy that are reliable and sustainable.521 Assoc. Prof. Dr. 
Mehmet Şahin from Gazi University, Energy Education Department encouraged 
the acquisition of nuclear technology for its input in other fields like electricity, 
computer, equipment, physics of energy, and so on.522  
Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu is an expert on arms control, disarmament 
and nonproliferation issues, and worked on Turkey’s nuclear energy bid. He 
acknowledges the benefits of nuclear technology in civilian applications, like 
medicine, agriculture, etcetera…, however, he has concerns about international and 
regional developments that challenge the nonproliferation regime, and which may 
erode the norms of nonproliferation and the pursuit of nuclear power. 
Prof. Dr. İnci Gökmen from Middle East Technical University, 
Department of Chemistry subscribes to anti-nuclear arguments.523 Assoc. Prof. 
Kayıhan Pala from Uludağ University’s Faculty of Medicine-Department of Public 
Health argued that the NPP would constitute great risk due to the shortcomings in 
implementation stage.524 He carried out a thorough study on the cancer cases in 
Eastern Black Sea region, namely the province of Hopa, after the Chernobyl 
accident. He found out that the cases of the Hopa region showed a divergence from 
other regions of Turkey, which deserves further research.525 
 Necdet Pamir is a prominent energy expert, with a focus on oil and gas. 
Pamir defines energy supply security issue as a function of national and economic 
                                               
521 Email correspondence with Cemal Saydam, June 3, 2009. 
522 Email correspondence with Mehmet Şahin, June 3, 2009. 
523 “Nükleer Santral Karşıtı Biliminsanları Bildirisi (The Declaration of Scientists against Nuclear 
Power Plants),” 2007. 
524 Pervin Metin, “Çernobil Türkiye içinde patlar (Chernobyl Will Explode in Turkey),” April 14, 
2006, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/04/14/gnd123.html>; confirmed by Kayıhan Pala via email 
correspondence, June 3, 2009. 
525 Kayıhan Pala, “Hopa’da Kanser Görülme Sıklığı: Tanı Konmuş Olgular ve Ölümler Üzerinden bir 
Değerlendirme (The Frequency Rate of Cancer in Hopa: An Assessment on the Detected Cases and 
Deaths),” Çernobil Nükleer Kazası Sonrası Türkiye’de Kanser (Cancer in Turkey after the Chernobly 
Nuclear Accident), Ankara: Turkish Medical Association Publications, April 2006, pp. 73-104. 
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security, and sees Turkey’s decisions shaped within the parameters of American 
energy security policy and strategy in the Middle East.526 Regarding the pursuit of 
nuclear power, he sees various unresolved issues, like waste disposal, and argues that 
it would not be a wise decision to materialize the transfer without first addressing 
these issues. Second, he is concerned about the conduct of the tender process, and 
about estimates that exaggerate the demand for energy in view of alternative 
resources. He encourages policymakers to set up the infrastructure on human 
resources, legislative and economic basis, and then plan for the construction.527  
The coordinator of the National Security Strategies Research Center-TUSAM 
(Türkiye Ulusal Stratejiler Araştırma Merkezi) Ali Külebi is the author of the book 
Turkey’s Energy Problems and Nuclear Necessity. He believed that anti-nuclear 
rhetoric damaged Turkey’s interests, because nuclear technology was a necessary 
component of modernity. He argued that it would provide Turkey with “strides” 
apart from electricity generation (by which he meant nuclear weapons).528 Külebi 
deemed that the anti-nuclear movement was an outgrowth of the West and its 
institutions which did not want Turkey to have nuclear power plants. The West used 
civil society organizations to form a public opinion that opposed the establishment of 
these plants, because they would loathe a Muslim country to possess nuclear 
technology.529  
This chapter has provided an overview of the actors and their arguments. 
Next chapter will analyze these arguments. 
 
                                               
526 Necdet Pamir, “ABD Politikalarının Kıskacında Irak ve Türkiye’nin Enerji Denklemleri (Iraq and 
Turkey’s Energy Equations in the Clamp of US Policies),” Cumhuriyet Enerji Dergisi (Cumhuriyet 
Energy Journal), No. 2, February, 2008, pp.12-14. 
527 Interview with Necdet Pamir by Nagehan Alçı, September 29, 2008: “Hükümetin Nükleer Israrı,” 
Akşam, October 19, 2008, <http://arsiv.aksam.com.tr/haber.asp?a=131157,12&tarih=19.10.2008>. 
528 Ali Külebi, Türkiye’nin Enerji Sorunları ve Nükleer Gereklilik (Turkey’s Energy Problems and the 
Necessity of the Nuclear), Istanbul: Bilgi, 2007, p. 131. 
529 Ibid, p. 135. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATE: THE TWO COMPETING 
MEANINGS OF NUCLEAR POWER 
 
 
 
This chapter will analyze how the actors construct social realities, establish 
links between meanings and fix them through discourse. State officials present 
nuclear energy and nuclear power plants as the “solution” to the “problem” (or 
sometimes the “response” to the “threat”). To that end, they first highlight the 
“problem of energy shortage” and then “the threat of energy dependency” to set the 
agenda. Afterwards, they present “nuclear energy and nuclear power plants” as “the 
solution” or “rational choice.” In the meantime, the government (including the 
energy bureaucracy) constructs an identity for itself (and its supporters), creates 
publics and excludes “others.” On the other hand, the opposition contests the 
definition of the problem and the determination of policy options. “Nuclear” (energy 
or power plants) comes to mean “disadvantageous” or “threat,” and the problem 
becomes the government decision itself. Hence, there are two rival discourses on 
nuclear power: The former constructs the meaning of nuclear as “power” or an 
“asset,” and the latter as “threat.” 
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The respective arguments of the actors will be analyzed as follows: The main 
arguments will be highlighted. The excerpts from the actors’ statements below them 
will be analyzed so as to understand the meanings they assign to concepts, the links 
they establish between them and the construction of identities. It will be done by 
“discursive practices approach,” that is through the tools of presupposition, predicate 
analysis and subject positioning. It will, thus, examine the discursive practices of the 
actors involved, such as the government, politicians and energy bureaucracy, who 
determine the threats to/needs of the state, and decide on the actions and their 
implementation. It will also analyze the discourses of the NGOs which focus on the 
environment and define threats and risks accordingly. The analysis will show how 
these actors linguistically construct reality and privilege the state over domestic 
actors (including the public) in the making of policy, how identities are constructed 
(the “self” and the “other”), how the “other” is depicted as a threat, and how its 
legitimacy is reduced.  The texts will be selected from the authorized representatives 
in the two groups: That is, government and military officials, bureaucrats, heads of 
associations and unions, of energy firms, energy professionals, civil society 
organizations, journalists and academics. The diversity of the choices will also 
address the problem of selection bias, since the views of the groups or individuals 
may not be uniform.  The analyses of the main arguments reveal results that may 
cause repetitions of the assumptions, predications or subject positions. These are not 
intended repetitions, but those which cannot be omitted due to the nature of the 
analysis.  
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7.1. Arguments in favor of the decision: “Nuclear energy is an asset for 
augmenting state power.” 
 
The following excerpts are chosen from the statements of state officials (such 
as the energy ministers, individuals from the energy bureaucracy and MPs who speak 
for the government in the Parliament), journalists, academics and civil society 
representatives. In their discourses, some four points are articulated and reinforced: 
Their definition of the issue constructs nuclear power as the “solution;” state is the 
referent of action, that is, the transfer of technology will enhance state power 
economically, ideationally and in military terms, and bolster energy security. Third, 
decisionmakers are “rational.” Finally, the “others” who oppose the decision are 
irrational, and “other sources of energy” are inferior to nuclear energy to address the 
“problem” at hand.  
Before the analysis of the texts, the official statement deserves attention. The 
Energy Ministry announces its decision on nuclear power as follows: 
 
…Related to the electrical energy supply and demand projections, it is planned that 
from 2015 on, a 5000 MW power nuclear power plant capacity will be made 
operational…The process of the establishment of nuclear power plants is in 
progress. Turkey’s first planned nuclear-power-plant in Mersin-Akkuyu retains the 
license, and studies for licensing the Sinop site is in progress. (…) The negative 
impact on the environment of fossil fueled, particularly of the coal-fired thermal 
plants are incomparable to that of nuclear power plants. To the contrary, nuclear 
power plants are options that should be taken regarding environmental effects. 
Regarding the continuity of electricity production, nuclear power plants are safer 
and ready compared to thermal or hydroelectrical power plants. In addition to the 
global developments on widening the use of renewable resources, projects on 
nuclear energy investments gained pace.530 
 
Presupposition: This excerpt creates the background knowledge that there is a 
discrepancy between supply and demand of electricity that causes an energy 
shortage. It also assumes that the license which was obtained in the 1970s for 
                                               
530 “Nuclear Energy,” Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 
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Mersin-Akkuyu site is still valid. Nuclear power plants are not harmless, but their 
impact on the environment is negligible. The global trend is to find alternatives to 
fossil fuels, and nuclear energy is among the viable alternatives. 
Predication: Nuclear Power Plants are predicated as the appropriate options to 
observe environment-sensitivity, and safer compared to coal and water.  
Subject positioning: The rest of the world is constituted as a subject, which 
uses nuclear energy. Although it is not openly stated, the government and the Energy 
Ministry are constituted as subjects who are in charge of meeting the gap in the 
electricity supply and demand. They are following the developments, assess the 
needs, and are capable of taking the right decision. Nuclear energy as an object is 
positioned superior to coal and water, hence the appropriate choice for the energy 
policy. 
The statements of the Energy Minister privilege the state over other actors or 
affected parties by the policy on nuclear energy. The referent is the state, its survival, 
its economy, and so on… The main point is that nuclear energy will strengthen the 
bases of state power. The identity of the state and the decisionmakers is constructed 
superior to the “others,” such as the public or the opposition. So is the position of 
nuclear energy versus “other types of energy.” 
The following highlights are the main arguments of the proponents: Nuclear 
power is necessary for Turkey and it will augment Turkey’s power militarily, 
politically and economically. It is a rational decision, and the opposition is irrational, 
driven by interest or ideology.  
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7.1.1. “Nuclear energy is necessary for Turkey’s development: It will 
address the energy shortage, will decrease dependency and the energy 
bill.” 
 
Hilmi Güler, former Minister of Energy: 
 
If Turkey aspires to develop viable solutions for the future in its national energy 
policy, it should place its energy basket over five pillars, that is, renewables, coal, 
hydro, nuclear and natural gas. 531…[N]uclear energy is not a choice but a necessity 
in order to meet the country’s energy shortage…the resources at disposal will fall 
short for a continuous flow of electricity for base load and peak hours, thus, nuclear 
energy is a must and the only way out.532 …We are determined [to establish nuclear 
power plants which will] decrease dependency [and] to pay less for the energy bill 
considering the rising oil and gas prices, and to inflict less pollution to the 
environment…533 (…) If you want us to be environment-friendly, to produce cheap, 
sustainable and continuous electricity without polluting the environment, we should 
do it… 534 
 
TÜSİAD:  
 
Taking note of the global developments, it has become necessary that [Turkey 
implement] policies in line with our strategic interests determined in the framework 
of a comprehensive energy policy… In this context, the decision to include nuclear 
energy, which was belated, into energy production basket is a positive one.535 
 
Haluk Utku, Hacettepe University:  
 
If Turkey ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it will need to give up investments on energy 
generation with coal. Thus, Turkey should take meetings on climate change 
seriously, and formulate policies in that regard… From the strategic perspective, the 
primary reasons [for choosing nuclear] are that oil and gas routes involve political 
and military risks and have price fluctuations… [while] nuclear fuel can be obtained 
from politically more stable countries, like Canada and Australia. 536 
 
Presupposition: Turkey will have an energy shortage in the future. Nuclear 
energy and nuclear power plants are cheap, environment-friendly, and will decrease 
dependency on foreign sources. Global developments require new policies on energy 
                                               
531 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year, 91st Session, April 20, 2006.  
532 “Nükleerde Son Perde (The Last “Scene” in Nuclear [Plans]),” 2007, p. 34. 
533 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 38th Session, December 20, 
2006. 
534 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103rd Session, May 8, 2007. 
535 TÜSİAD: “Nükleer Santral yapılması gecikmiş ancak olumlu bir adım (Establishment of nuclear 
power plant is a belated but a positive step),” 2006. 
536 Haluk Utku, “Nükleer Enerji ve Dikkate Alınması Gerekenler, (Nuclear Energy Policy and Points 
to be Considered),” 2005. 
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security. Energy security should be considered within strategic assessments. The 
decision for nuclear power is useful for Turkey’s energy security, and in accordance 
with the energy policy making criteria. Turkey is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol 
(speech delivered before Ankara ratified the Protocol in 2009), which allows it to 
pursue less environment-friendly measures for energy generation. However, it will 
eventually ratify it; thus, it must align its energy policies accordingly. 
Predication: Nuclear energy is predicated as “a necessity to meet the 
country’s energy shortage”, “must” and “the only way out.” These predicates 
constitute nuclear energy as the “life safer” from “a situation that needs urgent 
response.”  
Subject Positioning: Local resources, particularly hydro-power, oil and gas 
are put in an inferior position vis-à-vis nuclear energy: Domestic and renewable 
resources are insufficient; the resources at disposal will pollute the environment; and 
oil and gas will be costly. Nuclear energy is superior to fossil fuels in terms of supply 
security, price stability and environment friendliness. “We” refers to policymakers, 
the government, Energy Ministry, and the energy bureaucracy. It constitutes them as 
subjects, and confers the identity of the “powerful” or “mighty.” Since “We” are 
working for the best interests of the country, “We” are entitled to determine the best 
resource.  
Assessment: Nuclear power is constructed as a necessity by means of the 
energy shortage that faces the energy-dependent Turkey. Policymakers constitute 
themselves as capable and responsible actors who chose “the rational option” over 
other alternatives, which are inferior to nuclear energy. 
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7.1.1.1. “Nuclear energy is urgent, because its absence is a threat to the 
country’s survival, development and welfare.”  
 
Mustafa Öztürk, AKP Sinop MP:  
 
If we really think of the future of our country, its development and welfare… [T]o 
prevent darkness, nuclear power plants are urgent [measures]. If we do not show 
enough resolve, and do not bring this technology in 2015, we would be preparing 
the dark days. Therefore, in great responsibility, we must build urgently, quickly, 
without delay, not even one, but several nuclear power plants.537  
 
Sinan Aygün, former Chairman of ATO:  
 
“We have two choices: Either dark or nuclear power plant…538  
 
Metin Münir, Milliyet columnist:  
 
It is risky for the economy to be dependent on oil and gas which are instruments of 
coercion in foreign policy and whose prices are fluctuating. (…) There are several 
states in Europe which generate the main proportion of their energy need from 
nuclear power plants. Modern nuclear power plants are cheap and safe. Compared to 
the old generation power plants, they emit less waste. The energy produced is cheap 
after the construction cost deduced. In addition to limiting dependency on foreign 
sources, nuclear power plants decrease the emission of greenhouse gases…539 
 
Presupposition: Turkey needs and deserves to take advantage of nuclear 
energy. It is to a country’s interest to have a secure supply, diversified resources and 
to acquire nuclear technology. Nuclear energy will contribute to welfare. The West is 
the example; it is the yardstick. There is a problem of energy shortage, “darkness” is 
a threat, and nuclear power is the remedy. Dependency diminishes state power, 
undermines economic stability, and the diplomatic/negotiation powers of the state. 
“Remaining in the dark” is unacceptable neither for individuals nor for states. The 
arguments for risky and expensive NPPs are flawed. It is only nuclear energy that 
can make up the gap in the energy supply, and not any other resource. 
                                               
537 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
538 Nükleer Enerjide Acil Durum Raporu (The Report on the Urgency of Nuclear Power), 2007.  
539 Metin Münir, “Nükleerleştiremediklerimizden misiniz? (Are you one of those whom we could not 
nuclearize?)” Milliyet, January 28, 2006, <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/01/28/yazar/munir.html>. 
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Predication: NPPs are predicated as to “provide the main portion of electricity 
in several European states,” “are cheap and safe,” and “modern ones emit less waste” 
than old ones. 
Subject Positioning: The following concepts are positioned in a relation of 
superiority/inferiority: The economy versus other sectors; modern versus old NPPs; 
natural gas versus alternative resources. Nuclear power is positioned in opposition to 
“darkness” which is a danger. “We,” connotes Turkey, the decisionmakers, who 
should be responsible, and who are in a position to solve the problems of the country, 
need to take action, make a choice, and adopt policies to its favor.  
Assessment: Energy security is vital for survival; hence dependency and 
shortage are threats to security. Dependency on energy imports reached intolerable 
levels, and it is an issue that needs urgent measures. Nuclear power is the best or the 
most appropriate response. Nuclear energy is superior to other resources, and its 
absence would mean darkness. Policymakers need to take action. This discourse 
securitizes the shortage of energy, and constructs nuclear energy as the single 
response.  
 
 
7.1.1.2.  “Nuclear energy is superior to fossil fuels and renewables.” 
 
Gül Göktepe, advisor to TAEK Chairman: 
Among the developing countries, it is Turkey whose energy demand is increasing 
the most. We, as nuclearists, are not against renewables. We favor the use of clean 
energies like wind. However, since they are not enough by themselves, we are 
trying to say that there is a need for a clean source like nuclear energy.540  
 
                                               
540 Önay Yılmaz “Nükleer takip (The Nuclear Chase),” Milliyet, November 17, 2004, 
<http://www.milliyet.com/2004/11/17/siyaset/axsiy01.html>, statements confirmed by Gül Göktepe 
via email correspondence. 
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Mehmet Ali Yavuz, DYP Konya MP:  
 
Nuclear energy should definitely be used in our country, and the NPPs should be 
established… The NPPs-which observe public health and environmental safety and 
international high-technology- should be established.541 The construction of the 
hydroelectrical and thermal power plants are continuing…but they will not be 
enough to meet the needs. The establishment of nuclear power plants … is 
inevitable. Environmental groups are against NPPs; but they are the only way to 
overcome the shortage of energy.542 
 
Nuclear Engineers’ Association: 
 
…Considering that 10 years’ fuel for nuclear power plants can be stored, and thus 
dependency can be reduced, we are hard pressed to understand the logic behind the 
insistence on natural gas. The use of hydroelectricity is around 20% worldwide, 
whereas it is 40% in our country; and almost all the big and economical HEPPs 
have already been constructed. From now on, we do not have rivers left to make a 
second Atatürk dam. The (Hydroelectrical Power Plants) HEPPs to be constructed 
from now on, will be smaller in power, and higher in cost… [O]ur country should 
not be more dependent on hydroelectricity than today considering the irregular 
precipitation regime and river flows. How accurate and realistic to rely on wind and 
solar energy, whose share is less than 1 % in worldwide production of energy, is a 
separate issue of debate.543  
 
Presupposition: Developing countries are hungry for energy and Turkey is 
one of them. Renewable energy resources are not enough to meet the energy demand 
of developing countries. Turkey faces a serious energy shortage. The demand for 
energy is so high that the current measures are not enough and it will inevitably 
establish NPPs. Dependency on natural gas is disadvantageous for the state. The 
insistence on the use of hydro-power is groundless. Public health and environmental 
safety should be observed in energy projects. 
Predication: Renewables are “clean” but insufficient resources of energy. 
That renders nuclear energy the only option, because it is both “clean” and can 
address the energy demand of developing countries. NPPs “are the only way to 
overcome the shortage of energy”, and will “inevitably be established.” NPPs are 
advantageous to diminish dependency with the possibility to store the fuel. On the 
other hand, there are drawbacks of hydroelectricity: the use of rivers passed the 
                                               
541 TGNA General Board Minutes, 20th Term, 1st Legislative Year, 41st Session, April 20, 1996. 
542 TGNA General Board Minutes, 21st Term, 1st Legislative Year, 24th Session, June 27, 1999. 
543 “Akkuyu Nükleer Santral İhalesi’nin İptalinin Düşündürdükleri,” July 2000.  
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efficient levels, that is, it “will be more expensive if new HEPPs are built.” 
Renewables are “unpredictable resources.”  
Subject positioning: “We” refers to nuclearists who are confronted with the 
environmental groups. “Nuclearists” are not against renewables. So, “we” have 
overlapping grounds with “them”. Where “we” diverge is the (in)sufficiency of 
renewables to address the energy shortage. “We” place nuclear in the same basket 
with renewables, whereas “they” perceive it as an antonym. “Environmental safety” 
is prioritized over “shortage of energy,” because the referent is the economy, human 
needs and public health. Nuclear energy is positioned superior to natural gas, hydro, 
wind and solar energy. It is superior, because others either result in dependency or 
are insufficient to meet the overall demand. 
Assessment: Nuclear is more advantageous than renewables in terms of yield 
per unit investment, energy security and meeting the demand. All these 
characteristics make it the rational policy choice. 
 
 
7.1.1.3. “Nuclear energy is an issue of honor.” 
 
Hilmi Güler: 
 
The establishment of nuclear power plant has become a matter of honor for us. The 
aim is not just to generate energy, but to develop the technological infrastructure of 
the country. Our country should be able to stand on its own feet in terms of nuclear 
in the future. Nuclear technology is a threshold. We need to get over this threshold. 
Those who are blindly against nuclear energy do not know that there are 285 nuclear 
medicine units. (…) Nuclear power plant means cheap and unabated generation of 
electricity. [There might be] aridity… There might be insufficient water in dams. 
The wind might not blow continuously… Coal [produces] CO2. Nuclear energy is 
superior in these aspects as well.544 
 
Presupposition: The technological infrastructure of Turkey needs to be 
developed. Turkey is dependent on foreign sources for the nuclear technology 
                                               
544 Akman, “Hilmi Güler: Nükleer santral, namus meselemiz,” 2007.  
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infrastructure. Nuclear technology is advanced. There are those who are categorically 
against nuclear power. Honor is the bottomline of socially conditioned human 
behavior: If something is an issue of honor, then it must be accomplished, because it 
is a liability to the public. 
Predication: Nuclear technology is “advanced” and “a threshold,” Nuclear 
energy is “cheap,” provides “unabated electricity,” is not vulnerable to climatic 
changes and does not emit CO2. 
Subject Positioning: “We” are the policymakers, state officials, who work for 
“our” country. “We” are also devoted to social values, and do whatever it takes to 
live up to our commitment (to “our” people/constituencies/people who trusted us). 
“Those blindly against nuclear power” are inferior, because they are unaware of the 
facts and benefits of nuclear technology. Nuclear is superior to wind, hydro and coal, 
because they do not meet the energy security criteria. 
Assessment: Although there is one example of a text that includes the word 
“honor,” the concept is too important to be ignored. When something is declared an 
“issue of honor,” all obstacles are automatically removed in the minds. The concept 
of “honor” determines the urgency of an issue and the acceptability of an individual 
(or a group of people) in a group (or in a wider community), and the achievement of 
the “issue of honor” becomes the priority. It is a concept that is attributed to 
masculinity such that it is the duty of the man to protect his family. Similarly, 
governments may take “honor” as the basis of their existence, can mobilize the 
population, and can legitimize their position. They prevent a public discussion since 
all measures are acceptable for an “issue of honor.” The minister, by equating 
nuclear with “honor” tries to legitimize the necessity of establishing nuclear power 
plants. 
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7.1.2. “Nuclear energy will augment Turkey’s power: for the state 
(national security), the economy, the environment, technological 
development, and status.” 
 
7.1.2.1. Economy, Technology, Environment 
 
 
Mustafa Öztürk: 
 
The establishment of nuclear power plants will provide a secure base for electricity, 
and resource diversification, and would have a role in obtaining nuclear technology. 
NPPs are high-technology products. Since the use of this technology requires high 
quality and security systems, they will play a leading role for progress for industry 
and several sectors… Because it is relatively easier and cheaper to store the nuclear 
fuel, nuclear energy will contribute to the energy supply security. Nuclear power 
plants do not emit greenhouse gases, therefore they will be appropriate choices to 
prevent the adverse environmental consequences of rising energy demand. NPPs 
will contribute to the maintenance of price stability in the long-run. 545  
 
Metin Münir:  
 
There are several states in Europe which meet the main proportion of their energy 
need from nuclear power plants. In France, 78%, in Belgium, 55%, and in Sweden, 
52% of electricity is generated out of nuclear power plants.546 
 
Presupposition: Supply security, resource diversification and acquisition of 
nuclear technology are state interests. The West is a benchmark for Turkey in terms 
of development and energy policies. 
Predication: Nuclear power plants “are high technology products,” “do not 
emit greenhouse gases,” will constitute “a secure base for electricity,” “an alternative 
for diversification,” “basis for nuclear technology,” “a step for other high-technology 
sectors,” and will contribute to “price stability and energy supply security.” They 
exist in most of the industrialized countries, and provide a substantial share of 
electricity. 
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Subject Positioning: “Industrialized countries” and “states in Europe” are 
positioned in relation of similarity and superiority vis-à-vis Turkey, which does not 
have nuclear power plants. 
Assessment: NPPs will not be merely energy generating facilities, but will 
provide a value added to the level of technological development in the country, 
sustainability of the environment and the economy. The benefits of NPPs are 
multiple. Therefore, nuclear energy meets the criteria of energy security. 
 
 
7.1.2.2. State, National security 
 
7.1.2.2.1. “Nuclear power will overcome dependency on natural gas by 
diversification.” 
 
Hilmi Güler: 
 
…[T]he natural gas coming from the Russian Federation via our Western route 
reaches our country over Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria; and Russia’s efforts are 
continuing to mitigate the problems due to heavy winter conditions in this route. 
(…) Iran reduces its daily natural gas delivery to such an extent that violates the 
terms of the contract by the justification that its domestic consuption increases 
during the winter. (…) In addition, during January, there were delays in the arrival 
of tankers carrying liquified natural gas (LNG) coming from Algeria to our 
Marmara LNG facility because of the storm in the Dardanalles Strait. (…) Nuclear 
power plants have exclusive characteristics to provide for energy supply security. 
(…) Energy diversification in our country has become inevitable while the energy 
demand is rising constantly today.547 
 
NÜKTE: 
 
If we had been able to include this energy within our country’s portfolio, we would 
definitely not have become dependent on natural gas and we would have saved over 
3 billion dollars. When we multiply it with the passing years, we can see how much 
we erred. In this sense, it would become easier to understand why Russia, the world 
energy giant, increased the NPP investments. With a 100- million-dollar fuel an 
NPP of 1000 MW can produce energy for three years unabatedly, and you may be 
hard pressed to believe that this spends a 33-million-dollar fuel per year. It is also 
environment-friendly. It will be easier to understand why France produces 80% of 
its electricity out of nuclear. It thus provides its people the cheapest electricity! As a 
                                               
547 Interview with Hilmi Güler, İşveren (The Employer), Vol. 44, No. 5, February 2006, pp. 33, 34. 
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result, nuclear energy is a national energy. It is the most environment-sensitive 
one… 548  
 
Presupposition: Turkey is dependent on natural gas, and this is 
disadvantageous.The pipeline that carries the Russian natural gas to Turkey is full of 
problems: It passes through the territories of four states which increases risk, because 
those countries dramatically increase their demand for gas during winter. The 
alternative route is also problematic. The third option, the transportation of LNG, is 
also adversely affected by weather conditions. Therefore, none of the three routes are 
reliable, and natural gas does not meet the conditions for supply security. It is nuclear 
energy which can address the problems that natural gas creates. The rising energy 
demand can be met by adding new energy resources in the supply basket.  
Predication: Natural gas is problematic in terms of delivery, creates 
dependency, subject to shortages during the winter, and unreliable. Nuclear energy is 
“environment-friendly,” “national” and “the cheapest” resource. 
Subject Positioning: Nuclear power excludes all other options that could 
become an alternative to natural gas. It is not as risky as natural gas, so, it is superior.  
Assessment: Dependency on natural gas is a pressing issue for Turkey: It not 
only affects economic balances, but also constrains the power of the state. The 
transportation of natural gas for supply security is also problematic: Weather 
conditions and the political issues in the transportation routes increase risk. The fuel 
for natural gas is fluid as opposed to the storable nuclear fuel. Nuclear energy would 
be a “national” resource, that is, it will diffuse dependency, and avoid pressures in 
the conduct of its foreign policy, because it will provide abundant electricity and 
diversification. Nuclear power is the best alternative to address the problems of 
dependency on natural gas and supply security. 
                                               
548 “Türkiye Enerji Dosyası (The Turkish Energy Dossier),” NÜKTE, March 2006, 
<http://www.nukte.org/enerjidosyasi>. 
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7.1.2.2.2. “Turkey should have nuclear capability, and nuclear 
technology transfer will be the first step.”  
 
Some actors go a step further and securitize the absence of nuclear energy in 
that it can become a threat to national or economic security. They see nuclear power 
plants as the technological basis for a nuclear weapon capability. There are other 
individuals who directly argue that Turkey must have nuclear weapons to bolster its 
national security. Turkey is a party to the NPT and to other agreements of the 
international nonproliferation regime, therefore official statements underline the 
continuation of that status. Still, Iran’s nuclear program increased concerns on 
regional proliferation trends. In his last day of service, Gen. Hilmi Özkök, as Chief 
of General Staff, declared that: 
 
…The existence of states that have weapons of mass destruction or of states of 
concern along the axis starting from North Korea and extending to the Middle East, 
constitutes a serious… threat for our country’s security. If this problem is not 
resolved despite the intense diplomatic efforts of the international community, I 
think that it is quite possible that we, as a country, will be faced with important 
junctures of decision in the foreseeable future. Otherwise, we will be faced with 
losing our strategic superiority in the region… The Cold War … remained in the 
past. Ambiguities, frozen conflicts and the breakdown of balances of power have 
surrounded Turkey’s horizons like a nightmare… The new environment dictates that 
we always need to be cautious.549  
 
Presupposition: Regional proliferation is a threat to Turkey’s national 
security. By the Middle East, he refers to Iran. If diplomacy cannot turn the tide of 
regional proliferation, Turkey will not only lose its strategic superiority, but also will 
have to make hard choices with respect to the response to the threat. New threats of 
the post-Cold War require diverse security measures. The Cold War balances of 
power were sustainable and provided for Turkey’s security, but the new security 
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environment in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood is unsustainable and threatens 
national security.  
Predication: “We” and Turkey are predicated with “facing with important 
junctures of decision in the foreseeable future if proliferation continues in our 
region,” “surrounded in its horizons with the breakdown of balances of power like a 
nightmare,” “under the threat of proliferation,” and “needs to be cautious when the 
new security environment is concerned.”  
Subject positioning: “We” denotes Turkey and its citizens. Turkey is 
positioned superior to the countries in its region, and nuclear capability would alter 
this position when a regional country acquires it. 
Individual statements openly refer to a latent nuclear capability: Ali Külebi 
suggests that Turkey should acquire nuclear weapons with regards to the unreliability 
of alliances, the indefinite process of EU integration and the concerns on regional 
proliferation:  
 
... The acquisition of nuclear capability by bordering states, like North Korea, 
China, India and Pakistan, will form a “nuclear belt” that reaches to our borders 
when Iran also becomes a nuclear power. ...Turkey [will be] vulnerable to threats in 
its neighborhood... The … acquisition of nuclear power and a deterrent nuclear … 
umbrella is … a condition for regional powers [so] Turkey needs to attain this 
potential… (…)We think that it is helpful for Turkey - which will find the 
opportunity to take steps for becoming a nuclear power in military terms by 
establishing nuclear power plants- to plan becoming a nuclear power and to include 
it in the National Security Policy Strategy… Such deterrent mechanisms are 
necessities to alleviate and even to prevent … threats forged by foreign powers 
against the national unity and the probable pressures on our country. 550  
 
Doğan Heper, Hürriyet columnist:  
 
… Pakistan, India, North Korea and finally our neighbor Iran has channeled or 
aspiring to transfer nuclear power into military field…With the motion of March 1st, 
Turkish-American relations soared... The EU will accept us at least 15 years later.551 
…Russia and the United States are utilizing nuclear energy, even making weapons. 
On the other hand, we are begging Iran for gas. This begging disturbs me, how 
about you? … [The acquisition of] nuclear technology will eventually provide the 
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military superiority of this country… [It] will not only increase Turkey’s prestige in 
the region, but will also serve permanent peace…Otherwise… we will continue to 
remain a “developing country.”552  
 
Rıza Zelyut, journalist: 
  
Turkey definitely needs nuclear energy… both to make up its energy gap and to 
sustain its strategic advantage-that it maintains by its huge army- more cheaply and 
effectively. 553  (…) Please be mindful of which countries use nuclear power. These 
[countries] are those which could mend their economies rapidly.554  It is hard to say 
that the Turkish army has the power to deter, because it does not have an atomic 
bomb. (…) The West puts pressure on Turkey … [by warning] that “If Iran goes 
nuclear, it will strike you, too!” The main reason behind the anti-Iran propaganda is 
… to conceal the Israeli atomic threat, and to deprive the Muslim world of atomic 
bomb... 555   
 
Presupposition: Proliferation is potentially dangerous (for Turkey’s security 
in the future). Ensuring Turkey’s security and maintaining its regional standing in the 
foreseeable future is possible only by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. There is a 
gap between response capabilities and threats that Turkey is facing. Foreign powers 
conspire to weaken and divide Turkey by targeting its national unity and applying 
pressure on political issues. The way to deter these threats is the possession of 
nuclear weapons. Turkey was deceived and was not given nuclear technology. 
Turkey is a powerful country, but the fact that it does not have nuclear weapons 
keeps it lesser. Nuclear weapons mean power and prestige. It is a shame that Turkey 
does not have them. The response to proliferation is proliferation. Nuclear 
technology should be acquired as a stepping stone for its military use. The Christian 
and Western world knows that nuclear power augments power materially and 
ideationally, so they do not want the Muslims to have it, because Muslims are 
“inferior” and they should remain as such. Muslims do have the right to acquire the 
technology, but it is the West which prevents them. Turkey’s current status is fragile 
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regarding the balances of power and its alliances, thus it must increase its power. 
This justifies the threat and response in the form of nuclear weapons. 
Predication: Turkey does not have reliable allies, faces games/threats forged 
by foreign countries, “is begging Iran for gas,” “was deprived of nuclear energy,” 
needs to obtain the technology to develop nuclear weapons, “should plan on 
becoming a nuclear power and make it a policy,” should acquire nuclear energy and 
then nuclear weapons, “would become influential and gain prestige with nuclear 
weapons,” and will remain a “developing country” without nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
energy is predicated as a national and continuous resource and rational choice.  
Subject Positioning: Muslims versus the West/Christians, are pitted against 
each other as nuclear have-nots versus nuclear haves in superiority-inferiority 
relationship. The first is constructed as secondary to the latter, so nuclear energy will 
give them the status they seek.  
Assessment: Turkey is under threat, and should augment its military power: 
It should become a regional power to survive the external threats. Ankara should 
have its own nuclear capability. In this sense, the nuclear energy project will be the 
first step to provide latent nuclear weapons capability. 
 
 
7.1.2.3. “It will increase state power at the domestic level.”  
 
Rıza Zelyut: 
 
The AKP government, in its past five years of service, did not leave something that 
is worth remembering in the future. I hereby propose: They can put their mark under 
a big endeavor that can be considered as a turning point in Turkey’s history. Let me 
give its name: “To Start the Atomic Age in Turkey.” Acquiring [nuclear] 
technology is first and foremost a political decision… The previous governments 
boasted about highways and bridges. If the AKP government can bring this 
technology, then they can boast about initiating the nuclear age in Turkey. For me, 
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this is the biggest patriotic act. I can say that I will applaud this endeavor as an all-
time AKP-opponent.556  
 
Presupposition: Nuclear technology transfer is advantageous for state power, 
and the decision to that end would demonstrate that state officials observe the benefit 
of the state and their people. Notable performances by governments are huge 
development projects.  
Predication: The AKP government is “incapable” to contribute to the growth 
and development of the country, and an undertaking for nuclear power would make 
them “patriot.” 
Subject Positioning: The author places “I,” a citizen who is not satisfied with 
the deeds of the government, hence the tag “all-time AKP opponent.” The decision 
on nuclear energy is so effective that it could convert such an opponent to appreciate 
the government. The satisfaction of the opposition will increase the approval rates 
and increase the power of the government.  
Assessment: Mega projects signify development, and the increase in state 
power. Governments with such endeavors receive public acceptance and legitimacy. 
Nuclear power project is constructed as a “turning point” and “patriotic act” for 
governments needing to substantiate their power. 
 
 
7.1.2.4. “The nuclear energy project is a matter of prestige.”  
 
Hilmi Güler:  
For, this is not only an energy program for us, not a matter of energy, it is a matter 
of prestige, a matter of passing a threshold in terms of technology, that is, a 
threshold that self-confident states pass…557  
                                               
556 Ibid.   
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Doğan Heper:  
 
Our national pride should reach to the zenith. 70 million [the population of Turkey] 
are waiting for this. A morale-boosting action will make the 70 million to clamp 
together, to be in unity and integrity, and reinforce their pride to be Turkish citizens. 
For examle, the success on nuclear field … could give this morale to our society.558 
 
Presupposition: Turkish people need morale because their unity and integrity 
have been challenged such that it affected their pride for their “nationality.” So, 
nuclear power will restore their morale, because it represents power and prestige, and 
gives self-confidence. 
Predication: The “nuclear energy program” of the government is predicated 
as a “matter of prestige” and “passing a threshold in terms of technology” and which 
will restore the country’s “self-confidence.”  
Subject Positioning: “We” is used for the government and the policymakers. 
It constructs them as actors working to the benefit of the state. In the second text, it 
refers to the Turkish people. Turkey is positioned inferior to the “self-confident” 
states which passed the “threshold” through the acquisition of nuclear technology. 
Therefore, it is generation of nuclear power that will make Turkey even with those 
states. 
Assessment: Nuclear power project will not only augment Turkey’s power 
through its contribution to development, energy generation, and economic growth, 
but also to its status. For, having nuclear technology is a threshold to becoming a 
developed/1st tier country.  
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7.1.3. “It is rational to have nuclear energy, and irrational not to have it, 
because of its advantages.”  
 
The following text is chosen to present the bullet points of arguments 
regarding rationality: It is established by reference to policymakers identifying with 
the residents who perceive a threat to their health and environment, to “facts” that 
Turkey already has a background with nuclear technology, and to “incomplete or 
inaccurate information” that manipulate the rationality of the opposition. The 
remaining texts are chosen in different categories where nuclear energy is 
constructed as the “rational choice.” 
 
Hilmi Güler: 
 
… [W]e are not an ignorant country in terms of nuclear energy. (…) We also have 
kids, we … will also live in this country. (…)  I am from the Black Sea [region]. It 
is heads or tails, we will achieve this job. Let’s get rid of underestimating ourselves. 
(…) There is one way for rationality… : Turkey should start working for long-term 
nuclear energy production … We are trying to do what is right. Especially in face of 
global warming which is tremendously dangerous, we find it appropriate to 
[establish the nuclear power plants].559…[N]ow there is a… new period called 
“nuclear renaissance.” (…) Even the founding members of some environmentalist 
groups joined the nuclear environmentalist group.560 Waste is not that horrendous. 
…: If a five-member-family used nuclear power for fifty years, their waste would 
fill up [less than a] glass of water, 200cc. [The perception that] everywhere will be 
covered by waste, everybody will get cancer, will die, and the like… [is wrong].561 
 
Presupposition: The Turkish government is rational about nuclear energy. If 
the NPP were dangerous, the Minister himself would not have approved the decision. 
The Turkish public underestimates the state’s skills to properly carry out a task. 
There is a perception that waste is horrendous, but those who argue as such are 
unaware of the “real facts” about waste. 
Predication: He predicates policymakers as informed (not ignorant), with 
kids, residents of their homeland, “capable” of achieving nuclear power project, and 
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in an effort “to do what is right.” Waste is “in small quantities,” and does not “cause 
cancer or deaths.” 
Subject positioning: “We” refers to the government and the Energy Ministry. 
With the sentence “we are not ignorant,” Güler constructs himself and the state 
officials as rational subjects: They can decide for the good of the nation, economy, 
people and the environment-which are taken as objects and in an inferior position. 
“I” refers to the Minister himself as a person, as a father, and as someone from the 
Black Sea region, who will be exposed to the risks of a NPP. By constituting himself 
as subject, he reinforces rationality: As the person at the head of energy 
policymaking, and as someone who will not be insulated from the impacts, he must 
be rational by carrying out the decision. He establishes similarity with the residents 
of the Black Sea region, some of whom oppose the project. 
 
 
7.1.3.1. “Scientific and technical data corroborate the decision because 
they are objective. Experts approve the decision.” 
 
The discourse on science is a repeated theme to establish the objectivity of 
the information hence the credibility of actors: 
 
Hilmi Güler: 
 
[W]hile doing this, without any [psychological] complexes, I use quite serious, 
scientific and technical methods. I am an old TÜBİTAK member, at the same time I 
am coming from the bureaucracy; that is, I am a person who knows the nation and 
the state. Therefore, in these studies, only scientific and technical methods are used. 
562 
 
Presupposition: Science is the basis of knowledge and the “truth,” because it 
is objective. TÜBİTAK is the Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Institution, 
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which is presumed to be impartial. Government decisions become political and 
unscientific if they oversee scientific and technical assessments to address an issue. 
Predication: Hilmi Güler predicates himself as “an old TÜBİTAK member,” 
“coming from the bureaucracy,” that is, as “a person who knows the nation and the 
state.” 
Subject Positioning: With “I,” The Minister constitutes himself as an 
authority that has expertise and background in science, technology and bureaucracy. 
He positions himself superior to those who lack such expertise and who may argue 
against the government’s energy policy. 
Technical information is used to establish the argument that the 
disadvantages of nuclear energy are few and tolerable, so it becomes the rational 
choice. 
 
NÜKTE: 
 
Its waste is not a problem. A pool in the size of an Olympic pool installed during the 
construction of the NPP would contain the spent fuel rods. You can close down the 
NPP and this pool- which will be enough for a 50-year life [of an NPP]. Thus, you 
won’t have any waste problem. 
 
Presupposition: Opponents argue that nuclear waste is “lethal,” but this is not 
the case. Waste is stored in a way that does not threaten life.  
Predication: Waste is “not a problem,” it does not fill up huge spaces and can 
be contained safely.  
Subject positioning: “We” know what we are doing, because “we” looked at 
the technical details. “You” do not know the “facts”, which is why “you” exaggerate 
the “waste problem.” NÜKTE constructs itself as an authority by referring to others 
who are ignorant. 
Reference to experts is another method to construct rationality. Discourse can 
create experts or authorities, and refer to their statements as the source of knowledge 
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to establish a certain “reality.” The following excerpts are chosen from the 
statements of those individuals who establish themselves as “authorities” regarding 
the nuclear energy issue, or they include statements which refer to an “expert.” 
 
Nuclear Engineers’ Association:  
 
Prof. Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, the director of Harvard University’s Center of International 
Development, in his analysis which is published in the British journal, 
Economist…divides the World into three. Technology-producing countries, 
technology-using countries, and those countries which neither produce nor use 
technology. In this classification, Turkey was shown in the [category of] States not 
producing or using technology. The shame goes not to Turkish scientists, but to 
those statesmen who do not trust their own experts…the Nuclear Engineers’ 
Association could not accept the decision to cancel the Akkuyu NPP tender. The 
efforts of all these skilled people, the funds of the State, the hopes of nuclear 
engineers vanished all at once...563 
 
Mehmet Şahin, Gazi University: 
 
Actually, all facilities generating energy are harmful for the environment. For 
example, if [we] want to establish a 1000 MW wind power plant, [we] would need a 
50-thousand-acres field. Around these windmills, no living organisms or flora can 
live. For a 1000 MW HEPP, thousands of acres of field or agricultural land would 
be left under water. Nuclear power plant can be established in a much narrower area 
and would not be harmful to the environment. For me, a conscious environmentalist 
should support nuclear power plants.564 
 
Okan Zabunoğlu, Hacettepe University: 
 
As an academic and scholar, I well know that there are steps during the process of 
learning, like steps on a stairway. If you miss a step, you may reach the next one 
with some extra effort. If you miss 2 steps, it becomes much harder to reach the 
second one. Well, if you miss more than two steps, it may be impossible to catch up. 
This is my major worry … during our country's walk on a technological stairway.  
So far, we have remained deprived of the benefits of nuclear energy and technology. 
And … we are in the “nuclear era;” …staying away from nuclear technology is 
tantamount to missing a few steps on the stairway. I’m afraid that we will not be 
able reach the next step if we do not take steps [for nuclear power generation] soon- 
before it turns out that we are too late.565 
 
Presupposition: Western (more specifically Anglo-Saxon) academics, 
academic institutions and journals are points of reference. Scientists and academics 
are skilled people and they should be consulted with before taking a decision that 
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pertains to technology transfer. Nuclear technology is an advanced technology and 
one that grants status to states. It is a shame for statesmen who purposefully deprive 
Turkey of this technology. It is the experts who can guide policymakers for accurate 
decisions. The argument that “renewables are environment-friendly and nuclear is 
harmful” is false. To the contrary, nuclear energy is more environment-friendly than 
renewables. Scientific information is objective and true. Those environmentalists 
who are against NPPs are unconscious, that is, they are not accurately informed. 
Turkey should acquire the know-how on nuclear technology and attain the one at the 
global level. The more Turkey remains behind the pace of technology, the harder it 
becomes to learn new ones. Since Turkey could not procure nuclear technology 
while world entered the “nuclear era,” it is time that Turkey constructed nuclear 
power plants. Otherwise, it will never catch up with the contemporary technology. 
Predication: Experts on nuclear technology are skilled, and are acquainted 
with the pursuit of nuclear power. 
Subject Positioning: Western experts are advanced and they are given the 
identity of being the point of reference. Technology is constituted as an object in 
political economy to determine the status of countries in the world. Hence, Turkey is 
positioned inferior to states which possess advanced technology products. The 
nuclear engineers of Turkey, who are “experts” and “authorities,” are constituted as 
subjects superior to the statesmen who cancelled the tender and acted irrationally. 
Nuclear is superior over wind and hydro power considering the impacts on the 
environment. Nuclear technology is equated with the necessary leap to reach the next 
step in the technological ladder. 
Assessment: Nuclear energy is constituted as the rational choice for Turkey’s 
energy security, in view of increasing demand/need and limited supply. These supply 
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and demand estimates were made on the basis of scientific and technical facts. 
Scientists and experts are objective and reliable. Nuclear technology is also an asset 
to attain more advanced levels of science. Therefore, the “fact” that “nuclear energy 
is the appropriate choice” is established. The positivist philosophy566 and the 
significance of science567 are determining in the Turkish political culture regarding 
development and progress: They are under the basis of “what we know.” 
 
 
7.1.4. “Opposition to nuclear energy on environmental and human 
health grounds is tricky. International actors behind the opposition try to 
keep Turkey non-nuclear and weak.”  
 
Cumhur Ersümer, former Minister of Energy:  
 
Even if [they] write “stop” on the sky…we will materialize this project. (…) They 
put a placard onto the building of the Energy Ministry, saying “No to Nuclear” and 
they chained themselves. We have always been mild towards these groups…but we 
could not reckon that they would come together, [unite forces with] important 
[actors], and prevent us.568 
 
Rıza Zelyut: 
 
[W]hy Turkey, which is trying to accede to the European Union, and with scarce 
resources is not using this technology while the EU generated one third of its 
electricity from nuclear [?]. (…)To keep Turkey continuously dependent on foreign 
sources … to make it use risky and costly energy so as to prevent its rapid 
development… to prevent the manufacture of an atomic bomb... [and] to make it to 
allocate a huge amount of GDP to maintain the army, thereby to curtail its power for 
development.569 Europe and the United States have cheated countries like us so far 
by saying that “nuclear energy is dangerous!” When nuclear energy came to the 
agenda in our country, Western countries activated some civil society organizations 
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in Turkey. (…) …they showed… the Chernobyl accident as evidence… (…) … the 
absence of nuclear energy is one of the reasons of our energy dependence.570 
 
Can Ataklı, columnist in Vatan daily:  
 
Not every environmentalist movement is innocent. The most outstanding 
demonstrations of the past 15 years are those for “the environment.” (…) However 
… the “politicized” environmentalist movement was not composed only of 
“innocent” wishes and ideals, but was engaged with relations of interest. (…) The 
forerunner of the groups making demonstrations worldwide is Greenpeace. 
However, I always had doubts about this organization. (…) Now, they are making 
demonstrations in Turkey, and opposing nuclear power... Do Greenpeace and their 
supporters in Turkey oppose nuclear energy just because it will damage the 
environment or are they receiving the “financial” support of those who want to open 
up other energy sectors for service? If nuclear energy is that harmful, they should 
start their demonstrations in Russia and the United States.571 
 
Presupposition: Civil society organizations for the environment are false 
pretences; they are the agents of the West. So, the real reason behind the fear is not 
environment, but international and national interest. Those who give support to the 
environmentalist groups should be cautious and question the real intentions behind.  
Predication: Turkey was “kept dependent on foreign sources in energy,” 
“deprived of nuclear technology,” and “prevented from manufacturing an atomic 
bomb.” Thus, it could not develop and lost power. Greenpeace is predicated as “the 
forerunner of the environmentalists” but one which “created doubts” with 
“demonstrations involving corporate or state interests.”  
Subject Positioning: Turkey is positioned inferior vis-à-vis the EU and the 
United States, in a way to refer to “nuclear have-nots” versus “nuclear haves” in 
terms of technology. In this context, nuclear energy will confer Ankara’s prestige 
and status. The method to prevent countries like Turkey from having the technology 
is to create fear, so that these countries will reject nuclear energy by themselves.  
Assessment: The opposition -consciously or unconsciously- becomes the 
instrument of the international power game that tries to maintain “inequality” 
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between great and small powers. Therefore, their intentions are doubtful. These 
groups can manipulate the public opinion to choose one policy option over another, 
by politicizing or securitizing an issue. The supporters discursively construct 
(external) antagonism toward the opposition by referring to international concerns on 
proliferation and Turkey’s power that would be enhanced with the acquisition of 
nuclear power plants. 
 
 
7.1.4.1. “The opposition is irrational due to misinformation or lack of 
information.” 
 
Hilmi Güler:  
 
[There can be] no way with İstemezük. İstemezük is only a word for sheer opposition spoken 
by those who do not have expertise.572 
 
Doğan Heper:  
 
One of the first tasks of the US President Bush in his Asia visit was to sign a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with India…Some people… say that “the United States gave 
up nuclear energy, let’s not undertake it.” They do not know that today there are 440 
NPPs in operation, 26 in construction …and 32 planned… And us? None…573  
 
Mustafa Özcan Ültanır: 
 
Today in France, which is the leading country in nuclear, there are 59 reactors in 
operation, and 11 old NNPs are shut down. In Japan, where there are new reactors 
under construction, there are 56 in operation and three NPPs were shut down… 
[A]ll the fuss about the closure of reactors and waning of interest in nuclear after 
Chernobyl do not reflect the truth. Besides, Chernobyl with its old technology is 
quite different, and does not constitute an example…574 
 
Presupposition: The opposition should not object without an alternative (like 
the Jannissary demonstrations against the Ottoman Sultan). They cannot assess the 
problem well. The opposition argued that closure of reactors meant waning of 
                                               
572 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th  Legislative Year, 100th Session, May 10, 2006.  
573 Doğan Heper “Arapsaçı derler ya, öyle, (It’s just like a Muddle),” Milliyet, March 9, 2006, 
<http://www.milliyet.com/2006/03/09/yazar/heper.html>. 
574 Ültanır, “Nükleer Enerji Neden ve Nasıl Bir Çare? (Why and how is nuclear Power a remedy?)” 
2006, p. 64. 
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interest in nuclear energy, particularly after Chernobyl; but the record of the leading 
states in the industry points to the reverse. The United States is the leading country in 
technology, military, economic and political power. So, it must be acting rationally 
to maintain its status.  
Predication: Chernobyl NPP was “old technology,” “different” from the 
contemporary NPPs, and “does not set an example” to assess interest in nuclear 
energy. The opposition does not have expertise or know the “facts.” 
Subject Positioning: The opposition is inferior to “us,” because they oppose 
without an alternative, and irrationally. The planned NPPs are superior to Chernobyl-
type reactors. Those against the NPP put forward the United States as proof, but with 
lack of information.  
Assessment: An actor is rational when s/he bases her/his arguments on facts. 
The opposition relies on false or incomplete information, thus their arguments are 
unreliable. 
 
 
7.1.4.2.“The opposition is driven by ideology.” 
 
The style of anti-nuclear activists is described by the former Chairman of the 
TAEK, late Ahmed Yüksel Özemre, as follows: 
 
Since 1985, I had the opportunity to meet several “anti-nuclear” people in various 
European countries and of course in Turkey. It is possible to divide them into two: 
The first group is composed of people who are sincere and open-minded. The 
Second group [can be named as] “nuclear fanatics.” (…) Their common goal is to 
rid nuclear energy off the Earth. (…) …their behavior and beliefs are in the fashion 
of the Persian dualist religion [which seks] to demolish the “Evil” at any cost … and 
to restore the world to its primary status, that is, the paradise.  (…) The “Good” is 
the “Sun” (or renewables) and the “Evil” is nuclear power. (…) Greenpeace works 
like a “church,” there is “clergy,” “pilgrim sites,” such as nuclear power plant sites, 
or policymaking institutions (such as the Energy Ministry), and “prayers” in the 
form of slogans. (…) They label the supporters as “under the command” of 
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“lobbies” and “immoral,” whereas they are the “real scientists.” They do not make 
scientific analyses and do not count on factual evidence for their arguments. They 
also do not question the financial support they receive to organize their activities. 
Thus, it is hard to establish a rational dialogue, and the best way is to leave them 
with their ignorance.575  
 
Presupposition: The anti-nuclear movement is not changing and cannot 
change, because it is devoted to its cause, which is utopian. The financial support 
comes from actors with corporate or political interests. 
Predication: Anti-nuclearists are divided into two: The first group is open-
minded. The second group is fanatical, who mimic the philosophy of the old Persian 
religion, where there are two opposite sides. The fanatics are prejudiced, and hold on 
to their cause like a “religion.” they are irrational and “ignorant.” 
Subject Positioning: With “I,” Özemre establishes himself as the 
authority/expert of nuclear issues. The “other” is not even worth talking to. He 
constructs two anti-nuclear groups, and highlights the fanatics. The open-minded 
opponents can be talked into, and can understand the “facts” by gaining knowledge. 
The “other” is completely “ignorant.” 
Assessment: Opposition to nuclear power based on belief systems are hard to 
overcome: Their sight is precluded, and they reject listening to and understanding the 
“other.” 
 
7.2.  Arguments in opposition of the decision: “Nuclear power is a 
threat.” 
 
The following texts are chosen from the statements of civil society 
organizations, politicians and journalists. Examples from the international 
environmental or anti-nuclear arguments are also included where they are applicable, 
                                               
575 Özemre, Ah Şu Atomdan Neler Çektim! (Oh What I Suffered from the Atom!), 2002, pp. 165-170. 
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to show the overlaps with the domestic discourse. The opponents put forward five 
main arguments: Nuclear power plants are dangerous, because of the risk of 
accidents, leakage and proliferation. Chernobyl accident, the unresolved issue of 
waste, Turkey’s administrative deficiencies and proliferation cases prove the level of 
the “risk.” Nuclear power generation is also disadvantageous, that is the costs 
overwhelm the benefits. Renewable energy sources (particularly wind and solar) are 
alternatives with saving and efficiency measures. Decisionmakers are irrational, 
immoral and undemocratized, because they do not engage experts into decision-
making, are under the influence of nuclear lobbies, exaggerate the shortage scenario 
and sacrifice human life for economic benefit. As opposed to the global loss of faith 
in nuclear, it is odd that Ankara insists in the pursuit of nuclear power. Finally, the 
anti-nuclear groups admit that their position is shaped by an ideology that is broadly 
critical of the prevailing political and economic system.  
 
 
7.2.1. “Nuclear power plants are dangerous: The ‘radiation’ and 
proliferation risk threaten humans, environment, agriculture and 
tourism.”  
 
IPPNW: 
 
An accident could happen in any power station as a result of technical defect or 
human error, releasing large quantities of radioactivity into the environment. 
According to the official …risk study [in Germany], a German nuclear power 
station in operation over some 40 years has a 0.1 percent probability of a worst-case 
scenario nuclear incident. In the European Union there are more than 150 
operational nuclear power stations. The probability of a worst-case scenario nuclear 
incident is around 16% in Europe. That equates to the chances of throwing a 6 with 
the first cast of the dice. Worldwide there are some 440 operational nuclear power 
stations. The probability of a major worst-case scenario incident within the next 40 
years is in the region of 40 percent. As the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl shows, a 
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major worst-case scenario nuclear incident can be expected to cause several 
thousand fatalities. 576 
 
 
Engin Altay, CHP Sinop MP:  
 
We are not going to make Sinop a waste dump… There is no… border between 
radiation and cancer…577 (…) The risk of leakage and accident is still high. This 
technology…is… the junk technology of the past…578  
 
Turkish Medical Association: 
 
The radiation emitted during normal operation near the power plant, and accidental 
leaks are harmful. The waste issue could not be resolved for 50 years. The emitted 
radiation … passes onto living things through food or respiration. [It]… causes 
cancer… Despite all these catastrophes, with this Akkuyu NPP tender, we are 
gradually approaching another “national disaster” that our country has ever seen. 
Experts say that if the power plant is established close to the active Ecemiş fault line 
25 km away, the results of an earthquake or an accident will be catastrophic; and not 
only Turkey, but the entire Middle East will be affected.579  
 
Presupposition: Accidents are frequent in nuclear power plants. Human life is 
at risk. NPPs are unsafe, like the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, and all nuclear accidents 
will be like Chernobyl. An NPP in Sinop will make the city a “waste dump.” The 
radiation emission from a NPP is always above the tolerable levels, and it causes 
cancer. The site chosen is in an active earthquake zone, so the NPP will pose a grave 
risk in case of an earthquake. The risks are already high, and advances in technology 
did little to diminish them.  
Predication: Nuclear power plants are “never safe,” “problematic 
technologies,” “extremely risky,” “prone to accidents,” “radioactive,” and “cancer-
prone.” The planned NPP will make its environs “a waste dump,” be “outdated” and 
could be “constructed in an earthquake zone.” 
                                               
576 “International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign,” IPPNW, (Date accessed: April 25, 2006) 
<http://www.facts-on-nuclear-energy.info/index2.php?size=b&l=en>. 
577 General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year, 91st Session, 20 April, 2006. 
578 Ibid. 
579 “Hadi Deprem ‘Doğal Felaketti, Ya Nükleer Santral (The Earthquake was a ‘natural disaster,’ what 
about the nuclear power plant?),” (Declaration signed by civil society organizations including the 
Turkish Medical Association), Türk Tabipleri Birliği, (Date accessed: January 15, 2010) 
<http://www.ttb.org.tr/TD/TD56/nuklear.html>. 
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Subject positioning: 16% probability is likened to the dice, to highlight the 
image of “gambling,” that is, nuclear power plants have high accident risk, and 
sacrifice human life. “We” are the opposition and “we” are aware of the dangers and 
risks of the NPPs. The opposition identifies itself with the residents of Sinop, where 
the NPP will be built. “We” also refers to the Turkish public: “Our” country is 
dragged towards a disaster without consultation with the “experts.”  
Assessment: The referents of policy-making should be public health and 
safety. NPPs emit lethal doses of radiation and have frequent accidents. The site is 
unsuitable with respect to safety. The NPP is taken as a facility with a high 
probability of radiation risk and irreversible consequences for life. 
 
 
7.2.1.1. “Waste is an unresolved and a serious problem without a solution 
for the foreseeable future.” 
 
IIPNW: 
 
Every nuclear power station converts uranium fuel rods through nuclear fission into 
highly radioactive nuclear waste. Nuclear waste constitutes a life-threatening hazard 
because of its radioactive emissions. Therefore, people, animals and plants need to 
be protected for several hundreds of thousands of years. Nuclear power stations 
have been in operation for some 50 years but to date no one knows how nuclear 
waste can ultimately be stored. Worldwide there is not one safe and secure disposal 
option for the highly radioactive waste produced by nuclear power stations. In the 
short period of time that nuclear power has been used, it is leaving behind - in the 
shape of the resultant nuclear waste - a dead hand of historical dimensions for the 
Earth. If prehistoric man had already had nuclear power stations we would even 
today still be having to maintain a watch over his waste. 580 
 
Tacidar Seyhan, CHP Adana MP:  
 
OK, but what will you do with the waste?... Why is the world thinking about waste 
without any solution?... There is no single nuclear waste [in Arizona], why not? Is it 
only the reaction of the public? No. They could not solve the issue 
technologically…581  
 
                                               
580 “International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign,” 2006. 
581 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103rd Session, May 8, 2007. 
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Declaration of Scientists Against Nuclear Power Plants: 
 
1. [T]he nuclear power plant accidents and radioactive wastes, … are the main 
sources of harmful radioactive emissions…are among the riskiest in the… scientific 
scale, and it is not observable and not controllable.   
2. [This] radiation is unobservable, thus its effects are not detected in a short 
time…, therefore, [it leaves] the society … under threat… It is alarming because it 
cannot be controlled; it is catastrophic worldwide with lethal consequences, 
dangerous for future generations…  
3. The biggest risk is about waste management. (…) [T]he technology to manage 
the waste without risks has not yet been developed. Therefore, these wastes are sold 
to some states with high costs. Only this can prove why the nuclear lobby has 
chosen our country. Those who want to establish nuclear power plants should also 
explain how they will manage radioactive waste.582  
 
Presupposition: All that nuclear power generation produces is waste, which 
lasts for a long time and is lethal. Radioactive decay will not reach safe levels even 
after thousands of years. Nuclear lobby sees Turkey as a lucrative market. Despite all 
drawbacks, if the NPP is established, waste will stand as a pressing issue, because 
there is no final solution yet. The residents of Arizona reacted the waste repository 
under the Yucca Mountain. More importantly, the technology is insufficient to 
manage the waste without threatening public health and safety. 
Predication: “Nuclear waste” is constructed as a “threat” to human health and 
“a profitable asset.” It is predicated as “dangerous for future generations,” “the 
riskiest,” “unmanageable,” but profitable. The level of its radioactivity is 
“unobservable” and “uncontrollable.” It can result in “catastrophic consequences.”  
Subject positioning: Nuclear power is equated with the problem of waste. 
Waste is positioned in relation of similarity to “a dead hand of historical dimensions 
for the Earth.” The “prehistoric man” constructs “the huge difference” between the 
length of the time that nuclear waste needs to be controlled versus the shortness of 
time during which nuclear power is useful. It, thus, constructs the “high” cost and 
“meager” benefit of having NPPs. Nuclear waste will not only threaten “us” at 
present, but “our future.” “We” have to prevent this. The “Scientists” are experts on 
                                               
582 “Biliminsanlarından Nükleer Karşıtı Bildiri (Declaration of Scientists Against Nuclear),” 2007. 
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the dangers and drawbacks of nuclear power plants, whereas “those who want to 
establish NPPs” act only on interest and are immoral. Therefore, scientists are 
superior to decisionmakers. 
Assessment: Waste is constructed as “lethal,” because it is highly radioactive. 
Radiation is hard to detect and control. Therefore, when an NPP is established, it will 
threaten the lives of not only the residents, but also of future generations because of 
the unresolved issue of waste disposal. 
 
 
7.2.1.2. “Turkey’s administrative structure exacerbates the risk.” 
 
TMMOB:  
 
Since the increase in safety coefficients increase costs, it is not hard to predict that 
in developing countries like us, [there will be a] tendency to decrease costs by 
keeping safety criteria at low levels. Insurance companies cover only a small portion 
of the damages caused by nuclear accidents.583 
 
Meral Tamer:  
 
If I were Finnish, I would not have any objection to nuclear power plant, because: 
The Finnish… know how to operate a nuclear power plant. The government is 
transparent; it does not work behind closed doors. It has the habit and responsibility 
to be accountable to its public.584  
 
 
Declaration of Scientists: 
 
4. …there is no definition of nuclear crime and punishment in the Turkish legal 
documents… The allowed dose of radiation in Turkey is four times as much in the 
United States, 3.3 times in Germany and twice as much of Britain. Turkey managed 
the Chernobyl Accident with a regulation allowing five times as much of these 
doses. 
5. Our country… cannot observe the risks on the environment and health generated 
by nuclear power plants, cannot evaluate, manage, communicate, recognize, control 
them, and cannot protect the society against the harmful effects of radiation. 
6. (…) TAEK … is open to political influence. It is disadvantageous for our 
country… that this agency is the single high authority to license nuclear energy 
investments. 
                                               
583 TMMOB Press Release, September 15, 2008. 
584 Meral Tamer, “Çinli olsaydım nükleer santrale ‘evet’ derdim (If I were Chinese, I would say Yes 
to the NPP),” Milliyet, June 28, 2006, <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/06/28/yazar/tamer.html>.  
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7. (…) The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports issued by the Ministry 
of Environment does not protect the society in general and the ecosystem, it is rather 
a showpiece… The enterprise does not conform to EIA, but the EIA is rendered 
compatible with it… 
8. (…) The risks posed by nuclear power plants… are higher because of the 
incomplete and insufficient infrastructure of our country.  
It is evident that the DPT, Energy Ministry, BOTAŞ, TEAŞ, TAEK and DSİ … are 
uncoordinated, and that what we are having is indeed an “energy management 
crisis”…585  
 
Presupposition: Turkey is a developing country, does not know how to 
operate an NPP, its government is not transparent and does not have a tradition of 
accountability. Developing countries do not have enough funds to maintain 
appropriate safety and insurance levels. The nuclear power plant issue is not tackled 
properly, because it is only handled by the energy élite and the government. The 
parties which should be involved are excluded from the decision-making process. 
Nuclear crime and its punishment should be legally recognized. Western countries 
should be taken as yardstick, because they are more concerned about human life. 
Good governance is possible only by democracy. Nuclear energy is not environment-
friendly.  
Predication: The Finnish “are capable of operating an NPP,” and have a 
transparent and accountable” government. Turkey “does not have sufficient 
regulations for ensuring nuclear safety,”  “is not capable of maintaining statistics,” 
issues EIA reports as “showpieces,” and overall lack the infrastructure for properly 
establishing and operating a nuclear power plant, or meeting the safety standards.  
Subject Positioning: By referring to Finland, Meral Tamer compares the 
system in Finland and Turkey. She positions Turkey in an inferior position in terms 
of appropriately operating a nuclear power plant. Scientists use “We” to construct 
their identity as those who care about their country. It is “our” duty to present “you,” 
the uninformed community, the facts about nuclear power plants, because 
                                               
585 Nükleer Santral Karşıtı Bilim İnsanları Bildirisi (Declaration of Scientists Against Nuclear Power 
Plants), 10 March 2007. 
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decisionmakers do not and cannot. “We” are concerned about the environment, 
health and the future of “our” society, but the government is not. Technical personnel 
are pitted against bureaucratic/political, where the former is superior regarding NPPs. 
Assessment: Turkey’s political culture and technical insufficiency render it 
an incapable country to assess, prevent or deal with the risks and dangers of NPPs 
and radiation; therefore the risk will be multiplied in the case of Turkey. 
 
 
7.2.1.3. “Chernobyl is the proof of the threat.” 
 
The Chernobyl nuclear accident was a real example of NPP failure, and it 
affected particularly the Black Sea region-the environment, agriculture, economy, 
and more importantly human health. The resentment and protests against the choice 
of Sinop for an NPP site were inevitable, because the residents had developed an 
“image” through Chernobyl.  
 
IPPNW:  
 
As the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl shows, a major worst-case scenario nuclear 
incident can be expected to cause several thousand fatalities.586 
 
 
Engin Altay:  
 
We could not yet rid ourselves of the Chernobyl syndrome, the syndrome of a 
catastrophe which took place twenty years ago. [Y]ou do not have the right to put 
the entire Black Sea region into a new syndrome…587  
 
TMMOB:  
 
In the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, we once again warn the 
government: Turkish people should not be left under threat as a result of the 
pressures of nuclear lobbies.588 
                                               
586 “International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign,” 2006. 
587 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year, 91st Session, April 20, 2006. 
588 TMMOB Press Release, September 15, 2008. 
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Presupposition: All nuclear power plants pose accident risk, like Chernobyl, 
so all of them are threat to life. 
Predication: Chernobyl was “a catastrophe,” “the evidence of a worst-case 
scenario that would result in several thousand fatalities” and created the perception 
that “all NPPs threaten health and safety.” 
Subject Positioning: “We,” the residents of Sinop, are affected by 
Chernobyl’s consequences, and “our” memories are fresh. “You” are immoral and 
under the influence of “nuclear lobbies” and will create a new fear by establishing 
NPPs in the Black Sea region. “We” are under the domination of the “powerful.” 
Assessment: A catastrophic accident like Chernobyl is probable and all NPPs 
are accident-prone. The site chosen for the establishment of the NPP in Turkey is in 
the Black Sea region, which suffered the impacts of radiation in 1986 onwards, and 
the residents acquired the “Chernobyl syndrome.” The referent is human life, and it 
is superior to all interests, most notably corporate. 
Politicizing and securitizing processes are relatively easy for audiences who 
are more receptive to hear about the risks and threats to their survival. The risks to 
life are intolerable in case of an accident or a leakage. For the uninformed laymen, 
technical details of NPPs for safety measures remain under the shadow of 
“Chernobyl effect” and the administrative history of their home country. The 
common discourse of “threat” to security takes human health, environment and the 
economy with references to tourism or agriculture. The repeated predicates for NPP 
and nuclear energy are “dangerous, risky and dirty.” References to the “sacrifice” of 
human health and environment in return for “political gains,” create reaction against 
policymakers or “lobbies,” and mobilize the audience to oppose the project.  
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7.2.1.4.  “Nuclear technology is a step for nuclear weapons production.” 
 
IIPNW: 
 
Those countries which have developed and built nuclear bombs in recent decades 
began with a civil nuclear program. However, these civil programs were often only 
a cover for their military interests and provided them with access to the technologies 
and know-how for the design of nuclear bombs. This fact shows that the export and 
further proliferation of nuclear technology significantly increases the risk of nuclear 
weapons proliferation.589 
 
Arif Künar, Member of Electrical Engineers’ Chamber, Energy 
Commission: 
 
It is possible to divide those who support nuclear technology in our country into two 
main categories. (…) The second group,…is composed of… various right/left-wing 
nationalist or religious fundamentalist groups or parties, who seem to advocate 
nuclear technology with “innocent” reasons, but essentially aspire to have only 
“nuclear capability,” “nuclear weapons,” and “atomic bombs…” Included in this 
category are those who perceive nuclear weapons as an instrument of their greed for 
power, or who envy Iran’s defiance of the United States, and want to assume the 
leadership of the “World of the Oppressed.”590 
 
Greenpeace: 
 
As opposed to what the nuclear industry tries to make us believe, the proposed 
nuclear power plants …will cost billions of dollars, produce thousands of tons of 
high-level radiation, will increase the risk of nuclear proliferation due to the 
production of nuclear weapon raw material…591 
 
Presupposition: Proliferation is a threat, it should be prevented, and all civil 
programs carry proliferation risk. The pursuit of nuclear energy is irrational, because 
a risky, dirty and expensive facility will be established. Also, this is a technology of a 
weapon that threatens the entire humanity. Some supporters of the nuclear energy 
program view it as a latent capability: Although not pronounced, this is their main 
aim. The pursuit of nuclear weapons is out of greed, and it blocks rationality. They 
aspire to use them as instruments to attain regional leadership. The nationalist and 
                                               
589 “International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign,” 2006. 
590 Arif Künar, “Nükleer Santral Macerası Artık Bitmeli, Türkiye’nin Önü Daha Fazla 
Tıkanmamalıdır (The Nuclear Adventure Should End, Turkey Should not be Blocked Anymore),” 
Elektrik Mühendisliği (Electrical Engineering), Vol. 425, February 2005, p. 52, 
<http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/f61408e3afb633e_ek.pdf?dergi=4>. 
591 “Chernobyl,” Greenpeace, (Date accessed: January 13, 2010), 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/chernobyl/>. 
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religious fundamentalist groups want to gain support and legitimacy through nuclear 
power programs and hidden agendas. The nuclear industry tries to make people 
believe in the benefits of nuclear energy; however their costs overwhelm the benefits.  
Predication: Those who support nuclear energy to attain nuclear capability are 
“nationalist” or “fundamentalist.” They perceive nuclear weapons as instruments for 
“power” and “leadership” by which they can gain status among the “world of the 
oppressed,” and defy the United States.  
Subject Positioning: NPPs are constructed as objects equal to facilities for 
nuclear weapons production. “We” are the opposition, and the nuclear industry is the 
“other” which tries to deceive “us” in order to pursue its interests. 
Assessment: Nuclear weapons are irrelevant for the maintenance of external 
security (as deterrents or defense capabilities), and they threaten international 
security. Proliferation should be prevented. As nuclear power plants also produce the 
raw material for the manufacture of these weapons, they are risky for security. The 
risk of proliferation is constituted as a cost that significantly exceeds the benefits of 
nuclear energy. Nuclear technology will inevitably drive states to proliferation, not 
only for bolstering military capabilities, but also for status and prestige.  
 
 
7.2.2. “Nuclear power plants/nuclear energy are disadvantageous: Their 
contribution compared to cost is very low.” 
 
IPPNW: 
 
The human race can easily do without nuclear power's marginal contribution. The 
risks of nuclear accidents, production of highly radioactive waste and the costs 
necessary for its disposal, bear no rational relationship to the slight short-term gain 
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in energy that nuclear power provides. Nuclear power is both hazardous and 
superfluous. 592 
 
Sedat Uzunbay, CHP Izmir MP:  
 
The argument that nuclear-generated electricity is cheap is sheer fabrication. The 
cost of investment, operation and nuclear waste management expenditures reflected 
onto unit electricity is extremely high. In short, nuclear-generated electricity will be 
the most expensive, considering these facts… It is not possible to use the uranium 
and thorium that is present in our country in nuclear power plants. These NPPs use 
enriched uranium, and Turkey does not have enrichment facilities. In short, one can 
argue that Turkey does not have the energy resources that nuclear reactors need. So, 
NPPs are totally dependent on foreign sources. Thus, NPPs will increase our 
dependence.593 
 
Turkish Medical Association: 
 
It is asserted that there is enough uranium enough for nuclear power plants in our 
country. However, … [it is] enough to meet the annual fuel for a 1000 MW nuclear 
power plant. As a result, our dependency will continue in terms of fuel and 
technology…Nuclear energy is not cheap as argued; to the contrary, it is the most 
expensive. … Since their initial investment and normal operational costs are quite 
high, nuclear power plants, within their 30-35 years of time, produce energy with 
high costs due to prevalent accidents, out-of-service and maintenance costs. To 
these unit costs, if we add unaccounted costs, like decommissioning, closure, 
control and waste- which is still without a solution in the world-, we come across to 
awesome numbers.594  
 
Presupposition: The benefits of nuclear energy are exaggerated. Nuclearists 
paint an unproblematic picture for nuclear energy, but it is costly. Energy policies 
should address dependency and choose options with affordable prices and costs to 
maintain economic security. 
Predication: Nuclear energy is predicated as “providing slight short-term 
gains,” “hazardous and superfluous,” has problems with the domestic fuel supply, 
thus totally dependent on foreign sources, “expensive,” “unable to meet the unit costs 
in proposals,” and has “unaccounted costs of decommissioning, closure, control and 
waste.” 
                                               
592 “International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign,” 2006. 
593 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
594 “Hadi Deprem ‘Doğal Felaketti, Ya Nükleer Santral (The Earthquake was a ‘natural disaster,’ what 
about the nuclear power plant?),” 2010. 
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Subject positioning: The “estimates” of nuclearists are positioned inferior to 
those of the “experts” because the former is based on incomplete data and 
subjectivity, while the latter includes all items of costs and is objective. 
Assessment: Electricity generation via nuclear energy is has little benefits 
compared to its costs. Therefore, it becomes an irrational policy option. Nuclear 
power generation is likely to disrupt economic balances because of the high costs at 
every level.  
 
7.2.2.1. “There are other viable alternatives to nuclear energy: 
Renewables and Saving/efficiency.” 
 
IPPNW: 
 
…In just a few decades, nuclear power industry’s fuel reserves will run out.  (…) 
[V]arious world energy scenarios show that the climate problem can only be 
addressed by the use of renewable forms of energy in conjunction with efficient and 
economical energy technologies… Nuclear power is capital intensive while 
renewable forms of energy are labor (job) intensive. (…) [T]he rapid expansion of a 
world solar energy industry is an important step towards preventing wars over 
scarce resources such as oil, gas and uranium. 595 
 
Declaration of Scientists: 
 
The solution to climate change is not nuclear power plants…Building nuclear power 
plants as the remedy to climate change is to choose the worse over bad… [O]ur 
country has …natural, and abundant, sufficient, national, clean and renewable energy 
resources like hydroelectric, wind, solar, biomass, bio-fuel, biogas, national 
technologies of energy production and a great potential for energy conservation.   
 
 
Sedat Uzunbay:  
 
We can decrease loss and theft, and increase the efficiency of the operating plants. 
We can try to increase energy efficiency in household and industrial 
consumption.596 
 
Presupposition: Fossil fuels are not consumed efficiently. Since the raw 
material for nuclear power is scarce, it will share the same fate as fossil fuels; so it is 
                                               
595 “International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign,” 2006. 
596 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 3rd Legislative Year, 39th Session, December 24, 
2004. 
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not predictable. Climate change is a “problem” that needs a solution. Nuclear energy 
does have alternatives, and they are renewables. The share of renewables will 
eventually increase as a result of measures to slow down climate change. Fossil fuels 
and uranium are non-renewable, thus they have more potential to engender conflict. 
In contrary, renewables are not going to deplete, so they can prevent conflict out of 
scarcity. The domestic capacity of renewables is sufficient to meet Turkey’s energy 
demand, and they will benefit the country. Loss and theft ratio in the energy supply 
figures can become zero. Eliminating “loss and theft” and saving energy are the 
perfect “substitutes” for NPPs, because they will provide the same percentage of 
energy. 
Predication: Nuclear power is predicated with “expiring reserves,” and 
generating fewer jobs compared to other energy resources. Renewable energy 
industries are “labor-intensive.”  
Subject positioning: Renewables are positioned superior to fossil fuels and 
nuclear energy in terms of addressing climate change and of employment. They are 
also “peaceful resources,” since they do not cause resource conflict. “We” refers to 
the public represented by MPs, who have the capability to come up with less costly 
measures to ensure supply security. “Renewables” “decreasing the loss and theft 
ratio” and “saving” are constituted as substitutes for the “increase in total energy 
supply” the government expects to get from the NPPs. 
Assessment: This argument renders obsolete the proponents’ view that nuclear 
power is a necessity: It acknowledges Turkey’s energy shortage, but prescribes the 
amelioration of the infrastructure, the use of existing resources, and the modification 
of consumer behavior towards conserving energy. It runs parallel to the international 
environmentalist discourse that favors “small scale” energy investments that harm 
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the environment less instead of mega projects that are perceived to be risky for the 
environment.  
 
 
7.2.3. “Decisionmakers are irrational.” 
 
Just like the proponents, opponents make extensive use of the rationality 
discourse, and talk about science and technical “facts” to support their cases. 
Accordingly, the decision not only jeopardizes the interests of the country, but also 
threatens the citizens and the environment. Among the opposition, various groups 
consider NPPs dangerous by themselves and not even as an option in any energy 
policy. Some others argue about the handicaps in the government’s strategy to pursue 
nuclear energy. For the first group, the quest for nuclear energy is an act of 
irrationality by itself; for the latter, the decisionmakers act irrationally, immorally or 
irresponsibly about the technical, economic and legal infrastructure they have to 
establish before attempting to build NPPs.  
 
 
7.2.3.1. “Decisionmakers are insufficient. They do not work with experts. 
So, they are irrational.” 
 
The Declaration of Scientists against Nuclear Power Plants: 
  
The [issue of] nuclear power is a technical subject that involves all branches of 
science and concerns all interest groups of the society,… [It includes issues like] 
technology, site selection, …impacts on health and environment, … dependency on 
foreign sources, …the elimination of radioactive waste, decommissioning and the 
cost estimates of the above. That is why, we, who provide professional education 
and consultancy organizations… and as the experts, consider it as our duty to share 
… our knowledge and views …, for a healthy and safe society and its future… The 
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decision to make nuclear power plants in Turkey is not a scientific but a political 
choice….597 
 
Tacidar Seyhan, CHP Adana MP:  
 
[The decision for nuclear energy] has nothing to do with rationality, logic, 
modernity, reformist thinking or looking forward…598  
 
Turkish Medical Association:  
 
The decision for the nuclear adventure is too vital to be taken by a handful 
politicians and bureaucrats behind closed doors, by discarding the local people, 
scientific communities, associations and civil society organizations.599  
 
Presupposition: Policymakers should consider the interests and concerns 
of citizens, civil society and scientific communities regarding nuclear energy. The 
supporters must have other interests, because rational people would not support 
nuclear energy. It is the responsibility of the civil society to be against NPPs, and 
it should issue a warning. The undertaking for nuclear power is an adventure. 
Since politicians do not consult with experts and scientists, their decision must be 
flawed. They should choose nuclear power on a technical and scientific basis. 
Turkey has an energy problem. The government should make policies on a 
rational and logical basis in conformity with modernity and forward-looking 
vision. The process should include several experts from different disciplines. If a 
decision is taken in accordance with the interests of the bureaucracies and not of 
the citizens, then it is a political choice. Nuclear power generation is such a 
sensitive issue that decisions taken only by politicians make them too risky to 
implement.  
Predication: Experts “provide professional education and consultancy.” They 
are responsible to share their knowledge with the public. Policymakers are irrational, 
illogical, old-fashioned, and lack a forward-looking vision. 
                                               
597 The Declaration of Scientists Against Nuclear Power Plants, March 10, 2007.  
598 General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103th Session, May 8, 2007. 
599 “Hadi Deprem ‘Doğal Felaketti, Ya Nükleer Santral (The Earthquake was a ‘natural disaster,’ what 
about the nuclear power plant?),” 2010. 
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Subject Positioning: “We” constructs the scientists, as the medicals, experts 
and concerned citizens, as opposed to “policymakers” who take decisions with 
“political motives” and not science. Science is superior to politics, because it is 
objective and the latter is subjective. That is to say politics can easily divert from 
rationality that is acceptable to all. Therefore, “We,” experts, are superior to 
politicians in terms of decisions that involve technical matters. 
Assessment:  The decision is questionable from the beginning, because 
rationalities of those who are in charge of taking it are shaped by political concerns, 
and not by objective scientific criteria. Policymakers are constructed as subjective 
actors, and nuclear energy as an “irrational choice.” Science as the basis of 
knowledge and objectivity is a powerful argument to construct reality. The relevance 
of science is embedded in the culture and reiterated in Ataturk’s dictum that “the best 
guide in life is science.” 
 
7.2.3.2. “Nuclear energy risks human life; decisionmakers are 
undemocratized and immoral.” 
 
Engin Altay: 
 
The statement of the Prime Minister to establish a NPP in Sinop is, primarily, very 
undemocratic. In all developed countries which we take as an example-Japan, 
Austria, Sweden, Germany and the United States…such a vital issue cannot be 
imposed on the people of Sinop without consulting with the residents. And you 
won’t be able to impose it. Your power will not be enough to sacrifice the people of 
Sinop just because they have low population…600  
 
 
Vahit Çekmez, CHP Mersin MP:  
 
…Mr. Minister … shows various examples with people enjoying the sea next to an 
NPP. My concern here is the lack of responsibility, and the public health that would 
be sacrificed at the expense of political gains.601  
 
                                               
600 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year, 91st Session, April 20, 2006. 
601 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 5th Legislative Year, 103rd Session, May 8, 2007.  
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Mustafa Özyürek, CHP Istanbul MP: 
  
[T]he [party] program [of the AKP] includes the phrase, “environment-friendly 
nuclear power plant.” (...) There is no environment-friendly nuclear power plant… 
NPPs are NPPs, and in the past all environmentalist, all conscious people 
struggled… against the establishment of the NPP in Akkuyu… and prevented it 
until today. Now, if that plant will be established with an environmentalist pretext 
by those who will earn money out of it, we have always been, and we will be 
against such attempts, against these power plants that will turn Turkey into hell. 
[The CHP] is for environmentalism, social justice, equality and we are in front of 
our public with our philosophy which takes “human first.”602  
 
Presupposition: NPPs are definitely dangerous and will damage the 
environment. Those who have been against NPPs are conscious of its risks and 
dangers. The only reason to endorse these risks could be material gain, and it will be 
at the expense of the environment and public health. Human life is superior to 
political and economic interests. 
Predication: The CHP is “environmentalist,” observes “social justice and 
equality,” and, takes humans as the primary referent of policymaking. 
Subject Positioning: The CHP and the ruling AKP are at opposition. The 
AKP is “inferior” because it is unaware of facts, and has surrendered to corporate 
interests. “We” refers to the CHP. Its referents are humans and environment, not 
bureaucratic or economic interests. 
Assessment: Decisionmakers are idealized as ethical subjects who should 
take human life as their priority, and not bureaucratic or political interests. NPPs 
threaten human life, so the nuclear energy decision must be taken on the basis of 
personal or bureaucratic interests. Thus, the government sacrificed human life, and is 
“immoral.” In addition, the government is constructed as “undemocratic” because it 
did not consult with the residents “whose life will be at risk” should an NPP is built 
in their vicinity.  
 
                                               
602 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 1st Legislative Year, 52nd Session, March 21, 2003. 
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7.2.3.3. “The shortage scenario is exaggerated: The issue is not defined 
accurately.” 
 
Mehmet Soğancı, Chairman of TMMOB: 
 
None of the exaggerated demand estimates of the Energy Ministry after the 1980s 
turned out… [T]he government which presents nuclear power plants as solutions to 
the probable energy crises indeed knows well: For years, there are scenarios of 
remaining in the dark, but for some reason, our country does not remain in darkness. 
The government… knows well that the solution to these scenarios is not nuclear 
plants. For their share will only be 5% of the existing power generation. 603  
 
Sedat Uzunbay: 
 
Mr. Minister previously stated that there would be a bottleneck in energy in 2006; 
then, he changed [his mind] and the bottleneck was postponed to 2010: Error in 
estimates, four years. Second…for the year 2005 the electricity demand would be 
197 billion kWh; but the target in 2004 is 145 billion kW/h: Error in estimate, by 
difference of a year, is 35%. Our Minister now says that, under the low scenario, in 
the year 2010, that is, five years from now, the electricity demand will rise by 50%. 
These estimates are no longer convincing, Mr. Minister. What we have suffered 
were all due to these estimates.604 
 
Turkish Medical Association: 
 
All energy supply-demand scenarios prepared by official institutions in the 1970s 
are erroneous by 2-3 times and are exaggerated. The decision put forward 
depending on these estimates and [the assumption that] nuclear power plants are 
“the single and obligatory” choice is not one that is technical or economic, but 
political, [that is] according to some people’s interests.605  
 
Presupposition: The Energy Ministry exaggerates data to construct the 
“threat” of darkness. The public needs “real” data to be convinced. There must be 
something that made the government to assign urgency to nuclear power plants. 
Numbers and facts are objective, and they prove the government’s exaggerations of 
the energy shortage. 
Predication: The government is “well-informed” that Turkey will not remain 
in the dark and the solution to the energy problem is not nuclear power plants, but it 
                                               
603 TMMOB Press Release, September 15, 2008.  
604 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 3rd Legislative Year, 39th Session, December 24, 
2004. 
605 “Hadi Deprem ‘Doğal Felaketti, Ya Nükleer Santral (The Earthquake was a ‘natural disaster,’ what 
about the nuclear power plant?),” 2010. 
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decides “according to the political interests of some people.” Energy crisis/shortage 
scenario is “exaggerated,” “based on flawed estimates,” and “unconvincing.” 
Subject Positioning: The estimates of Energy Ministry or official institutions 
are confronted with the “real facts” about the energy gap in relation of inferiority. 
“We” denotes Turkey and Turkish people, and they are constructed as those “without 
authority but suffering” from the decisions of “insufficient policymakers.” 
Assessment: The fact that there will be energy shortage is agreed upon, but 
the shortage is not as pressing as it is argued to make nuclear power as the “unique” 
solution. The argument constructs the energy gap as “tolerable” and not “urgent” as 
the proponents argue. 
 
 
7.2.3.4. “The (developed/rest of) the world is giving up nuclear, why is 
Turkey going after it?” 
 
Greenpeace: 
 
With their shocking effects, the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents created such a 
public suspicion that in all of the world, new orders for commercial reactors were 
suspended… Moreover, despite the talk of a nuclear renaissance, the new reactor orders did 
not match the high expectations.606 
 
Engin Altay: 
 
It is all open facts… Canada… didn’t it shut down its 7 plants? Germany… didn’t it convert 
the three of the four plants to natural gas? The United States: technology giant, patron of the 
world…did it establish a plant since 1979? The Asian tigers, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Vietnam… didn’t they suspend their nuclear project? Didn’t the EU states turn toward 
renewable energies? Isn’t it their aim to make narrow use of all nuclear power plants? Mr. 
Minister should sincerely answer these questions…607 
 
Mehmet Soğancı: 
 
While nuclear power plants are being given up in the entire world, why is the government so 
persistent in the establishment of nuclear power plants in Turkey? Their [aim] is not to 
                                               
606 Nükleer Güç, Enerji Güvensizliği (Nuclear Power, Energy Insecurity), Greenpeace, September 
2008, p. 6. 
607 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 4th Legislative Year, 91st Session, April 20, 2006. 
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address Turkey’s energy problem, but to make our country a market for the nuclear industry. 
The government which shapes all its policies according to the impositions of the United 
States, European Union, the IMF and the World Bank, instead of thinking our people and the 
country’s interests, is exposing once again our country’s citizens and livelihoods under threat 
with the impositions of the nuclear lobbies.608  
 
 
Presupposition: The accident risk in nuclear power reactors are so high that 
the expected increase in demand did not come to fruition. The developed world and 
the big energy consumer countries in Asia chose to make little use of nuclear power. 
There is an inconsistency between the global trends in energy and the policies of the 
Turkish government. The government prioritizes bureaucratic interests over the 
interests of the country and its citizens, because it cannot take independent decisions 
that would be to the benefit of the country. International interests do not care about 
national or public interests. Therefore, the nuclear decision was not given to the 
benefit of the country; instead it serves the economic interests of international 
lobbies which ally with governments. 
Predication: Nuclear power plants are “given up in the entire world,” 
indicated by the insufficient orders that do not match high expectations of nuclear 
renaissance. The government is in collaboration with the nuclear lobbies, does not 
think of the interests of the country and the citizens. It acts in accordance with the 
impositions of political and economic giants. 
Subject Positioning: The rest of the world (the developed world) is the 
benchmark for taking economically sound decisions. Since Turkey took a step in the 
opposite direction, it is irrational and inferior with respect to the developed world. 
Assessment: Rationality construction continues with reference to the 
behavior of the “rational” decisionmakers in the developed world. The “fact” that the 
                                               
608 Press Statement of Mehmet Soğancı, the Chairman of the Executive Board of TMMOB: See 
TMMOB Press Release, September 15, 2008. 
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rest of the world is giving up on nuclear power is constructed with the “data” that 
their interest to nuclear power is low.  
 
 
7.2.3.5. “The nuclear lobby influences decisionmakers.”  
 
Sedat Uzunbay:  
 
“What has changed; perhaps nuclear lobbies got involved.” 609 
 
IPPNW:  
 
In order to attribute significance to nuclear power, the nuclear industry repeatedly 
overstates nuclear energy’s share of electricity generation. If one examines closely 
what contribution nuclear energy makes to total worldwide energy consumption, it 
becomes evident that nuclear power is of practically no significance for mankind’s 
energy needs. 610 
 
Meral Tamer:  
 
…Nuclear lobby is in charge again… The weakest argument of the Energy Minister 
… was the NPP photographs he wanted to show me: “If only you saw those 
photographs, there are beaches right next to the power plant. People go to the sea, 
they fish…” Right there, I got suspicious that the nuclear lobby was in charge again. 
Indeed, as a journalist who made her first visit to a nuclear power plant 20 years 
ago, and who tried to watch the activities of the nuclear lobby in Turkey since mid-
80s, I already memorized those photographs. I even remember the CEO of the 
construction company wearing his bathing suit and swimming in the sea next to the 
nuclear plant.611  
 
Presupposition: NPPs are certainly dangerous, and governments decide under 
the influence of lobbies. If Turkey establishes NPPs, it will be “surrendering” to the 
interests of nuclear lobbies. 
Predication: Nuclear lobbies put pressure on Turkey and “overstate the share 
of nuclear energy in electricity generation” to make it more attractive for 
governments. The Turkish government is influenced by nuclear lobbies, because the 
                                               
609 TGNA General Board Minutes, 22nd Term, 3rd Legislative Year, 39th Session, December 24, 
2004. 
610 International Nuclear Power Fact File Poster Campaign, 2006. 
611 Meral Tamer, “Enerji Bakanı Hilmi Güler’e nükleer sorular (Nuclear Questions to the Energy 
Minister Hilmi Güler),” Milliyet, July 2, 2004, 
<http://www.milliyet.com/2004/07/02/yazar/tamer.html>. 
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Minister of Energy uses the same medium to convince people of the advantages and 
safety of NPPs. 
 Subject Positioning: Nuclear lobbies are powerful and influence domestic 
decisionmakers. They are given the same identity. The government is also 
constructed in opposition to its own country, in terms of prioritizing bureaucratic 
interests. Therefore, it is alienated from its citizens, and their decision on nuclear 
energy becomes “irrational.” 
Assessment: The minds and deeds of decisionmakers are manipulated by the 
propaganda of corporate interests, and impair their rationality. Accordingly, even if 
supply shortage may be a fact, nuclear power should not have been the choice. 
International firms united their interests with those of local policymakers who might 
have tackled the energy shortage issue in good faith. 
Similar to the proponents’ construction of the “other” as “irrational”, the 
opponents try to construct the supporters of nuclear power and decisionmakers 
irrational, incapable or undemocratized on the basis of the “fact” that nuclear power 
is a threat to life and environment. Risks of production are represented mainly by 
radiation that could be leaked from nuclear power plants anytime and/or by 
accidents.  
 
 
7.2.4. “Anti-nuclearism is an effort for an alternative world to the 
capitalist system with alternative resources.” 
 
The “Ekoloji Kollektifi” (The Ecology Collective), in its “Call to the Anti-
nuclearists,” establishes linkage between environmentalism and anti-nuclearism with 
changing the capitalist- liberal economic system and right-wing policies: 
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If, for the ecology movement, anti-nuclearism will continue to be the title for 
creating an alternative world, it should criticize the current civilization, display it 
and to “get even with” it… In the broader sense, anti-nuclear movement should 
focus on creating an alternative to the capitalist and industrial civilization that is 
maintained by energy consumption. (…) Saying “No” to nuclear energy implies the 
necessity to create a new production and consumption pattern… Alternative energy 
can only be possible with an alternative society… In today’s world, where nuclear 
programs have become a function of the “exploitation economies” … energy 
policies based on nuclear energy precipitates the impoverishment of people and 
degradation of the environment. … [N]uclear power means colonialization. (…) The 
“nuclear power plant civilization” means poverty and doom. (…) The demand is 
“No to nuclear energy; free and clean energy to meet everybody’s needs.” This is an 
appeal for the “communitization of energy.” The slogan “No to Nuclear” rejects 
relations of dominance and exploitation within the prevailing developmental, 
economic and governance approaches. It will be possible by a policy of solidarity, 
equality and the will to create an ecological society.”612 
 
 
The Found for the Preservation of Turkey’s Nature -Antalya Branch:  
 
The Nuclear Law… is uncivilized, just like the uncivilized administrations [that 
exercise power] over women, environment and the economy, and is far from 
humanity [and] environment-friendliness…613 
 
Emet Değirmenci: 
 
First of all, we need to look at the hierarchical/centralized structure of the power 
that wants to keep the sovereignty/exploitation of the nuclear industry when we 
argue against nuclear power or the logic that wants to erect an atomic plant in 
Akkuyu today. (…) …[U]nless [we] get rid of the mindset from which this 
hierarchical power emanates, centralized giant structures will always prevail in our 
world. The exploitation of human over human, the sovereign relationship of man 
over woman, the old over the young will always continue. For, although energy is 
recyclable, if the logic favors sovereign relations, … giant solar panels, biomass 
plants or wind turbines of kilometers will continue to scare us. For, when a 
prevailing power comes and turns off the switches, what could those [people] on the 
… mountains do? In fact, as socialists, we do not want mammoth-fancy complex 
structures like the symbols of the Stalin period in Russia. We want to put into action 
solutions that are local, the techniques of which could be understood and used by 
the public, technologies that would not feed relations of domination and those that 
are far from bureaucratic structures.614  
 
Presupposition: Social movements that take the environment and ecology as 
their focus should place themselves in the left of the political spectrum, because 
environmental degradation is the result of the capitalist economic system. Anti-
                                               
612 “Nükleer Karşıtlarına Çağrımızdır! (Our Call to the Anti-nuclearists),” The Ecology Collective, 
February 24, 2006. 
613 “AKP Hükümet’nin Yaptığı Nükleer Yasa’nın Meşruiyeti Yoktur! (The Nuclear Law of the AKP 
Government does not have Legitimacy) ,” Press Release, The Fund for the Preservation of Turkey’s 
Nature -Antalya Branch, May 9, 2007. 
614 Emet Değirmenci, “Toplumsal Ekoloji Perspektifinden Nükleer Endüstri,” in Künar, “Don 
Quichottes against Akkuyu…,” 2002, p. 256.  
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nuclearism is the back-bone of these movements: It implies “the necessity to create a 
new production and consumption relationship.” Capitalist economy results in 
“dominance” and “exploitation.” “Alternative energy” is “environment-friendly,” 
and further implies an “alternative world” to the capitalist one. Domination over the 
weak by the strong is an indication of lack of modernity. Civilized/modern societies 
observe the rights of the lower strata, as well as the environment, which is exploited. 
Nuclear power is promoted by the hierarchical/centralized structure of power which 
wants to maintain its position. The word “erect” instead of “establish” indicates an 
unfavorable action. Giant structures of hierarchy and domination want such giant 
structures of electricity generation, therefore they should be eliminated. To put an 
end to exploitation, energy generation systems should not pave the way for 
domination, but should be local and easy to use.  
Predication: Nuclear energy “is a function of exploitation economy,” 
“precipitates the impoverishment of people and the degradation of the environment;” 
it “means the same with colonialization,” which is directly related to the “survival of 
environment and communities.” Nuclear power plants are the products of 
“centralized giant structures power” that produce such structures of power 
generation. Local structures of energy generation are the “solutions” to the energy 
problem, their “technologies are intelligible to the public,” and they do not serve the 
interests of the centralized structures of power. 
Subject Positioning: Nuclear energy is positioned similar to dominance and 
anti-nuclear is accepted equal to the rejection of dominance. Accordingly, those who 
argue for nuclear energy would support colonialization, dominance and exploitation. 
The government is identified with an “uncivilized administration.” Local, small, and 
simple structures of power generation are superior to giant and complex structures.  
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Assessment: The referents of the ecologists and anti-nuclearists are humans 
and the environment. They are under the “risk” of nuclear power plants, and are 
“exploited” by the inequality that is reinforced by the capitalist world economy. 
Nuclear power rests at the heart of the system championed by the “powerful and 
dominant capitalist, right-wing polity,” and perpetuates their power. The ecological 
society is equated with equity, living in harmony with the environment, and new 
relations of production. When production pattern changes, so will consumption. To 
transform the world to an ecological society, nuclear energy should be abandoned.  
 
7.3. Evaluation 
 
The above analysis revealed the “constitutive stories”/narratives of both sides: 
The supporters structured their narrative so as to construct the “reality” that nuclear 
energy is an asset for state power in tangible and intangible terms (political, 
economic, environmental and with respect to prestige). Nuclear power plants should 
be established as soon as possible, because the absence of nuclear energy will leave 
the country in the “dark.” Nuclear energy will diversify the energy basket and will 
diffuse the country’s dependency on imported resources and their providers. The 
secure energy base and stable prices will boost economic growth, development and 
competitiveness of the country in international trade. Acquisition of nuclear 
technology will contribute to scientific and technological progress, and to Turkey’s 
international standing. Accordingly, it is “irrational” to be devoid of nuclear energy. 
Scientific and technical data also prove its advantages. Therefore, the opposition is 
“irrational:” They are either the representatives of international lobbies, are 
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misinformed or driven by ideology. The supporters take the state, the economy, and 
the environment (in terms of its use for economic and state security) as referents. 
As far as the positioning of subjects are concerned, the government is 
superior to the public, it knows the best, works for the best of the country, 
experienced, rational, so it has taken the best decision. Nuclear energy is superior to 
fossil fuels and renewables. Scientists, experts are superior to the public. The 
opposition is irrational. Economic growth and development are primary state 
interests, and they are superior to the protection of the environment. The 
environment should be protected as a base for economic growth.  
The dissenters’ narrative constructs nuclear power as a “threat:” Nuclear 
power generation is dangerous for human health and the environment due to the “risk 
of radiation” during operation, leakages, accidents, or waste disposal. Nuclear power 
plants carry “proliferation risk” and threaten economy and agriculture. Turkey’s 
political and scientific bases are insufficient to take appropriate measures to alleviate 
the risk: As a matter of fact the accident in Chernobyl is the proof that nuclear power 
plants are dangerous. Their meager contribution to power supply is incomparable to 
the threats and risks it poses. Renewable energy resources like solar and wind, saving 
and efficient use of energy would substitute the expected share of nuclear power in 
total energy supply. Decisionmakers are irrational, insufficient, immoral and 
undemocratic since they do not engage “experts” and the public into the decision-
making process in a project that directly affect humans and livelihood. The energy 
shortage estimates are flawed and exaggerated, thus, Turkey does not need to make 
huge investments for such a big project on energy. Decisionmakers are irrational 
because they do not follow up the “rest of the world” which gave up on nuclear 
power. Consequently, the decision on nuclear power was taken on the basis of 
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bureaucratic or individual interests which were influenced by nuclear lobbies. 
Decisionmakers with moral and democratic values would not put the lives of their 
citizens at risk for material gains. For anti-nuclearists, being against nuclear energy 
and nuclear weapons is an ideological position that seeks to create an alternative 
world to the capitalist system.  
The opponents’ positioning of subjects reveal that renewable resources are 
superior to nuclear power and public health and environment are superior to state 
power. The government and supporters of nuclear energy are irrational: 
Policymakers are immoral and undemocratized because they sacrifice human life in 
return for personal gain.  
The nuclear power debate is marked rather by a competition for 
rationalization of the position, than a preoccupation to find the scientific/technical 
facts. The arguments do not always rely on scientific data; they might be driven by 
disinformation or misinformation. The following chapter will look at what misses 
from the debate. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
FILLING IN THE GAPS 
 
 
 
The previous chapter analyzed the competing discourses on nuclear power in 
Turkey. However, some of these arguments contained technical mistakes or 
misrepresentations. This chapter will shed light on those mistakes and the missing 
issues from the debate. The narratives that construct the meaning of nuclear energy at 
times selected or ignored certain pieces of information to produce or reproduce a 
certain meaning. Actors might not question these “facts.” Thus, combing these 
misrepresentations, correcting them and including the missing points would facilitate 
the negotiation process. The first section will revisit the misrepresented “facts.”  
The previous chapter found that science and reference to experts are 
important tools to establish “reality” in the domestic context. The dissertation 
foresees the inclusion of academics in the critical engagement process. The second 
section will provide the multiple facets of “nuclear decision-making,” including 
political, economic, technological, and legal aspects. It will rely on the views of 
academics and experts on the legal and technical aspects of nuclear power 
generation. 
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Actors may present inaccurate information to an uninformed audience. They 
may use technical terms which leave the audience unable to check against reality. 
Ronald Bleiker, in his assessment of the United States’ construction of North Korea 
as a rogue state,615 points out to the language of defense analysts which became the 
most accepted, the most credible and rational way of assessing issues of security.  
 
Experts on military technologies have played an essential role in constructing North 
Korea as a threat… The political debate… is articulated in highly technical terms.” 
Non-experts “…often lack the technical expertise to verify the claims thus 
advanced, even though those claims are used to legitimize important political 
decisions. As a result, the techno-strategic language of defense analysis has 
managed to place many important security issues beyond the reach of political and 
moral discussions.616  
 
Technical language may obscure facts or misrepresent them, thereby 
affecting policy or public opinion. The following section will explore the distorted or 
misrepresented technical facts, which will also help to display what misses from the 
debate. 
 
 
8.1. “Facts” revisited:  
 
8.1.1. “The accident risk in a nuclear power plant is high.” 
 
Nuclear energy differs from fossil fuels in terms of its requirements for 
safety, particularly regarding the functioning of the reactor core and the disposal of 
radioactive waste. Environmental and anti-nuclear groups emphasize that the damage 
in the reactor core could result in catastrophes like the accident in Chernobyl in 1986. 
                                               
615 Bleiker, “A rogue is a rogue is a rogue…,” 2003. 
616 Ibid., p. 734. 
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They refer to the numerous minor accidents throughout the 1990s,617 and argue that 
the increase in the number of plants will increase the probability. Some figures do 
not represent facts appropriately, however. The IPPNW’s information note 
dramatically increases the probability rate and constructs the “risk” as intolerable: 
 
An accident could happen in any power station as a result of technical defect or 
human error, releasing large quantities of radioactivity into the environment. 
According to the official “German Nuclear Power Station Risk Study - Phase B,” a 
German nuclear power station in operation over some 40 years has a 0.1 percent 
probability of a worst-case scenario nuclear incident. In the European Union there 
are more than 150 operational nuclear power stations. The probability of a worst-
case scenario nuclear incident is around 16% in Europe. That equates to the chances 
of throwing a 6 with the first cast of the dice. Worldwide there are some 440 
operational nuclear power stations. The probability of a major worst-case scenario 
incident within the next 40 years is in the region of 40 percent. As the nuclear 
disaster in Chernobyl shows, a major worst-case scenario nuclear incident can be 
expected to cause several thousand fatalities. 
 
The term “worst-case scenario” refers to a case like Chernobyl that would 
discharge high-level radiation with catastrophic consequences. Advanced technology 
reactors involve safety structures and components such as containment structure for 
the reactor core that would prevent the release of high-level radiation to the 
environment, such as in Chernobyl. However, an accident may also be in the 
category of “severe accident” that exceeds the limits of the safety structures. If the 
probability rate of 0.1% is taken for “severe accidents”, then the mathematical 
formula for calculating the probability for, for example 150 nuclear power plants is 
not derived by simply multiplying 0.1% * 150= 15. In that case, if we had 1,000 
NPPs in Europe, we would have 100% probability of accident! As much as it is true 
that the more NPPs are constructed, the more the risk is, the calculation of the 
probability generates a much lower number.  
 
                                               
617 See “Calendar of Nuclear Accidents and Events,” Greenpeace, (date accessed, December 20, 
2009), <http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/nukes/chernob/rep02.html>. 
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8.1.2. “Saving and decreasing the loss and theft ratio will substitute the 
contribution of nuclear power.” 
 
This argument is widely used in the statements of the anti-nuclear groups. 
Energy gap is estimated according to the supply and demand at a certain point in the 
future. Energy demand forecasts are made according to the economic growth rate. 
For a period of a decade, estimates could have error margins depending on internal or 
external shocks to the economy and economic growth. As of 2007, Turkey’s installed 
capacity is 40,836 MW, and the consumption of electricity was 191,6 billion kWh. 
The Ministry estimates that according to the low scenario, the demand would be 
around 406 billion kWh, and 500 billion kWh according to the high scenario in the 
year 2020. The Ministry foresaw that the installed capacity should be doubled to 
meet the demand in the following decade.618 
In economics, the intersection of supply and demand curves of a commodity 
is called “equilibrium.” The diagram below shows a standard demand and supply 
curve determined by the price and quantity of the commodity. The point (Q1, P1) is 
the equilibrium. When there is a shock to the economy, which increases price, the 
quantity demanded decreases and moves to (Q2, P2) level. Here, there is a surplus if 
there is still Q1 amount of the commodity in the market. If the reverse occurred, then 
there would be a shortage of the commodity as in the point (Q3, P3). 
 
 
 
                                               
618 “Elektrik (Electricity),” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, May 20, 
2009, 
<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=elektrik&bn=219&hn=219&nm=384&i
d=386>. 
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Diagram 1. Supply and Demand 
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To talk about a gap in a certain period of time, the supply and demand curves 
should be depicted in a diagram with time and quantity in the axes, as shown in the 
second diagram: As the supply and demand are only forecasts for the future, the 
equilibrium may vary. The expectation is that the policy would provide that both 
curves run parallel to each other with the supply either overlapping or above the 
demand curve in order to prevent shortage. The outlook of Turkey’s supply and 
demand curves are depicted in Diagram 2. The difference between quantities 
demanded and supplied produces the shortage, that is, energy gap. Unless the supply 
increases through time, the gap will widen as shown in the difference between Q1 
and Q2. 
 
Diagram 2. Quantity demanded and supply of energy by time 
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In the case of Turkey, the demand is expected to increase within the 
parameters of a “developing country” and growing population, while the supply is 
expected to grow with a decreasing rate and to decrease considering climate change, 
decrease in the level of resources or incomplete use of capacity (unless new 
resources are included).619 The demand for energy may decrease with internal or 
external shocks to the economy like economic crises, decreasing employment and 
increasing prices. That is, the supply and demand curves may shift according to these 
shocks in the first diagram and re-determine the equilibrium. The first diagram 
applies to a relatively shorter period of time, whereas the second is what estimates 
are depicted on.  
Accordingly, the statement for increase/decrease in demand/supply and 
quantity demanded/supplied are not the same. The proposals for bringing down loss 
and theft miss the “price” as a variable to affect the quantity demanded and mix up 
the demand and supply of electricity. The ratio of loss and theft was 20% in 2002 and 
diminished to 14 %.620 Loss refers to that in transmission lines, and amelioration 
would certainly increase the supply of electricity. However, it is not possible to bring 
it down to zero for technical reasons. The theft ratio in Turkey is enormous (average 
is over 15%), particularly in Eastern and Southeastern regions: Almost 70% of the 
population use unaccounted electricity.621 However, it does not mean that if 
electricity theft is addressed, so will energy shortage. Theft refers to unregistered 
users of electricity, who use power without payment. So, when they are made 
                                               
619 “The 2006 Performance Report of the Energy Ministry,” 2006, p. 16. 
620 Former Minister of Energy Hilmi Güler’s remarks, “Güler: Elektrikte kayıp-kaçak oranı % 14'e 
düştü (Güler: The loss and theft ratio in electricity fell to 14 %),” Pal Haber, April 12, 2009, 
<http://www.palhaber.com/haber/ekonomi/ekonomi-genel/guler-elektrikte-kayip-kacak-orani-14-e-
dustu.html>. 
621 “Elektrikte 2.2 milyar YTL’lik kayıp-kaçak (2.2. billion YTL worth of loss and theft),” 
NTVMSNBC, June 16, 2008, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/450024.asp>. 
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registered users, their demand will decrease slightly, because they would have to pay 
a price for it. That is, the theft ratio may become zero, but it will not decrease the 
quantity demanded by the exact ratio of theft. For, they will still be using, that is, 
demanding electricity. So, the quantity demanded of the “new” users will be 
reflected to the demand curve which requires an equal amount in supply in order not 
to have a gap. The decrease in the demand for electricity will be a meager amount of 
saving from loss and theft instead of the total 20%. So, in absolute terms, the 
addition to power supply will not come mainly from decreasing the theft ratio, but 
the loss. The addition to the supply will come with the decrease in loss and the 
decrease in quantity demanded due to the “increase” in the price of electricity (from 
zero to the actual price). 
 
 
8.1.3. “Waste is a problem that is yet to be addressed.”  
 
Anti-nuclear groups highlight the “waste issue” to depict the costs and 
“threat” of nuclear power plants. They argue that the final disposal method or lieu is 
not definite yet, and Turkey should not be a waste dump. They perceive that until 
such a method is found, nuclear power is extremely dangerous. The main issue that 
misses from the debate is the question of “what to do with spent fuel,” that is, the 
fuel used up in the reactor. Nuclear fuel comes in the form of “assembly” of long, 
thin rods bundled together. When the reactor cannot be operated with the existing 
fuel, some of it is replaced by fresh fuel. The fuel that is taken out is called “spent 
fuel” in the form of long thin metallic rods. Other than that, there is no highly 
radioactive waste or emission from nuclear power plants. Around 95% of the spent 
fuel is uranium, 1% is plutonium (which is a potential explosive), and the remaining 
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4% is fission products and other actinides. Spent fuel is stored in water ponds. If the 
spent fuel is not reprocessed, it is by itself called High Level Waste (HLW). In the 
case of reactors using natural uranium, spent fuel contains weapons-grade Pu-239 
(the fuel contains U-238 that becomes Np-239, and which then turns into Pu-239) 
which can be diverted to misuse after being reprocessed. Some countries may sell 
their spent fuel as a commodity, but the transportation process is cumbersome and 
involves risks of accident or theft.  
The safety risk emanating from spent fuel is the long half-life of the 
radioactive waste. In the reprocessing plants to re-cycle spent fuel, a slow leakage 
could end in catastrophic consequences for the environment and people. The main 
issue is the absence of a final disposal of the reactor and reprocessed waste (the large 
cooling pools to store the fuel are interim measures). Storing the waste in deep 
geological repositories is the most suitable option. However, it has unresolved issues, 
such as finding a fully functional repository and whether the spent fuel and 
reprocessed waste can be stored equally efficiently in all sites. The United States, 
Finland and Sweden worked on finding a suitable repository.622 Looking at the issue 
from a developing country perspective, the outlook is grim considering their weak 
safety cultures and lax implementation of regulations. 
As much as the management of waste is a legitimate concern, it is not without 
a solution. Özemre suggests a sarcophagus instead of decommissioning the nuclear 
power plant. There are other methods, such as burying the waste under geological 
formations. The Yucca Mountain in Nevada was chosen as the nuclear waste 
repository by the United States, but these plans were deferred partly because of 
public opposition, and also for making use of the valuable portion of the spent fuel, 
                                               
622 “Nuclear Power’s Changing Future,” Press Release, IAEA, June 26, 2004, 
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2004/prn200405.html>. 
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considering that the price of uranium may increase. Another reason for countries to 
defer the final disposal is that the later waste is buried the less radioactive it will be 
and the less room it will require. Okan Zabunoğlu does not see a nuclear waste issue 
for Turkey. He assumes that even if all the electricity production were made through 
nuclear plants, that is, with around 23 plants in operation (each with 1,000 MWe), 
the waste generated for 20 years would not even fill an Olypmic pool.623  
 
 
8.1.4. “The share of nuclear power would not worth the investment. 
Renewables are enough to make up the gap.”  
 
This argument defines “cost” only materially, and not politically. The energy 
strategy criteria foresee as little dependency as possible, that is, diffusing the 
dependencies by diversifying resources, or choosing a resource that is national. The 
current basket of resources to produce electricity in Turkey includes coal (lignite), 
hydropower and natural gas. The Energy Ministry acknowledged that due to drought, 
the hydroelectricity could not reach the expected level.624 The lion’s share is with 
natural gas (47.3 %), then follow coal (20.7%) and hydro-power (18.2%).625 The 
percentage of Russian gas is around 60% and it is expected to increase in the coming 
decade.626 It creates an enormous dependence on natural gas as a resource, and is 
multiplied by the dependence on one country, which in turn has foreign policy 
implications. The repetitive crises in the coldest times of winter as Russia cuts the 
                                               
623 Interview with Okan Zabunoğlu, 2008. 
624 “Hidrolik (Hydraulic),” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, May 20, 
2009, 
<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=hidrolik&bn=232&hn=&nm=384&id=
40699>. 
625 “Elektrik (Electricity),” 2009. 
626 “Natural Gas Purchase Agreements,” BOTAŞ, (Date accessed: November 25, 2009), 
<http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp>. 
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flow of gas to Ukraine led Europe to seek for alternative measures or resources, like 
the Nabucco gas pipeline project.  
The ratio of renewables and their availability is a matter of question. 
Renewables have reliability issues, and the installed capacity will be incomparable to 
nuclear power. If 5% of the power supply is unfulfilled, it will remain as a shortage, 
and will exacerbate the dependency rate. In addition, one of the most popular 
arguments of the opponents is that “Turkey did not remain in the dark as the 
proponents argued in the past decades;” however, the increase in dependency on 
Russia and natural gas, and the high price of electricity are the prices paid by the 
industry and households to prevent “darkness.”  
Another important factor in defining the energy need is the distinction 
between the “base load,” that is, the minimum amount of energy demanded at a 
particular timeframe, versus the “peak load,” which is the amount over base load. 
The electricity network should contain the base load amount of electricity, which 
should be generated from reliable and continuous sources. In this case, fossil fuels 
and nuclear stand out. Renewables, on the other hand, are more suitable for meeting 
peak loads, because their continuity is dependent on geographic and climatic 
conditions. When the issue is the energy shortage in the base load, the criteria of 
selection should include continuity and reliability of the energy resource. 
 
8.1.5. “Thorium is abundant in Turkey and Turkey should wait for new 
generation Thorium-operated reactors.” 
 
The thorium in nature is Th-232, which is not fissile, hence does not qualify 
to be fuel. It becomes valuable when it is converted to U-233, a fissile isotope. Apart 
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from the three main types of nuclear reactors in operation-PWR (Pressurized Water 
Reactor), BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) and CANDU (Canadian Deuterium-
Uranium), there are reactors specifically designed for use of Thorium, however, they 
have not become commercial. O. Zabunoğlu argues that it is not wise to acquire 
nuclear technology through a reactor specifically designed for the use of Thorium. It 
is better to start with better established, standard reactor technologies, which is 
actually the first and important step in technology. He also advises caution on the 
exact amount of Thorium in Turkey, which should be verified by an analysis of the 
MTA on its grade and reserves.627 
 
 
8.1.6. “Nuclear power will not cease dependency, because Turkey will 
import fuel.” 
 
Nuclear fuel will be imported; however, dependency on nuclear fuel is 
different in nature from that on natural gas. A reactor is usually purchased with an 
accompanying contract for the supply of nuclear fuel, which can be stored in large 
amounts for a long period of time. Zabunoğlu points out to the fact that not all 
countries having nuclear power plants have the facilities to produce natural uranium 
and enrich it and fabricate it as nuclear fuel. Thus, he suggests cooperation and 
exchange between countries, because only few of them carry out these tasks to obtain 
fuel. Although Turkey is said to have uranium reserves enough for about a 2000 
MWe plant for 30 years, it does not have the technology for the production of fuel, or 
the establishment and operation of a nuclear power plant. In addition, he does not 
                                               
627 Interview with Okan Zabunoğlu, 2008. 
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suggest that Turkey acquire enrichment technology, because it does not plan to have 
sufficient number of reactors that would make enrichment economically feasible.628 
 
 
8.1.7. “Turkey does not have enough human resources for a nuclear 
industry.” 
 
Turkey has several nuclear science and engineering programs: Hacettepe 
University’s Department of Nuclear Engineering and the Institute of Nuclear 
Sciences, the Nuclear Energy Program of the Energy Institute of the İTÜ, the 
Nuclear Sciences Institute of Ege University, Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Ankara 
University, and the Department of Nuclear Medicine  Gazi University. There was 
also a nuclear energy track in the Middle East Technical University’s Mechanical 
Engineering Department, in its graduate program. Some graduates of he Department 
of Nuclear Engineering at Hacettepe University continued graduate study in the 
United States, worked in international organizations, or firms. Some of them returned 
to work in Turkish universities, TAEK, EÜAŞ and the private sector. Zabunoğlu 
argues that there is a significant potential for human resource although the number of 
qualified people for the time being is not sufficient. He suggests that with planning, 
the capacity could be increased for organizing this potential, such as raising 
specialists in selected areas, providing practical training, and such.629 
 
 
                                               
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 
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8.1.8. “The most developed and the most widely used nuclear power 
plant technology will be procured.” 630 
  
“The most developed technology” is the latest, that is, either not tested, or 
tested insufficiently, so they are not widely used. Insufficient tests involve several 
potential risks, and risk the country to be the testing ground. Therefore, “the widest 
technology” and “the most developed technology” are mutually exclusive, that is, 
they cannot be met at the same time. Thus, it would not suit Turkey’s conditions. 
“The most developed technology” is the Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling 
Water Reactors, which use enriched uranium. If Ankara insists in domestically 
enriching uranium for a few reactors on the basis of dependency issue, it may create 
international concerns such as those with Iran’s nuclear program.631  
 
 
8.1.9. “Nuclear Renaissance” 
 
“Nuclear renaissance” refers to a renewed interest in nuclear power to address 
both to climate change and to ensure energy security in the new century. Moeed 
Yusuf argues that the picture is not as bright as the optimists think.632 For the 
“renaissance” to become true, nuclear industry should be economically competitive 
compared to its main rivals, coal and natural gas, which dominate today’s electricity 
market. Wind and solar energy, on the other hand, are not likely to rival nuclear 
                                               
630 Akman, “Hilmi Güler: Nükleer santral, namus meselemiz (Hilmi Güler: Nuclear Power Plant is an 
issue of honor for us),” 2007. 
631 Iran’s nuclear program created international concerns since 2002. Iran refuses to halt its uranium 
enrichment program, and to ratify the Additional Protocol, thereby causing concerns on the 
transparency of Iran’s program. Its insistence to continue enrichment activities on the basis of energy 
shortage and to avoid dependency does not convince the international community. 
632 Yusuf, Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future? 2008. 
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energy. However, nuclear power does not seem to surpass coal and natural gas on the 
basis of economic criteria due to investment uncertainty caused by long construction 
periods and capital costs. Added to that are the low efficiency levels, higher 
operation and management costs, political uncertainty and policy reversals in 
developing countries. All these increase the risk of investment, and reduce investor 
motivation for the improvement of the nuclear sector to decrease those risks; hence 
turns into a chicken-and-egg problem. 
 Climate change is a strong factor pushing the demand for nuclear energy, 
which does not have greenhouse gas emissions. The overall CO2 emission of fossil 
fuel chains is around 20-60 times as much of the nuclear power generation 
process.633 However, mainly due to public opposition, Europe kept nuclear power out 
of the climate change agenda. The United States, even with a renewed interest, gave 
priority to renewables, efficiency, carbon capture and sequestration.634 Yusuf also 
cites the safety and waste issues that require high expenditures.635  
Proliferation is the most important concern about the spread of nuclear 
energy. The increase in the number of plants would require enriched uranium, hence 
more enrichment facilities. Considering the path going down to the weapon, and the 
experience with Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, which chose to have their own 
enrichment capacities, the renewed interest particularly in the developing world 
could become an impediment for the nuclear renaissance. The proposals to revise the 
provisions in the NPT that allow every country to pursue civilian nuclear technology 
are not practical. The option being pursued is to put the “suspect” states under 
                                               
633 “Nuclear Power and Climate Change,” Nuclear Energy Agency, 1997, p.11, available at: 
<http://www.nea.fr/ndd/climate/climate.pdf >; “Comparison of energy sources in terms of their full-
energy-chain emission factors of greenhouse gases, IAEA-TECDOC-892, Vienna: International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 1996. 
634 Yusuf, Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future?, 2008, pp.14, 15. 
635 See “Calendar of Nuclear Accidents and Events,” 2009. 
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enhanced safeguard inspections by the IAEA and deny privileges; however, this is 
against the spirit of the Treaty. What is more, it creates an “us versus them” 
dichotomy. Proposals to address the proliferation puzzle due to the diffusion of 
nuclear technology end up with the same dichotomy- this time as “haves versus 
have-nots” (such as the denial of the critical technologies to developing countries). 
This strategy also results in insecurity for the have-nots at the ideational level and 
adds further motivation for seeking nuclear-weapons capability.636 
 Yusuf cites public opinion regarding nuclear energy as quite a significant 
factor for the future of the industry particularly in terms of safety concerns. Safety 
and security concerns will continue to block a positive sentiment in the public. 
Particularly, in the new security environment, nuclear terrorism and proliferation are 
added to the agenda. The industry has been opaque towards the public, which expects 
more transparency,637 and that could add to the items of cost. It is mainly the 
developing countries which advocate nuclear power for energy security, because they 
need predictable and abundant supplies of energy. They find nuclear energy 
attractive compared to fossil fuels, because they can store fuel and find uranium in 
several parts of the world.638 Also, the cost of uranium is much less than fossil fuels 
in terms of production expenses. However, due to proliferation concerns, the reserves 
of uranium may not be readily available, and states may refrain from investing 
because of high establishment costs and investor averseness. On these grounds, 
Yusuf is convinced that “nuclear renaissance” has serious impediments and is hard to 
become a reality. 
 
                                               
636 Yusuf, Does Nuclear Energy Have a Future?, 2008, pp. 18-21. 
637 See Nuclear Power Joint Fact-Finding, Keystone, CO: The Keystone Center, June 2007, pp. 13, 
63, 64, available at: 
<http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdfFiles/rpt_KeystoneReportNuclearPowerJointFactFinding_2007.pdf >. 
638 See Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand, Paris: Nuclear Energy Agency, 2006. 
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8.2. The Multiple Facets of “Nuclear Decision-making”: Energy 
Policy, Science and Technology, Legal Process 
 
Nuclear energy is only one item in the broader issue of planning Turkey’s 
energy policy. Apart from the traditional variables (cost, reliability and availability), 
environment-friendliness and political priorities determine decision-making. 
Turkey’s EU accession process and Kyoto Protocol are two such examples. As a 
candidate country to the European Union, Turkey should plan its energy policy in 
accordance with the Union’s acquis, in principle. The EU Green Paper, “Doing More 
with Less”639 puts forward the political priorities of the Union. Considering that the 
EU is poor in fossil fuels, and meets domestic demand via imports, its priority is to 
ensure the safety and the reliability of the transit routes. In this context, it views 
Turkey as an important transit country. Furthermore, the EU is a leading actor for 
meeting the goals of the Kyoto Protocol; so it will expect Turkey to pursue an energy 
policy that will be compatible with the climate change targets.640  
The decision-making process for nuclear power generation involves complex 
strategic political and technical processes. The establishment, operation and 
management of power plants require strong political, legal and technical 
infrastructure. Politically, a country which pursues nuclear energy must convert plans 
into a state policy that will allow governments to plan, invest in and coordinate 
institutions on nuclear energy. It is extremely important to translate these efforts into 
law and to establish the legal infrastructure for supporting the subsequent steps. The 
                                               
639 Doing More with Less, Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, European Communities, 2005, 
<ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/doc/2005_06_green_paper_book_en.pdf>. 
640 Haluk Utku, “Enerji Güvenliğinde Eylemsizlik Prensibimiz: Nükleer Enerjiye Giriş (Our Principle 
of Inaction in Energy Security: Introduction to Nuclear Power),” Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi 
(Strategic Research Journal), Vol. 6, No. 2, December 2008, p. 2. 
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technical infrastructure is necessary to operate and develop nuclear technology. It is 
not entirely independent from the political processes, because the decision to raise 
technical personnel and establish relevant institutions is given at the governmental 
level. Implicit in this process is timing: A nuclear power decision cannot be sealed 
from an analysis of the legal and technical infrastructure in place and making up the 
gaps in these sectors.  
 
8.2.1. Legal infrastructure  
 
The legal aspect of the nuclear energy projects is one of the least discussed 
issues. There are international guidelines for states which consider and plan their first 
nuclear power plant. Experts on nuclear energy are critical of the domestic processes 
in terms of drafting the legal bases and procedures. This section will first present the 
IAEA guidelines, and then the views of the experts on the technical and legal bases 
of the establishment of nuclear power plants. 
 
 
8.2.1.1. International guidelines  
 
Technical documents of the IAEA are available for countries which will 
construct NPPs for the first time.641 In the preambles of these documents, it is 
emphasized that: 
 
                                               
641 Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear 
Energy Series, No. NG-G-3.1, Vienna: IAEA, 2007, available at: <http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1305_web.pdf>; IAEA TECDOC-1555, Managing the First 
Nuclear Power Plant Project, Vienna: IAEA, 2007, available at <http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1555_web.pdf>. 
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The decision by a Member State to embark on a nuclear program should be based 
upon a commitment to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, in a safe and secure 
manner. This commitment requires the establishment of a sustainable national 
infrastructure that provides governmental, legal, regulatory, managerial, 
technological, human and industrial support for the nuclear program throughout its 
life cycle. (…) The development and implementation of an appropriate 
infrastructure to support the successful introduction of nuclear power and its safe, 
secure, peaceful and efficient application is an issue of central concern, especially 
for countries that are considering and planning the first nuclear power plant. The 
infrastructure needed to support the implementation of a nuclear power plant covers 
a wide range, from the physical facilities and equipment associated with the delivery 
of the electricity, the transport of the material and supplies to the site, the site itself, 
and the facilities for handling the radioactive waste material, to the legal and 
regulatory framework within which all of the necessary activities are carried out, 
and the human and financial resources necessary to implement the required 
activities. (…) For a country with little-developed technical base, the 
implementation of the first nuclear power plant would, on average, take about 15 
years.642 (…) A wide range of legislation is expected to be in place in a State that 
has decided to implement nuclear power, the key elements of such legislation being 
nuclear safety, security, safeguards and liability for nuclear damage.643  
 
Member States are advised to adopt the following international instruments 
before beginning a nuclear power project include: 
 
-Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement pursuant to INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) 
-Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) 
-Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
-Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency 
-Convention on Nuclear Safety 
-Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive 
-Waste Management, reproduced in document INFCIRC/546 
-Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and Amendment 
-Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
-Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention, reproduced in document INFCIRC/402 
-Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage and Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
-Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision of Technical 
Assistance by the IAEA.644  
 
The IAEA TECDOC 1555 also stipulates the following measures for the 
proper operation of nuclear facilities to achieve the highest safety standards: 
 
-To control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material 
to the environment; 
                                               
642 Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, 2007, pp. 1, 2. 
643 IAEA TECDOC 1555, 2007 p. 2. 
644 Ibid, pp. 2, 3. 
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-To restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a 
nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source 
of radiation; 
-To mitigate the consequences of events if they were to occur. 
The fundamental safety objective applies to all nuclear facilities and activities and 
for all stages over the lifetime of a facility or radiation source, including planning, 
siting, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning and operation as well as 
decommissioning and closure. This includes the associated transport of radioactive 
material and management of radioactive waste. (…)...an effective nuclear 
infrastructure [should be] implemented in due time to ensure that the concerns of all 
stakeholders (and public especially) are being addressed adequately and that man 
and machine work together harmoniously to ensure safety…national efforts alone 
should not be considered sufficient and should be supported by the activities of 
variety of international organizations that cooperate to ensure an effective global 
nuclear safety regime.645 
 
Legal framework is one of the key safety elements for an effective nuclear 
infrastructure. It includes legislation which establishes “…an independent and 
competent regulatory body [and] a regulatory system that provides framework … 
within which construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities can 
proceed.”646 Other key elements are regulatory competence that refers to the ability 
of the regulator to oversee all stages of the nuclear power generation project, 
“…including site evaluation, design review, construction, operation, 
decommissioning and waste management.”647 Other elements are financial stability 
and capacity to acquire a plant and to fund operations, decommissioning and waste 
management; technical competence to organize adequate educational and training 
programs to raise skilled personnel; operator skills for appropriately maintaining 
facilities and development of safety culture; emergency preparedness at local, 
regional, national or international levels; and international connectivity with 
organizations in regimes of nuclear safety and operation.648 
 
 
                                               
645 Ibid, p. 3. 
646 Ibid, p. 4. 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid, pp. 4, 5. 
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8.2.1.2. Expert view on the legal and technical aspects of nuclear power 
generation 
 
Experts on nuclear energy criticized Law No. 5710 (on the establishment of 
nuclear power plants) and the accompanying TAEK criteria,649 because the rationales 
of the decision and the implementation of the policy were inconsistent. Academics 
argued that the sine qua non elements of the establishment process are missing. 
Under these conditions, national nuclear technology could not be developed.650  
Prof. Dr. Haluk Utku from the Hacettepe University observed that the 
involvement of both the public and private sector in financing with the way the 
                                               
649 TAEK provided its criteria in accordance with the Article 3 of the Law No. 5710 (The Law on the 
Establishment and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Energy Sales).  
1. Nuclear safety, up-to-date and proven technology. The design of the plant would be evaluated with 
respect to the measures taken to alleviate the radiological consequences of a “severe accident.” (The 
text uses “serious” with an inaccurate translation.) 
2. Licensing. Except for the conditions and necessities of the (construction) site, the nuclear power 
plant should be in accordance with the designer country’s current nuclear safety legislation in force. 
The reference NPP will be one that can be an example for the proposed NPP, thus it should be 
licensed, in operation and be the latest example of the technology to be proposed.  
3. Reactor type. Those types that will be considered for evaluation are heavy water reactors using 
natural uranium, pressurized water reactors and boiling light water reactors using enriched uranium. 
Therefore, reactors such as light water cooling graphite neutron moderated reactors, gas cooled 
reactors or fast breeder reactors) would not be taken into consideration.  
4. Reactor life should have at least 40 years.  
5. The reactor should be technologically tested. It includes second and third generation plants that 
have contemporary technological qualities and innovations.  
6. Fuel technology should be tested. Here, too, reactors are specified to use either natural uranium or 
enriched uranium. Also, those reactors using MOX fuel are possible. The law explicitly proposes for 
domestic production of fuel, but acknowledges that production will become economical as multiple 
units are established.  
7. Domestic contribution should be 60%.  
8. Operational experience of reactors which should be documented.  
9. Electrical output should be over 600 MW for each unit. 
See “Criteria to be met by investors who will construct and operate nuclear power plants,” TAEK, 
September 17, 2009, available at: 
<http://www.taek.gov.tr/belgeler-formlar/func-startdown/94/ >. 
650 They draw attention to the various technical errors, missing points and loopholes in the Law on the 
establishment of nuclear power plants. The law misses to include its “aim” of obtaining nuclear 
technology. TAEK prepared a short and insufficient document for the nuclear power generation plans. 
The questions still stand about financing and tender process. Source: Prof. Dr. Şarman Gençay’s 
speech preceding the Turkish Nuclear Energy Forum’s Press Briefing: Sayın Cumhurbaşkanına, 
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’ne, Hükümet’e, Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne ve Kamuoyu’na Açık Mektup, 
(The Open Letter to the President, Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Government, the 
Constitutional Court and the Public), Ankara: Türk Nükleer Enerji Forumu (the Turkish Nuclear 
Energy Forum), January 18, 2008. 
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government presented the issue would keep the costs high.651 As expenditures and 
costs increase, private firms would be discouraged from financing the project, and 
would ask for further guarantees from the host state. That would prolong the process. 
More importantly, the investment will have little funds for research and 
development, and that will render the NPP as an enterprise dependent on foreign 
sources. He underlined that one of the main pillars of research and development 
(R&D) was graduate studies in universities. The primary institution to provide 
financial resources to the projects on nuclear technology is TAEK. That is why, there 
must be linkage and cohesion with universities. The targeted dates did not conform 
to the science policy to raise skilled personnel on health physics and radiation safety. 
The only graduate program on health physics is at the Hacettepe University’s 
Institute of Nuclear Sciences, and it would be insufficient to meet that gap. Further, it 
would need equipment for training labs and additional academic personnel. He 
proposed more research assistant admissions, increase in funds for TAEK, and 
membership to organizations such as WANO (World Association of Nuclear 
Operators), that makes analyses of the reactors in operation and provides 
information.652 
Utku urged for a reliable electrical grid: Although NPP is a sound power 
generator, in the case of a shut-down because of an off-site power loss, the power 
plant itself needs significant amounts of energy. Particularly in winter and in peak 
hours, the frequency stability malfunctions will impose serious restrictions on the 
power plant. In those cases, the NPPs would need additional systems other than the 
ready-to-use emergency diesel generators. Such investments for safety should be 
                                               
651 See Haluk Utku, “Nükleer Santral İhalesine Neden Tek Bir Firma Katıldı? (Why Was There Only 
One Bidder Firm in The Nuclear Tender?” Zaman, October 20, 2008, 
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=751288&title=yorum-prof-dr-haluk-utku-nukleer-
santral-ihalesine-neden-tek-bir-firma-katildi&haberSayfa=1>. 
652 Haluk Utku’s letter to the TAEK Chairman, Okay Çakıroğlu, May 8, 2006. 
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taken into account, and even in the future training of control room operators, 
measures in times of scenarios involving network failure should be emphasized. 653   
Some 33 people who specialized in different branches of nuclear power came 
together under the “Turkish Nuclear Energy Forum” and issued an “Open Letter” to 
communicate their concerns with the Law No. 5710 and the TAEK criteria: They 
complained about several technical errors, deficiencies and loopholes. They also 
found the law too short to cover all the relevant points on nuclear power 
generation.654  
The late Ahmed Yüksel Özemre (former Chairman of the TAEK) criticized 
the inconsistent and vague points in the Law and statements of officials, because they 
could be contrary to Turkey’s interests.655 Özemre demanded clarification of the 
terms “firm,” “competition,” and “licensing.” He also argued that instead of 
decommissioning, the nuclear reactor should be covered in sarcophagus.656  
Nuclear power plant projects should be planned in detail, and the construction 
should be completed fast. Vural Altın, retired professor from Bosphorus University’s 
Nuclear Energy Engineering Department, and advisor to TAEK, acknowledged that 
the initial investment costs are higher and the period of construction is longer in 
NPPs; however, he also stated that the return of a nuclear power plant investment 
starts after a long period of an initial investment process. In the first five years of 
operation, the costs of depreciation are deducted from the income flow, which render 
                                               
653 Utku’s Letter to the TAEK Chairman, May 8, 2006, p. 2. 
654 The Open Letter, 2008. 
655 In his article “Yeni Nükleer Enerji Kanunu Türkiye’yi Nereye Götürür (Where Would the New 
Nuclear Energy Law Draw Turkey to)?” January 5, 2008, 
<http://www.ozemre.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=280&Itemid=57> , 
Özemre refers to Hilmi Güler’s statement on the “Turkish model of investment model” regarding 
nuclear power. See “Hilmi Güler: Nükleer Santral Namus Meselemiz…,” March 2, 2007 and Nuriye 
Akman, “Nükleer Santral Bizim İçin Tercih Değil Mecburiyet (Nuclear Power Plant is not a Choice 
but Necessity for us),” Zaman, March 22, 2007, 
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=516832 >.   
656 Özemre, “Yeni Nükleer Enerji Kanunu Türkiye’yi Nereye Götürür (Where Would the New 
Nuclear Energy Law Draw Turkey to)?,” 2008. 
245 
 
the cost of unit production high; but then it dramatically declines. Fora realistic 
assessment, one needs to consider “the cost of life cycle” that takes the entire project. 
This assessment is subject to the construction period and the “discount limit” (the 
maximum discount that the bidding firm can make). The second one is determined in 
the market, but the first one can be controlled. If the construction is completed in due 
time, the project would yield the targeted return.  
In the fifth article, the Law stipulated the creation of a National Radioactive 
Waste Fund (Ulusal Radyoaktif Atık Hesabı-URAH) to manage the waste, and an 
Account for De-Commissioning (İşletmeden Çıkarma Hesabı-İÇH) to meet the costs 
of dismantling at the end of the project life. However, the question is whether these 
funds will be enough since the decommissioning costs vary according to the nuclear 
power plant type. It is also unclear who or which fund will be used in case URAH 
becomes insufficient, because URAH will be a national fund, whereas the İÇH will 
be reserved for the power plant itself.657  
 
 
8.2.2. Technology and fuel 
 
 Another important element of nuclear power generation is the reactor 
type and fuel. It is important to choose a type whose feasibility is proven and the 
widely used one is the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).  
 
 
 
                                               
657 “Prof. Dr. Vural Altın Nükleer Enerji Yasası'nı yorumluyor (Prof. Dr. Vural Altın Assesses the 
Nuclear Energy Law),” Global Enerji (Global Energy), Vol. 40, December 2007, 
<http://www.globalenerji.com.tr/hab-23000202-114,40@2300.html>. 
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Table 1. Nuclear power plants in commercial operation658 
 
Reactor type Main 
Countries 
Number GWe Fuel Coolant Moderator 
Pressurized Water 
Reactor (PWR) 
US, France, 
Japan, Russia 
265 251.6 enriched 
UO2 
water water 
Boiling Water Reactor 
(BWR) 
US, Japan, 
Sweden 
94 86.4 enriched 
UO2 
water water 
Pressurized Heavy 
Water Reactor 
“CANDU” (PHWR) 
Canada 44 24.3 natural 
UO2 
heavy 
water 
heavy 
water 
Gas-cooled Reactor 
(AGR & Magnox) 
UK 18 10.8 natural U 
(metal), 
enriched 
UO2 
CO2 graphite 
Light Water Graphite 
Reactor (RBMK) 
Russia 12 12.3 enriched 
UO2 
water graphite 
Fast Neutron Reactor 
(FBR) 
Japan, France, 
Russia 
4 1.0 PuO2 and 
UO2 
liquid 
sodium 
none 
Other Russia 4 0.05 enriched 
UO2 
water graphite 
  TOTAL 441 386.5       
GWe = capacity in thousands of megawatts (gross) 
 
TAEK is the institution that will guide the development of nuclear 
technology. It should provide financial capabilities for procurement to the innovation 
firms in order for them to develop technology. Foreign firms can be encouraged to 
work with Turkish partners, and these projects can be linked with the IAEA project 
In Pro, which covers the development of the fourth generation nuclear power plants. 
With such a method, Turkey can acquire know-how.659 
The production of nuclear fuel is another challenging issue: For uranium 
enrichment, countries need IAEA’s cooperation. The providing firms may submit 
plans that would prolong the process until the construction of additional plants. Firms 
could accept the projects only upon the approval of their home countries. Second, 
Turkey should acquire the production capabilities regarding certain critical 
                                               
658 “Nuclear Power Reactors,” World Nuclear Association, April 2009, <http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf32.html>. 
659 Haluk Utku, “Nükleer Enerjide Eylemsizlik Prensibimiz (Our Principle of Inaction in Energy 
Security)…,” 2008, pp. 9, 10. 
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components which are heavy, voluminous and expensive. In terms of reactor safety, 
the nuclear electronic, measurement, control and instrumentation of the power plant 
should be in high standards. A center is necessary to test the electronic devices and 
circuits in the power plants which are under high radiation.660  
With respect to fuel, new techniques have been developed that allows 
CANDU and PWR technologies to work together, and that almost removes the 
potential for the development of nuclear weapons out of spent fuel.661 The scientific 
debates on the Th-U cycle regarding nuclear nonproliferation are not complete yet. 
However, in the future, the use of Th-U cycle may be proposed for High 
Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGR) since it will decrease the use of natural uranium. 
Another type of fuel called MOX (MixOxide) includes plutonium, and would 
contribute to the elimination of the plutonium produced for use in nuclear 
weapons.662 
Utku states that nuclear cooperation with Russia can turn into an economic 
advantage. He also urges Ankara to develop interest in the ITER (Thermonuclear 
Energy Project) which involves fusion technology, and expected to be operational 
beyond 2030. It was launched in France with the participation of France, Germany, 
Britain, the United States, Japan and Russia. If successful, commercial fusion 
reactors will be established which produce electricity in high amounts.663  
Haluk Utku states that when Turkey moves towards nuclear energy 
investments, it will be encouraged to receive fuel in the context of Global Nuclear 
                                               
660 Ibid, p. 10. 
661 Jeremy J. Whitlock, The Evolution of CANDU Fuel Cycles and Their Potential Contribution to 
World Peace” Paper Presented at “International Youth Nuclear Congress 2000,” Bratislava, Slovakia, 
April 9-14, 2000. 
662 Utku, “Nükleer Enerjide Eylemsizlik Prensibimiz (Our Principle of Inaction in Energy 
Security)…,” 2008, p. 6. 
663 Ibid, p. 11. 
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Energy Principles (GNEP). 664  The purpose of the GNEP is to obtain nuclear fuel out 
of a pool (which will probably be stationed in countries with uranium enrichment or 
reprocessing facilities) to ensure that other countries will not be producing nuclear 
fuel. This aims at maintaining price stability and preventing nuclear proliferation. 
However, since the NPT allows countries to develop nuclear technology for civilian 
purposes, foregoing from this right would be contrary to the Treaty, in principle. 
That’s why the phrase “voluntarily engage” is used in the GNEP Principles 
document:665 
  
States participating in this cooperation would not give up any rights, and voluntarily 
engage to share the effort and gain the benefits of economical, peaceful nuclear 
energy… [T]his cooperation will be pursued with [an objective of] establish[ing] 
international supply frameworks to enhance, reliable, cost-effective fuel services 
and supplies to the world market, providing options for generating nuclear energy 
and fostering development while reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation by 
creating a viable alternative to alternative acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle 
technologies.666 
 
 
 
8.3. Evaluation  
 
 
This piece analyzed the discourses and the missing points in meaning 
construction: It provided how nuclear energy acquired two competing meanings, and 
how subjects and objects are positioned. This chapter provided what missed from the 
debate. Selection of “relevant facts” and “reduction” in narratives constructed the 
meaning of nuclear power. 
The meaning of nuclear energy as “asset” and “threat” are constructed 
through two different narratives: The former establishes nuclear energy as an asset 
for state power on the basis of political, economic and environmental security along 
                                               
664 Ibid, pp. 4, 5. 
665 Ibid, p. 5. 
666 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Statement of Principles, September 16, 2007, pp. 1, 2, available 
at: <http://www.gneppartnership.org/docs/GNEP_SOP.pdf >. 
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with its value added to the status of the country among the community of nations. Its 
absence would have “unbearable consequences” not only for the economy but also 
for daily life. It is the “only” alternative that could both diversify the energy basket 
and diffuse the country’s dependency on imported resources and their providers. 
What Turkey needs is a secure energy base and stable prices that will boost 
economic growth, development and competitiveness of the country in international 
trade. Nuclear power generation is the best choice for energy policy. 
The dissenters’ narrative constructs nuclear energy as a “threat:” Nuclear 
power generation is dangerous for human health and the environment due to the “risk 
of radiation” during operation, leakages, “frequent” accidents, or waste disposal. 
Nuclear power plants carry “proliferation risk” and threaten the economy and 
agriculture. Turkey’s insufficient political and scientific bases exacerbate the level of 
the risk: The accident in Chernobyl is the proof that nuclear power plants are 
dangerous. Their meager contribution to power supply is incomparable to the threats 
and risks. Renewable energy resources like solar and wind, saving and efficient use 
of energy would substitute the contribution of nuclear power. The energy shortage 
estimates are flawed and exaggerated; thus, Turkey does not need to make huge 
investments for such a big project on energy.  
Supporters endorse a Realist view of state security (and international trade), 
and prefer an energy resource that will ensure energy independence, economic 
security and an environment that serves as a sustainable natural resource base for the 
economy. Their arguments are also influenced by the international norms of the 
pursuit of peaceful nuclear power. There are some individuals who also favor the 
military use of nuclear technology although they acknowledge that proliferation is 
indeed a threat to national security. They are worried that Ankara could be caught 
250 
 
“unprepared” by proliferation trends in the region. Regional security dilemma rules 
this argument.  
Economic growth is essential to bolster the military sector, and sustain the 
power base in general. The understanding that economic growth and development 
will ensure the survival of the state dominates the discourses of the proponents. 
Although energy policymakers uphold international cooperation, reducing 
dependency on foreign sources is still the primary goal in the determination of 
energy strategy. This is the Realpolitik view of international trade, which is based on 
the assumption that international relations is a zero-sum game. Accordingly, the state 
should avoid dependency and vulnerability in order to maintain its power. Nuclear 
energy is constructed as an instrument that would enhance state power not only in 
material terms, but also ideational: Turkey is assumed to be a developing or a 
“second-tier” country, and the procurement of nuclear technology is seen as an asset 
to confer status and augment its power. In this conception, the environment, human 
rights, public health, and the like, are secondary concerns.  
The proponents’ arguments are rather “home-made,” but those of the 
opposition are, for the most part, influenced by the international anti-nuclear or 
environmentalist discourse. These movements aim at putting pressure on 
governments on the basis of environmental protection and public health rather than 
other referents that relate to state power. They were influenced by the ideas such as 
“limits to growth” or “small is beautiful,” which lie at the basis of the 
environmentalist belief system. Different from environmentalism which accepts the 
system as a given, anti-nuclearism shares the worldview that favors the overthrow of 
the capitalist system. In general, environmentalists and anti-nuclearists prefer small-
scale energy projects to huge ones: In this context, nuclear power rests at the heart of 
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the consumption economy, while using renewables and saving energy are choices in 
“harmony with nature.” The arguments of the dissenters reveal that the capitalist 
system is based on “domination of the nature” for economic gain. So, they perceive 
nuclear power as the instrument to reinforce this system, and demand change by 
proposing energy resources that are in “harmony with nature.”  
The arguments of the dissenters suggest that they are borrowed extensively 
from the premises of Marxist, Critical and “Green” theories, which are not only 
“critical” of nuclear power but also of Realism. It is not the state, but the 
environment and the individual that should be protected from the negative impacts of 
further industrial growth. The demand for energy would not be high if the 
consumption-driven system was switched from the urban life-style to self-sufficient 
communities. The latter’s energy demand is substantially less. Nuclear power 
became a symbol for “mega” energy projects that reinforce the domination patterns 
in the world, be it political or economic. The findings out of the discursive analysis 
of the arguments promise positions for reconciliation to this “conflict” between the 
two views through the process of “critical engagement.” 
 
 
8.3.1. Common Grounds for Critical Engagement 
 
The domestic debate on the energy security policy of Turkey take place 
through two different belief systems in which nuclear power is perceived either as an 
asset to reinforce state power or an imminent threat to life. Their definition of the 
“need for energy,” safety concerns, impact on the economy and on the country’s 
image, the magnitude of facilities and referents of energy policy are different; so are 
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their prescriptions. In this context, it seems like a futile effort to expect reconciliation 
between the two positions since the latter is critical of the former not only at the 
practical level, but also at the theoretical level. At this point, the Constructivist 
insight that conflict can be eased through commonalities is relevant: Constructivism 
accepts that “reality” is a social construction, and ideas are sets of beliefs. Interaction 
of parties to a conflict is essential for mitigating the conflict. The above analysis 
provided the possibility for the mitigation of conflict on the basis of common points 
between these discourses. They can provide the opportunity to produce a sound 
policy on energy and nuclear power generation.  
Social relations within the modern state can take advantage of the process of 
“exchange” to reduce the tendency toward the extreme. 667  Z. Aydın observed that 
the state and the civil society showed the first signs of critical engagement regarding 
environmental protection and reconciling it with development goals.668 Critical 
engagement refers to the mutual recognition by the state and the NGOs of the other’s 
capabilities, and the understanding that the qualities of each party are necessary to 
address social and environmental problems.669 The government is one of the parties 
to the debate, and the opposition includes NGOs (environmental organizations and 
groups), as well as political parties, unions, chambers, and scientists. Power relations 
between the state and the civil society are unequal, so critical engagement involves 
cooperation and conflict when they discuss social and environmental issues. The aim 
is to prevent the conflict to get out of hand: If NGOs openly and strongly condemn 
state policies, they would put their power at risk to exert pressure on the state. On the 
other hand, if the state completely ignores the views of NGOs on environmental 
                                               
667 Infra, pp. 23, 24. 
668 Aydın, “The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism,” 2005, p. 60. 
669 Clark, “The State, Participation and the Voluntary Sector,” 1995; Bryant and Bailey, Third World 
Political Ecology, 1997; Fisher, Nongovernments, 1998. 
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issues, it may lose legitimacy. Critical engagement would help NGOs to influence 
policy-making, and help the state to show the public that it is receptive to their views 
and priorities.670  
Common grounds exist to prevent an “absolute war:” That is to say, 
interaction and “exchange” would prevent the government to lose legitimacy, and the 
civil society to lose the opportunity to communicate public concerns and fears. A 
promising feature of the Turkish state for a constructive dialogue is the commitment 
to the goal of Westernization/modernization, and the acquisition of a more liberal 
view of politics and economics after 1980. The state started to endorse liberal values 
as a result of integration with the global economy and progressing relations with the 
EU, because it perceived them as a milestone for Westernization. Westernization is a 
powerful propellant for the state towards reconciling the goals of economic growth 
and environmental protection, because it provides a margin of flexibility to include 
challenging items on the agenda for the sake of modernity. Economic growth is the 
main component of development politics that will push other tasks such as women’s 
liberalization and the development of fine arts (which are indicators of 
Westernization). It allows the introduction of new goals or the revisioning of existing 
ones. Consequently, environmental protection can well be included in the agenda of 
development.671  
In Turkey, environmental activism was not perceived as a challenge as long 
as it did not focus on issues that could impede economic growth. The priorities of the 
state and dominant classes regarding development have prevented them to receive 
the demands of environmental civil society organizations, as well as similar 
                                               
670 Aydın, “The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism,” 2005, p. 60. 
671 Adaman and Arsel, “Development and Democratization in an Era of Environmental Crisis,” 2005, 
pp. 293-298. 
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international movements with which the former forms alliances.672 The primary 
concern of the state regarding “critical engagement” with the NGOs and other civil 
society organizations was the consequences of such dialogue on developmental 
goals, and whether it would allow further demands that might jeopardize the state’s 
preferred development strategy.  
The views of the opposition fall in the “Critical realm” except the argument 
that “nuclear energy is disadvantageous for the economy and the state.” The 
opposition argues that the high costs of investment, operation, maintenance and 
decommissioning would adversely affect the economy. The mindset is the same with 
the proponents that growth and economic development are integral to enhance state 
power. The belief system that underlies anti-nuclearism is critical of the prevailing 
power relations and demands change for a more equitable distribution of global 
income. Environmentalism demands ecological sustainability in production patterns. 
“Sustainable development” is one of the common grounds between the two sides: 
Here, the environment is a referent of the economy, and costs incurred by the 
environment are taken into account in the development schemes, especially for 
developing countries. Thus, “economic growth and development” is the main ground 
that reconciliation can be pursued.  
Environmentalist position stands closer to liberalism than anti-nuclearism, 
and it provides a common “platform” for the state and environmentalists to engage in 
a dialogue. However, the dialogue between the state and environmentalists can 
address part of the conflict. The following section will list other common points with 
the state and anti-nuclearists, and will elaborate the points on modernity and 
economic growth. 
                                               
672 Aydın, “The State, Civil Society, and Environmentalism,” 2005, pp. 61, 66, 67. 
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8.3.2. Common Points in the Nuclear Debate 
 
The analysis of arguments in the nuclear energy debate revealed common 
concepts, categories or assumptions. The first is the discourse on modernity, which is 
understood as a process by which the state would attain the developmental goals. The 
proponents equate the concept with economic growth, development and the 
acquisition of advanced technology. In this sense, they argue that nuclear power will 
stimulate development. The opposition, too, upholds modernity, but its indicator is 
environment-consciousness or environment-friendliness. Therefore, the more a 
government adopts environmental-friendly policies, the more modern it is. There is 
prospect for reconciliation on environmentally-sustainable economic policies, which 
are more effective than the existing ones. Governments should also focus on the 
reconciliation of economic growth with environmental protection, and engage the 
Ministry of Environment more effectively and strengthen the criteria in 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports for enterprises. The common ground 
with environmentalists that was tackled in the previous section can be furthered with 
a perspective on modernity. 
The second common concept is economic growth. The proponents’ 
arguments associate the acquisition of nuclear technology with economic growth 
under the argument of “energy security.” Energy shortage is a serious problem for 
the current account balance, hence the gross domestic product. If energy prices fall, 
then Turkey’s competitiveness in international trade will rise. It will also increase the 
output for the domestic market, which will decrease input (such as interim goods) 
prices other than energy. The opposition is concerned about the adverse economic 
impacts of high spending for NPP construction, and other costs like insurance, 
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decommissioning, and so on… They argue that these costs will put pressure on the 
budget and disrupt the economy. 
Although they are the basis of environmentalism, the “small is beautiful” and 
“limits to growth” arguments are not common. The discourse of “economic growth 
and development” seem to have prevented these concepts to flourish in the domestic 
debate. Renewables are promoted primarily because they are “green” resources. In 
fact, the opponents argue that “renewables could substitute the contribution of 
nuclear power in total energy supply,” by which they demonstrate their concern for 
“energy security,” rather than the promotion of small-scale energy projects. 
Under “energy security,” there are several common points between the two 
sides. They both agree that dependency on suppliers of natural gas should be 
reduced, and the solution is diversification. Second, both are convinced that the use 
of fossil fuels should be avoided, because they are harmful to the environment: 
Dependency on suppliers, price fluctuations and international shocks make them 
unpredictable. Third, both sides would rather have an option that would guarantee a 
cut in the energy bill. It would mean that the unit price of electricity should be 
affordable compared to natural gas in industrial production and household heating. 
With the emphasis on dependency and economic security, the opponents take the 
determinants of state power as referents. Last but not least, climate change worries 
both sides, and they agree that energy policies should take environmental criteria into 
account to slow down or prevent global warming. 
Nuclear technology stimulates fear about proliferation. Both sides agree that 
nuclear proliferation threatens international peace and security.673 For the opponents, 
an additional concern is the impact on the environment that an accidental or intended 
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nuclear explosion (such as nuclear testing) might have. It is why nuclear power 
should not be pursued. While some supporters of nuclear power plants see them as a 
step and promote Ankara’s acquisition of nuclear capability, they initially refer to 
regional proliferation, and especially the possibility of a nuclear neighbor. They 
argue that in order to not to lose its strategic position, Turkey should acquire nuclear 
technology. The Turkish government is worried about Iran’s nuclear program and 
has been pursuing an active policy to address the problem with Iran’s uranium 
enrichment activities. However, it is true that this issue calls Turkey’s non-nuclear-
weapon status into question, and that Ankara does not exclude the possibility to 
acquire enrichment capabilities in the future.   
 Critical engagement can excel through the concepts of modernity, economic 
growth, development and energy security. Negotiations can then continue about 
transparency regarding safety and waste management. In the first set of rounds, 
environmental groups can be engaged more than anti-nuclear groups and Greens, 
who may be stiff on growth and renewable energy options. It also takes an effective 
public relations exercise that involves nuclear scientists, training programs and 
allocation of funds for joint programs with universities. The language used in public 
statements should refer to policymakers and the public alike to demonstrate that the 
process is transparent and all-encompassing instead of being limited to closed 
sessions.  
The outstanding issue that forms the bulwark between policymakers and the 
public is the safety concerns during and after the operation of the nuclear power 
plants. In this context, the primary concern is “radiation” by which the opponents 
refer to high-level radiation that could “leak” from NPPs during normal operation, by 
accidents or from “high-level waste.” Both sides agree that nuclear waste is highly 
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radioactive, and it should be managed; however opponents argue that as long as a 
final method of waste disposal is not found, nuclear power generation is a threat to 
life. The burden is on the state to relieve the worries about safety, particularly of 
local residents. Safety and waste management issues particularly require 
transparency and effective information sharing with the public. The liberal and 
democratic qualities of governments will be an asset at easing the public’s concerns.  
Democratic governance and transparency is exactly where local residents are 
particularly worried about because of the past record of the state regarding crisis 
management and prevention. Governmental agencies, most notably TAEK could 
inform the public about acceptable levels of radiation. Governments should give 
utmost attention to informing the public about safety measures, and it should be 
included as an item in the nuclear energy policy. 
Another shared conviction is that science is the objective source of 
knowledge and “truth.” Indeed, the science and technology discourse has been 
powerful to construct reality in the Turkish case. The process of critical engagement 
should also include the presentation of “actual facts” and should eliminate 
misinformation and disinformation in the broader nuclear energy debate. This would 
allow technical data sharing between the two sides during talks. Chapter VII 
provided scientific and technical explanations to remove the flaws in the arguments.  
The first round of talks was proposed to take place between the state and the 
civil society, more specifically environmentalists. In this round, the state should also 
aim at eliminating the “facts” that create disinformation on nuclear power. First, the 
risk of radiation through accidents, leakage or waste is amplified in the opposition’s 
discourse. Radiation is perceived as the source of environmental damage, and 
acquired the meaning “threat to life.” The level of radioactivity and the risk of 
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leakage as a result of accidents or waste disposal require clarification and technical 
explanations. Only after the information is corrected and effectively disseminated, 
the “threat perception” of nuclear power plants could recede. Yet, the memories of 
Chernobyl are revitalized with each cancer patient in the Black Sea region. So, the 
challenge is to overcome the psychological barrier of the locals. 
Second, the opposition questions whether nuclear power is actually 
necessary. The government and the civil society should agree on the status of energy 
shortage, and the policy options that would address the issue. For the opposition, 
existing resources, most notably renewables, saving/efficiency measures, and 
ameliorating transmission and unregistered use would substitute nuclear power’s 
share in total supply. The government should underline that the “myth” of 
eliminating “loss and theft” would not diminish the necessity of nuclear power. The 
opposition presents “theft” as if it is about making up the shortage of supply, and 
misses the point that it implies “unregistered users” who should be included in the 
demand estimates. The actual shortage cannot be met only by saving measures and 
addressing theft. Renewables are also presented as feasible substitutes. Here, the 
difference between base load and peak load is the key to understand the insufficiency 
of renewables for continuous and reliable power supply. 
  On the safety issue, the opposition argues that Turkey will procure old 
technology reactors. They can hear the explanation that proven and widely used 
technology excludes up-to-date technology, because new technologies cannot be 
tested enough. Also, thorium-operated reactors have not become commercial, yet. 
On the dependency question, the difference between natural gas and nuclear 
power requires clarification: Natural gas supply is vulnerable to abrupt disruptions, 
because it is fluid and transported via pipelines. Hence, it could become a political 
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instrument. Turkey could be affected by these disruptions although it may not be the 
subject of a political crisis (such as one between Russia and Ukraine). However, 
nuclear fuel can be stored for a long time and are purchased in large quantities. 
Therefore, dependency on fuel does not render the country vulnerable to political 
crises. Also, as nuclear power would provide diversification in resources, it will be 
diffusing dependency if not eliminating it altogether. 
 The most challenging issue in the talks is likely to be waste management. The 
opponents are mainly concerned about highly radioactive waste, and the absence of a 
final disposal method. Some of them are also worried about the plutonium in spent 
fuel that could be extracted to make nuclear weapons. The government should put 
forward convincing measures to answer how to manage “waste.” That is, it is 
important to understand whether the government will treat them as waste that should 
be disposed of, or would send them for reprocessing. It will remain as a question 
whether Turkey would insist on retaining its right to have the entire fuel cycle (so 
that it can acquire enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the future), or would 
agree on forgoing from this right and receiving fuel from an international pool.  
The legal infrastructure for the establishment of nuclear power plants and 
generation of electricity requires a detailed study that also involves scientists, 
lawyers, economists and foreign ministry officials as the issue has several aspects 
including science, technology, law, pricing, insurance and nuclear nonproliferation. 
They both agree that legal infrastructure and fine management are integral for energy 
policy, because both are sensitive towards safety of NPPs. The second round of talks 
could be devoted to the technical and legal processes. 
In this round, the government would be the audience while the experts on 
scientific and technical matters take the floor. Agreements, tender specifications or 
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legal documents may miss or be unclear about some points that could contradict with 
state interests. They could be prevented with the involvement of the scientific 
community in the policymaking processes. Chapter VII also provided their views 
with respect to framing of the legal and technical bases of nuclear power generation. 
They emphasized critical details during establishment, operation and 
decommissioning of nuclear power plants. The terms and concepts in the legal texts 
should be clarified to ensure that responsible institutions or firms would carry out 
their commitments. This is of vital importance, in case of inconveniencies that would 
affect local residents and the environment. The scientific community is in a position 
to ask the relevant questions to find answers and to integrate them into the legal 
framework. The present chapter showed that they detected several missing items 
including those specified in the IAEA guidelines, vague provisions that would be 
contrary to state interests or to those of the local residents. The involvement of the 
scientific community is important: They do not hold on to a certain political position, 
and would contribute to the making of a sound energy policy by correcting the 
mistakes, or inserting relevant information that are missing.  
 Regarding proliferation concerns, officials strongly emphasized that Turkey’s 
aim is only to generate nuclear power. The choice of the reactor type and fuel 
inevitably draws international scrutiny, because it is an indicator of a country’s 
intentions. Ankara has chosen the PWR, which uses enriched uranium. It is likely 
that fuel will be provided by the home country of the constructor firm. However, 
Turkey’s insistence on not endorsing the GNEP principles and its position that 
supports Iran’s “right to enrich uranium because it would consider doing the same in 
the future” would worry international actors for Ankara’s intentions. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study analyzed the competing discourses on nuclear energy in Turkey by 
looking at the different meanings of the concept which were promoted so as to affect 
energy security policy. As a growing economy, Turkey tries to meet its energy needs. 
In this context, nuclear energy was presented as “the solution” to the “problem” of 
energy shortage. On the other hand, beginning particularly from mid-1980s, these 
attempts faced the environmentalist and anti-nuclear challenge, which deemed that 
nuclear power generation is indeed the “problem,” and the “solution” to Turkey’s 
energy shortage should be sought in other alternatives, particularly renewable energy 
resources.  
The discourses of the policymakers showed how they constructed the 
meaning of nuclear energy as “power” or an “asset” for state security. Similarly, the 
dissertation revealed the meaning of nuclear power in the discourses of the 
opposition, and how they constructed “nuclear” as “the threat to life.” The analysis 
disclosed that the two discourses represent two distinct belief systems which rest in 
different practical and theoretical levels. This study also looked at power relations at 
the international and domestic level regarding the utilization of nuclear technology 
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for peaceful purposes. It showed that international norms and belief systems on 
nuclear nonproliferation, peaceful use of nuclear power, energy security, 
environmentalism and anti-nuclearism shaped the arguments. 
Chapter IV provided international power relations and norms with respect to 
nuclear nonproliferation, pursuit of peaceful nuclear power, energy security and 
environmentalist/anti-nuclearist position. It set the background for understanding 
what actors took as reference when constructing their arguments.  
Chapter VII revealed the inner meanings the actors assigned to concepts, like 
nuclear energy, security, radiation, and so on… It found that the referents of the 
proponents are the state, economy and the environment in terms of its input to the 
economic processes and the survival of the state. On the other hand, the opposition 
upheld environmental protection and human health. The dissertation found that the 
two competing discourses belong to two different practical and theoretical realms, 
that is, Realism and Green Political Theory which is influenced by Ecocentrism, 
Marxism and Critical Theory. The dissertation hypothesized that these two 
discourses can still be reconciled by the insights of Constructivism. Through the 
common points extracted out of discourse analysis, it provided common grounds for 
a “Critical Engagement” between the government and civil society. Otherwise, the 
“conflict” could go the “extreme” if the government turned a blind eye to the 
public’s concerns, and the civil society protested the government at the expense of 
losing the opportunity to influence the policy in the table.  
The narratives that construct a certain reality may ignore or select some data 
to produce or reproduce the meaning. Chapter VIII looked into the missing or 
misrepresented information in the debate that constructed the “reality” to the favor of 
one’s arguments. It also provided scientific and technical data with the help of expert 
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opinion. With the results of the analysis in Chapter VII, Chapter VIII assessed the 
debate and provided a roadmap for the process of critical engagement. It enlisted the 
common points for negotiation, and determined two essential concepts: Economic 
growth and environmental protection should be talked together, that is, they cannot 
be traded. Environmental groups and other actors of opposition should uphold 
economic growth, and the state should formulate development projects that take into 
account environmental protection.  
Second, the state has a tradition of flexibility towards goals that would further 
Turkey’s march for Westernization and modernization. After integration with global 
economy starting from 1980, the state started to pursue more liberal policies. If the 
opposition emphasized that environmental protection and sensitivity is a feature of 
modern societies, the state would be more willing and flexible to adopt policies in 
that regard. However, it is environmental groups rather than anti-nuclearists who are 
closer to liberal thinking. That is, they accept the current political and economic 
system and uphold the sustainability of the environment for that of the economy and 
state survival. On the other hand, Greens and anti-nuclearists take the ecology as 
their referent, and are against development projects that harm the environment. 
Therefore, the dissertation proposed that the first round of negotiations should start 
with the government and environmental groups instead of predominantly anti-
nuclearists. Yet, it pulled out other common points that could provide a fertile ground 
for negotiation between the state and anti-nuclearists. These are modernity, resource 
diversification to avoid dependency and reliance on fossil fuels, concern on climate 
change and environmental protection, safety and waste management, the primacy of 
science to attain “reality,” and appropriate energy planning. 
265 
 
Science and technology are significant to attain “objectivity” in the Turkish 
case. The second round of talks would host academics and experts on nuclear energy 
who would inform the government on the technical and legal aspects of nuclear 
power generation. Their input is integral not only for proper management, but also 
for correcting the mistakes that lead to a misrepresentation of issues, particularly 
those about safety. “Fear from radiation” underlies the opposition, and it takes an 
effective public relations effort to address safety concerns.  
The dissertation qualifies to challenge the Realist theory’s assumption for 
“neutral” national interest and its ignorance of decision-making processes. For, 
Realism argues that the state is a rational actor which seeks to maximize power, and 
national interest is defined in terms of power. However, it does not look at the 
different rationalities, ideational power, and how an issue becomes that of national 
interest. The analysis showed that Turkey’s national interest for generation of nuclear 
power to ensure energy security is not “objective,” but constructed. Similarly, it 
contributed to Constructivism by the constructed meanings of nuclear energy as an 
“asset” for state power or “threat” (to the state, economy, environment and the 
individual) at the same time. It can provide a case for conflict resolution studies 
regarding the reconciliation of two seemingly irreconcilable positions, on the basis of 
common grounds for mutual understanding and facilitating negotiation. Last but not 
least, the analysis of the debate on nuclear power in Turkey would contribute to the 
nonproliferation literature in assessing the domestic level dynamics for proliferation 
should Turkey start generating nuclear power. The distinction between nuclear-haves 
versus nuclear-have-nots in terms of technology is a recently developing one. The 
former are the advanced industrialized countries, while the latter are predominantly 
developing countries. The contribution of the dissertation will be twofold: First, the 
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debate on nuclear power generation will provide a case for the developing country 
problematique between development and sustainability on the making of its energy 
policy. Second, nuclear energy promises more than economic growth; it is perceived 
as a threshold for international standing. The proponents’ emphasis on gaining status 
through nuclear power generation would be an example of a “nuclear-have-not” 
within the new nuclear “North-South” debate.  
As far as the future course of policy is concerned, it is important to note that 
nuclear power decision should be taken within the broader framework of Turkey’s 
energy strategy. With the changing balances after the Cold War, and the growing 
demand, energy has become an item in the security agenda. Coupled with the aims of 
addressing climate change, states include environmental costs in their balance sheets, 
and energy issues cut across domestic, foreign and international agendas. On this 
basis, Ankara should carry out a concerted action with the Energy, Environment and 
Foreign Ministries to pursue a balanced power policy. Energy planning and 
particularly nuclear power projects require policies at state level instead of 
governmental, which are subject to change. They require a strong technical, 
personnel, economic, legal and political infrastructure to be conducted properly. 
Turkey does not seem to have devoted its resources to these goals, and unfortunately 
facing the dilemma of lagging behind or consuming resources inefficiently.  
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